CIVIL-MILITARY CHANGE IN CHINA:
ELITES, INSTITUTES, AND IDEAS
AFTER THE 16TH PARTY CONGRESS

CHAPTERS 4 THROUGH 6


PDF ORIGINAL DOCUMENT

Edited by
Andrew Scobell
Larry Wortzel
September 2004
Carlisle Barracks
Pennsylvania
U.S. War College
U.S.A.
September 19- 21, 2003
Sponsored by:
The American Enterprise Institute
The Heritage Foundation
The Army War College
Archives
Research Dept.
La Nueva Cuba
February 4, 2006

CONTENTS

Foreword

Ambassador James R. Lilley ............................................................................ v
1. Introduction
Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzel................................................................. 1
2. Party-Army Relations Since the 16th Party Congress:
The Battle of the gTwo Centersh?
James C. Mulvenon ....................................................................................... 11
3. Hu Jintao as Chinafs Emerging National Security Leader
Murray Scot Tanner ..................................................................................... 49
4. Chinafs Ruling Elite: The Politburo and Central Committee
Joseph Fewsmith ............................................................................................ 77
5. Premier Wen and Vice President Zeng: The gTwo Centersh
of Chinafs gFourth Generationh
John Tkacik .................................................................................................... 95
6. The 16th Party Congress and Leadership Changes in the PLA
Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise, Dean Cheng, and Ken Gause........................... 179
7. PLA Leadership in Chinafs Military Regions
Elizabeth Hague........................................................................................... 219
8. Predicting PLA Leader Promotions
Kenneth W. Allen and John F. Corbett, Jr................................................... 257
9. Agents of Infl uence: Assessing the Role of Chinese Foreign
Policy Research Organizations after the 16th Party Congress
Evan Medeiros ............................................................................................. 279
10. Demystifying Sha Shou Jian: Chinafs gAssassinfs Maceh Concept
Jason Bruzdzinski ........................................................................................ 309
11. The Future of PLA Modernization: Bumps and Boosters
Ellis Joffe ...................................................................................................... 365
12. About the Contributors............................................................................ 373

CHAPTER 3

HU JINTAO AS CHINAfS EMERGING
NATIONAL SECURITY LEADER

Murray Scot Tanner

INTRODUCTION

The end of Hu Jintaofs fi rst year as general secretary marks an
appropriate time to begin assessing what Chinese national security
policy under Hu Jintao will look like. The purpose of this chapter is
to assess Hufs emergence as a gnational security leader.h I will use
the term gnational securityh not in the narrower U.S. conception, but
conceived rather broadly, as the Chinese themselves do when they
use the term gguojia anquanh to include Hufs leadership not only
in foreign and military affairs, but also in internal security. More
specifi cally, this chapter focuses on several interrelated questions:
How well has Hu Jintao done in asserting himself as a policy leader
in national security affairs? How effective has he been in obtaining a
leading role in security-related policymaking\by gaining leadership
over the key organizations involved in security policymaking, or by
expanding the security-policy role of those organizations that he does
lead, or by attempting to use policy issues to strengthen his infl uence
in sectors where his organizational infl uence still lags? Finally, to
what extent has Hu attempted, and succeeded, in articulating his
own distinctive vision of Chinafs national security?

STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES TO HU JINTAOfS NATIONAL
SECURITY POWER BASE

Two major institutional issues shape the political context within
which Hu Jintao has come to power and help defi ne the powerful
challenges he faces as he tries to become a national security leader.
The fi rst of these concerns the structure of the leadership succession
struggle, while the second concerns the evolving pattern of civilmilitary
relations in China. Both present Hu with formidable
challenges.
50
As I have argued elsewhere, Hu Jintao came to power under
conditions of the gsuccessorfs dilemmah\a rational dilemma
of power building that bedevils all designated successors in all
authoritarian systems. The root of the gsuccessorfs dilemmah lies in
an assumption about the power of the top leader in authoritarian
systems; that this power is not\and cannot\be fully institutionalized
independent of the individual who holds it. Otherwise, these would
be gconstitutionalh rather than gauthoritarianh systems. Thus, the
personal power relations among the current leader, the designated
successor, and the other top leaders in the system become crucial.
Since Hu began his rise to power while his predecessor was still alive,
as long as Jiang Zemin retains a major share of informal political
power, Hu must struggle to keep Jiangfs trust and support for fear
that Jiang will feel threatened by Hufs rise and turn on him. But even
if Hu succeeds in winning Jiangfs support, Hu must work to secure
his power for after Jiang is gone by simultaneously building his own
sources of power that are ultimately independent of Jiang. In doing
so, however, Hu must be careful not to make his predecessor feel
threatened\something that even heavyweight political operators
like Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang failed to
do.
As successor, Hu can attempt to build his independent power
in many ways, most of which are not mutually exclusive. Most
obviously, Hu can pursue the traditional gcircular theoryh of a
Leninist general secretaryfs powerbase by striving to promote
his personal supporters and clients to the Politburo, the Central
Military Commission (CMC), the Central Committee, and the other
bodies that, in turn, help defi ne a general secretaryfs power. Second,
and relatedly, since power in the Chinese system is certainly not
entirely uninstitutionalized, Hu Jintao can seek the leadership of
key organs of power for himself and his allies, or conversely try to
expand the infl uence of the organs which he and his followers do
command. Third, Hu can attempt to take advantage of the political
issues and crises that arise in the system to assert his leadership and
try to demonstrate to his colleagues that he is gindispensableh as
a leader. Fourth, and relatedly, since Hu Jintao accedes to power
in a reforming Leninist system where the very nature of power is
51
undergoing gradual change, Hu can try to create new sources of
power that can persuade or compel his colleagues to embrace or at
least accept his leadership. In other reforming Leninist systems, the
most obvious\and most perilous\paths to creating new sources
of power have been through direct appeals to mass support, either
through informal populist appeals or through formal efforts to build
a plebiscitary or proto-democratic power base for the executive. But
since this last involves guessing both the direction and timing of
truly historic change, it requires remarkable political timing (and
no small amount of luck!). Thus, for every Boris Yeltsin or Eduard
Shevardnadze who successfully timed their leap from a Leninist
power base to an electoral one, the ground is strewn with dozens of
political corpses of those who\like Zhao Ziyang\made their mass
appeals too early and were crushed by the remaining power of the
old system\or those who\like Mikhail Gorbachev\waited too long
to transform their base of power from Leninism to electoralism and
found themselves rudely shut out of the new sources of power.
But the superfi cial smoothness of Hu Jintaofs accession to offi cial
power at the 16th Party Congress and the subsequent National
Peoplefs Congress (NPC) session has sparked a debate among our
best analysts of the Chinese leadership that raises the question
of whether the classic gsuccessorfs dilemmah has been rendered
obsolete by the gradual institutionalization of leadership politics. In
their widely read study, Chinafs New Rulers: The Secret Files, Andrew
Nathan and Bruce Gilley argue that the accession of Hu Jintao and the
new Politiburo Standing Committee marks the culmination of a 10-
year leadership selection, winnowing, and succession process begun
by Deng Xiaoping that gradually gathered so much institutional
momentum that Jiang Zemin\even if he had wanted to\was unable
to stop it, notwithstanding the fact that Deng has been dead since
1997.1 To be fair to Nathan and Gilley, they do not speak in terms of
the gsuccessorfs dilemmah I have discussed. But the implication of
their work is clear: Chinese leadership succession politics are now
suffi ciently institutionalized that even a powerful ex-leader like
Jiang Zemin lacks the informal infl uence to threaten his successor
after the successor holds the reins of formal institutional power\and
what informal power Jiang still holds will atrophy rapidly now that
52
he is no longer General Secretary or President. Thus, one half of the
danger the successor faces in his gdilemmah appears to be gone.
But Joseph Fewsmith and many other analysts are having none
of this characterization of institutionalization and the Hu succession.
These analysts may be willing to concede that Jiang was either
unwilling or unable to block Hufs path to the General Secretaryfs
position. But Jiang has succeeded in surrounding Hu with a Politburo
overwhelmingly stacked with Jiangfs clients, and almost devoid of
leaders who primarily owe their careers to Hu. Despite forecasts to
the contrary by those who see the system as more institutionalized,
Jiang has thus far clung to the chairmanship of the CMC. So effective
has Jiang been in caging Hu that Fewsmith labels the 16th Congress
gthe succession that didnft happen.h2
Hu Jintaofs second institutional challenge derives from
longstanding changes in Chinafs civil-military relations. The erosion
of what David Shambaugh has labelled the old ginterlocking
directorateh among Party and Peoplefs Liberation Army (PLA)
leaders has, in one sense, facilitated Hu Jintaofs rise, but will also
cause Hu problems as he tries to assert his leadership over the PLA
in the years to come. On the one hand, all reporting to date suggests
that, in contrast to all of his predecessors as the Chinese Communist
Partyfs (CCP) top leader, the PLA played virtually no role as
gkingmakerh in Hufs selection and promotion. The other side of this
equation is that Hu Jintao, like Jiang himself, has no experience as a
military leader, and therefore lacks the sort of ready-made support
base that earlier CCP leaders could count on.
While there is some disagreement among analysts about the
allegiances of a few members of the new Politburo and CMC, I am
more impressed by the evidence that Hu Jintao took over leadership
bodies far more dominated by Jiangfs followers than his own. But
for the narrower purposes of this chapter, the key point is that the
identifi able network of Hu Jintaofs associates who were promoted
are concentrated in Party and government sectors that are not related
to national security (e.g., propaganda, united front work, provincial
leadership).
Virtually all of the new civilian security leaders owe their
careers far more to Jiang and other leaders than to Hu. Luo Gan,
53
who has replaced Wei Jianxing as the Political Bureaufs Standing
Committee (PBSC) member in charge of political-legal (zhengfa)
affairs, has historically been associated with Li Peng. New Politburo
member and Minister of Public Security Zhou Wenkang emerged
from Chinafs northeastern petroleum sector, and at fi rst blush,
Zong Hairenfs claim that he owes his rise fi rst to the patronage
of Yu Qiuli and later of Zeng Qinghong and Jiang seems to fi t the
available career data. Minister of State Security Xu Yongyue was
also promoted under Jiang, not Hu, and according to some Hong
Kong and Taiwan press sources, owes his career more to the fact that
his father was a personal secretary to Chen Geng, one of the mythic
founding members of the Chinese Communist intelligence services.
Hufs infl uence within the PLA remains plagued by gunknownsh
and is diffi cult to assess. Based on previously available information,
I have argued elsewhere that it was diffi cult to identify even one
top-ranking PLA offi cer who probably owes his career more to
Hu than to Jiang. Recently, moreover, Jiang was reportedly able
to reassert the residual power over military personnel that some
forecast would wane by promoting ally Jia Tingfan within the CMC.
But there is still much we do not know about Hufs military support
network, for example, which offi cers Hu Jintao worked most closely
with when he chaired the politically sensitive drive to get the PLA
out of business. Moreover, the network of senior offi cers with whom
he enjoys good relations may be a bit better than I (and others)
originally assessed. One of the key gunknownsh here seems to be the
state of Hufs relationship with former Chief of General Staff (COGS)
Fu Quanyou. The ties between the two men go back at least a decade
and a half, to when Fu commanded the Chengdu Military Region
(MR) and Hu was Tibetan Party Secretary during the diffi cult days of
the suppression of the 1989 Tibetan uprising. Among Fufs numerous
subordinates who received senior promotions last year, many
reportedly served in Tibet during the suppression, including CMC
Vice Chairman Guo Boxiong and General Logistics Department
Chief Liao Xilong. Thus, if Hu enjoys Fu Quanyoufs active support,
he may after all have the beginnings of a ready-made PLA infl uence
network. But assuming an alliance from past leadership ties is risky.
And it has also been reported that that Fu Quanyou was one of the
54
senior military leaders who suggested that Jiang Zemin should
continue in his current post.3 Thus the relationship between Hu and
Fu, about which we know little, must still rank very high on our
leadership politics research agenda.
Hufs lack of an impressive personnel base coming out of
the Congress has shaped and limited his strategic options for
establishing himself as a national security leader. His approach to
the internationally-oriented aspects of national security have been
far more cautious than his policies on domestic security-related
issues. As this chapter will argue, Hu has worked with care to
expand the national security impact of those decisionmaking bodies
where he is strongest, in particular laying down markers that the
Politburo could become a greater actor in military issues. Relatedly,
Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao have also tried to manipulate key issues
to strengthen his authority among the leadership. There has been a
strong populist fl avor to this strategy (the severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) crisis and the crackdown on law enforcement
abuses, both discussed below, are the clearest examples).
Despite widespread press rumors of backstage disagreements
between Hu and Jiang, however, the available evidence suggests
Hu has tried to maintain a solid relationship with Jiang\remaining
publicly deferential and respectful (though far less obsequious
than in recent years). Jiang, for his part, has mostly reciprocated by
assuming a lower profi le. But this does not mean Hu has refrained
entirely from policy disagreements with Jiang and Jiangfs allies.
Hu has not picked many issue battles in his fi rst year, and he has
picked them very carefully for maximum political effect. As I will
try to demonstrate below, on most foreign policy, military affairs,
and internal security issues, Hu has remained scrupulously gon
messageh during his fi rst year, and embraced policy lines wellestablished
by his colleagues in recent years. There have been a few
noteworthy exceptions\regarding SARS and the Korean issue, for
example\and Hu apparently fl irted with a more institutionalist
response to Chinafs growing crisis of internal stability, though he
was ultimately forced to back down for the time being.
For the most part, however, Hufs strategy has been to embrace
existing policy lines while taking over leadership of several key
policymaking bodies,4 and cautiously reasserting the role of his
55
Politburo in military affairs\raising for some the spectre of gtwo
centersh in military leadership. Hu has also emphasized and
insisted upon the use of formal rather than informal avenues of
power, apparently trying to dilute Jiangfs remaining infl uence by
decreasing the number of arenas in which he can exercise it. The most
prominent example was Hufs reported decision to end the annual
leadership summer confab in Beidaihe\historically one of the key
venues through which retired elders exercised great infl uence over
key leadership personnel and policy decisions.5
Also, while such things are virtually impossible to measure
reliably, Hu seems to have used his command of political issues to
strengthen his personal popularity among the broader Party elite
and general citizenry. To his advantage, Hu seems to have enjoyed
greater popularity within the broader Party elite than within his
own Politburo. Since the mid-1980s, one useful measure of such
support has been the vote totals leaders received for state positions
at the quinquennial National Peoplefs Congress (NPC) session. Hu
received a notably higher vote for President at the NPC session than
Jiang Zemin did for reelection to the State Military Commission
chairmanship, and indeed, some delegates even wrote in Hufs name
for the latter post. Hufs putative rival, Zeng Qinghong, received
something of an electoral raspberry from the assembled NPC
delegates.
Hu effectively built on that popular base with a series of
seemingly low-risk efforts to portray himself as a clean leader close
to the people. Most prominent\and most bold\was of course his
highly public engagement of the SARS crisis, including potentially
risky visits with Wen Jiabao to supervise anti-SARS operations
gat the front.h Hu also gave major addresses on surefi re populist
themes\pledging to strengthen grule by lawh and calling for an end
to corruption and a return to plain living by Party offi cials. While
these speeches were all notably short on specifi c policy proposals,
they helped buttress Hufs image.6
I will argue at the end of this chapter, however, that some of
Hufs efforts to strengthen his mass support by portraying himself as
a responsive, populist, clean government reformer are riskier than
they might fi rst appear. As a national security leader who has not
yet come to grips with how he wants to respond to growing protest
56
and unrest in Chinese society, Hu must be cautious not to create
unrealistic images of himself and expectations among disgruntled
groups in Chinese society.

RELATIONS WITH JIANG

Except for the SARS case (see below), Hufs desire to maintain
strong positive relations with Jiang has caused him to show his
predecessor deference, but hardly obsequiousness. An excellent
example was Hufs July 1 speech on the Party, which affi rmed
Jiangfs contributions, but can hardly be described as effusive
personal praise. Hu began by lauding the theory of gThe Three
Representationsh as gone of the three great theoretical products of
the Chinese Communist Partyh in its historical effort to integrate
communist theory with Chinese reality\placing Jiangfs pet theory
in the pantheon alongside Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping
Theory.7 But in crediting Jiang and his contributions by name, Hu
described him merely as gthe main representative, along with
contemporary Chinese Communistsh in building this theoretical
decision. Likewise in his March 11 major speech on Taiwan, Hu
gave extensive credit for strong leadership to the third generation
leadership with Jiang as core\again crediting him as leader, but
within a collective context.

EMERGING FOREIGN POLICY VIEWS

Less Victimhood.

Reflecting a broader trend that predates his presidency, Hu
Jintao has largely resisted portraying China as a victim on the world
stage.8 For some, this may represent something of a surprise. Before
his accession, Hufs most famous foray into foreign policy was his
speech giving Chinafs offi cial response to the U.S.fs bombing of
the Belgrade embassy.9 More than one analyst, drawing upon this
speech, anticipated a prickly nationalism to Chinese foreign policy
under Hu. Since his election to General Secretary last November, Hu
has not even mentioned the Belgrade bombing once in public.10
57

Taiwan

Hu Jintaofs fi rst year in offi ce, particularly the latter months,
was of course marked by gradually increasing tension in crossstraits
relations, which tested the entire leadershipfs willingness to
maintain its low-key patient approach. In his early meetings with
senior U.S. offi cials from President Bush, Secretary Powell, and
Senator Frist to former President Carter, Hu has reportedly been
restrained, meticulously gon message,h and even formulaic about
Taiwan\typically noting Chinafs gappreciationh of U.S. repeated
assurances that it will adhere to the one-China policy, abide by
the three joint communiques, and oppose Taiwan independence.
Hu invariably asks each to avoid sending the wrong signals to
independence advocates, and play a constructive role in peaceful
reunifi cation.11
Hufs real coming out party on Taiwan was his March 11 speech
to the Taiwan delegation at the NPC.12 The very fact that Hu got
to deliver the speech is probably more important than its content.
Beijing offi cials had already signaled that there would be continuity
in Taiwan policy after Jiang stepped down,13 and Hufs remarks
reaffi rmed recent policy statements. Hufs speech was offi cially
billed as gimportanth by a spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Offi ce.
Coupled with Hufs meeting with President Bush and the lack of any
public statements on Taiwan by Jiang since his 16th Congress report,
the speech clearly marked Hu as the authoritative face of Chinese
foreign policy, especially Taiwan policy.14
Hufs speech hit all the major points, calling for steadfastly
upholding the basic principles of peaceful reunifi cation, gone
country two systemsh as well as Jiangfs 8-point proposal. Hu put
great stress on economic and cultural exchanges and personal visits,
and vigorously promoting the direct three links across the straits. He
held out to the Taiwan people an offer of strengthening protections
for them and their investments on the mainland.15 Hu repeatedly
invoked the importance of reunifi cation through peaceful means,
and generally characterized the cross-straits situation as positive
and progressive. Hu gave no indication of desperation or a belief
that time is on the side of independence.
Hufs speech was largely upbeat and assured. His remarks
58
greatly elaborated on Jiangfs much briefer comments on Taiwan
at the 16th Party Congress, and he refl ected the general confi dence
of those remarks.16 Hu characterized the current situation as one
in which the number of Taiwanese who support reunifi cation is
expanding\a gwin-winh situation for both sides. Hu also expressed
a fi rm belief that with their efforts, the Taiwan situation could be
resolved at an early date. Hufs speech was strong on carrots, with
little or no reference to sticks. With no sign of desperation, Hu
stated a strong belief that time was on the side of reunifi cation.
Certainly Hu was addressing multiple audiences\trying at one
time to talk past or disarm independence sympathizers, strengthen
the hand of Taiwanese who are more receptive to a deal, reassure
U.S. authorities about Chinafs intentions, and provide little public
intellectual justifi cation for Peoplefs Republic of China (PRC) leaders
who might argue that more forceful tactics to pressure Taiwan are
necessary or justifi ed at present.17
Hufs disciplined quality of staying on message and refusing
to rise to the bait of provocative statements coming out of Taiwan
makes it virtually impossible to discern any personal impact he may
have on the shaping of Taiwan policy. Still, despite offi cial assertions
that Taiwan policy would not change under Hu, at least some Taiwan
analysts claim to see signs that Hu may handle Taiwan issues with
greater deftness and fl exibility, particularly after he has established
his power. According to Andrew Yang of the Chinese Council of
Advanced Policy Studies (CCAPS), after China initially embarrassed
itself by petulantly opposing World Health Organization (WHO)
observer status for Taiwan during the SARS crisis, Chinese offi cials
changed their behavior at the Kuala Lumpur conference. They were
gquite low-profi le in . . . its approach to Taiwanfs representatives . . .
[and] did not emphasize that Taiwan is part of China . . . [and were]
. . . very approachable in terms of communication with the Taipei
representative.h18 Yang reportedly sees Hufs infl uence in this change
of style.
Sino-U.S. Relations.
Some analysts also hypothesize an emerging security debate
between Jiang and Hu over how to deal with the United States, with
59
advisors to Hu arguing that China has put too much emphasis on
maintaining good relations with the United States, even to the point
of paralyzing itself in dealing with Third World countries or the
Iraq war.19 These authors contend that Hu Jintao is concerned about
appearing weak, and may move to be a bit tougher on the United
States than Jiang Zemin has been. As part of this line, these analysts
expect Hu to push for an even stronger relationship with Russia
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) countries as a
counterbalance to the United States, particularly in Central Asia.
Whatever Hu may be thinking privately, his public remarks on
Sino-U.S. and Sino-Russia relations have not validated this view.
During his trip to Russia, Hufs comments on the U.S. war on Iraq,
though critical, were indirect and low-key. Hu rarely mentioned
the United States publicly by name, and insisted that the war
cannot change the emerging multipolar global architecture.20
Hufs remarks on relations with Russia were similarly generic and
mainstream, seeming to betray no special urgency about deepening
the relationship.21
North Korea.
Hufs most surprising\and apparently personal\foreign policy
departure has been his activism on the Korean issue, in which he
has shown strong personal engagement as an intermediary between
the United States and North Korea,22 as well as a willingness to use
Chinafs economic leverage to pressure North Korea. Symbolizing
a major evolution in Chinafs policy, Hu has resisted becoming
paralyzed by the prospect of a North Korean rebuff to its efforts, or
by the very real prospect of an even greater refugee problem on the
border of Chinafs depressed and unstable Northeast.
Publicly, Hu has shown Chinafs strong interest in the
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and perhaps a slightly
more equivocal commitment to the security of the Democratic
Peoplefs Republic of Korea (DPRK).23 In his May Interfax interview,
for example, he noted that China and Russia are gfriendly neighbors
of the Korean peninsulah (emphasis added) with no particular
reaffi rmation of the DPRK per se. He noted much more clearly that
China stands gfor the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and
60
we are against either side . . . developing or possessing nuclear weapons,h
while stating much less defi nitively Chinafs belief that gthe concerns
of the DPRK for its own security must receive proper consideration.h24
While we cannot say what role Hu may have played in some
of Chinafs stronger actions, such as the reported 3-day cutoff of oil
to the DPRK or the recent substitution of regular PLA for Peoplefs
Action Party (PAP) forces on Chinafs Korean border, Hufs personal
initiatives have apparently been very important in arranging talks
with the DPRK. On July 12, 2003, Hu dispatched Dai Bingguo to
deliver a letter to Kim, urging the necessity of talks. The exact
contents of the letter have not been released. But according to an
article by Zong Hairen, Hu personally made three promises to
Kim: that gChina is willing to help resolve this crisis, mediate, and
facilitate negotiation with the greatest sincerity; China is willing to
offer the DPRK greater economic aid than in previous years (without
mentioning specifi c numbers); and China will resolutely persuade the
United States to make a promise of nonaggression against the DPRK,
in exchange for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.h25

GROWING INVOLVEMENT IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

As with Taiwan affairs and Korea, Hufs approach to military
issues provides an example of his strategy of embracing wellaccepted
policies while trying to establish his authoritative position
as a national security leader. In May Hu hosted a policy study session
for the Politburo on military modernization and gave the opening
speech. According to Nanfang Zhoumo, Hufs speech emphasized
the need for gdeveloping by leaps and bounds . . . national defense
and military modernization on the basis of the development of the
national economy and science and technological progress.h26 Hu was
followed by presentations from military researchers Qian Haihao and
Fu Liqun. The seminar reportedly stressed two particular aspects of
the new transformation in military affairs. First, with the end of the
cold war and bipolarity, the prospect for the outbreak of world war
has greatly diminished, but smaller scale wars persist, sometimes on
the rise, sometimes on the decline. So the military system designed
to deal with a large war must be readjusted to fi t the new situation
of numerous smaller wars. The second is the rise of advanced new
61
technologies, with information technology as the core, which dictate
the need for readjustments in construction, size, and structure
of the armed forces.27 Hufs comments are in keeping with a long
series of recent authoritative CCP and Defense documents calling
for increased coordination of military and nonmilitary science and
technology to accelerate defense modernization. This development,
however, is to be conditioned by and promoted on the basis of the
Chinafs continued overall economic development.
The South China Morning Post characterized the meeting and
Hufs speech as an effort to encroach on Jiangfs territory, even
though several analysts agree that Hufs speech did not contradict
Jiangfs military policy.28 Whether one characterizes it as cautious
encroachment, creating gtwo centers,h or a completely defensible
assertion of prerogatives by the Partyfs top body, Hu was clearly
asserting cautiously his authority as Party chief to involve himself in
military policy. At a minimum, by arranging a small dose of military
education for the Politburo, Hu seemed to serve notice that under
his leadership the Politburo would not merely be an gagenda takerh
on military issues.
Nor was this Hufs only effort to involve himself in military
issues during the year. Later Hu effectively used the SARS crisis to
press the military for greater transparency about the cases in their
hospitals. The South China Morning Post article also charges that it
was Hu who promoted publication of information on the accident
aboard a Chinese Ming-class submarine in which all souls aboard
were lost. This last allegation cannot be confi rmed, however, and
must be treated with some skepticism.29

EMERGING INTERNAL SECURITY VIEWS: HOW TO
HANDLE RISING UNREST

Hu Jintao comes to power as Chinafs internal security specialists
are engaged in a major debate over how to handle social unrest,
sparked by the terrifi c increase in mass protests since the early
1990s. In their efforts to better understand the roots of rising
protest, many senior police offi cials and analysts have increasingly
discarded the conspiracy-based explanations of unrest that were
offi cially imposed after Tiananmen. In their place, most offi cial
62
analyses are now debating competing explanations of unrest and
the implications that these competing explanations have for the
best way of handling unrest. In particular, debate has centered on
how much China should rely on coercion, economic buyoffs, or
more fundamental political concessions in dealing with protestors.
Many are attracted to theories explaining unrest almost solely
as the result of shifting economic interest and suggesting that if
China can keep a lid on long enough, it can eventually goutgrowh
the problem. But growing numbers of analysts contend that such
economic theories are inadequate, and rising unrest refl ects either
a permanent shift toward a more assertive mass political culture, or
is the result of fundamental failures in Chinafs political and legal
institutions to rein-in corruption and abuses by cadres. These latter
two explanations suggest that much bolder and more far-reaching
political and institutional reforms will be necessary if China is to
successfully handle unrest.30
As Hu establishes himself in offi ce, his emerging understanding
of the origins of, and optimal strategies for, dealing with unrest
will likely have a major impact on how the leadership responds
to unrest\in particular, whether or not China considers more
fundamental reforms in political institutions. If Hufs views become
at odds with Jiang and other senior leaders, it could also be a major
source of leadership disagreement.

Jiang Zemin on Handling Unrest.

Jiang Zeminfs thinking on the origins of unrest (gcontradictions
among the peopleh and gmass incidentsh) and the proper
strategies for handling it seems to be a mixture of rather traditional
conspiratorialism, mixed with a strong streak of economism, and
simple moral appeals to errant local cadres. Innumerable times he
has reminded listeners that gin the course of reform, opening up,
and the development of the socialist market economy, contradictions
among the people are obviously increasing.h These tensions are
exacerbated by abuses, mishandling, and corruption by local cadres.
But Jiang also frequently reminds Party and security offi cials to be
vigilant against a wide array of unspecifi ed genemy forcesh (didui
shili) who lie poised to take advantage of these tensions (and turn
them into gantagonistic contradictionsh).
63
Absent from Jiangfs thinking about unrest seems to be any
deeper institutional or cultural analysis. He typically has called
on local cadres to mend their ways, become closer to the people,
and take concrete steps to ease popular anger. But despite voicing
these criticisms for a decades, Jiang usually seems to stop just short
of drawing the (seemingly obvious) policy conclusion that without
signifi cant political institutional reforms, China cannot establish
a self-sustaining system to impose accountability on the Party
cadres who are angering the people. Nor can it establish adequate
institutional channels for aggrieved citizens to voice their complaints
peacefully. As a matter of strategy, Jiang seems to believe that
through a mixture of strong selective repression of dissident protest
leaders and periodic high profi le crackdowns on selected corrupt
offi cials, the CCP can muddle through\keeping unrest manageable
until China reaches a high-enough level of economic growth to cure
what he believes is the true root cause of most unrest. Indeed Jiangfs
mostly economist views seem to describe the post-Tiananmen
mainstream analysis of unrest.

Hu Jintao: New Departures?

To date Hu Jintaofs offi cial pronouncements primarily show an
embrace of this mainstream viewpoint, tinged with a few intriguing
hints of bolder thinking about how China should confront its
growing problem of unrest. But many have looked to Hu rather
expectantly for bolder ideas, and a number of unconfi rmable Hong
Kong sources report a much wider gap separates Hu and Jiang on
these issues.
Few CCP leaders come to power with more direct experience
in dealing with unrest, and Hufs pre-2002 record is littered with
interesting and contradictory hints about his thinking on the
problem. The pivotal incident, of course, came in 1989 when Hu
was the front-line leader in suppressing the Tibetan uprising.
Unfortunately, Western experts still know virtually nothing about
Hufs personal role in the decisionmaking process leading up to
the suppression. The scant available public evidence shows no
hesitation on the young Party secretaryfs part in leading martial law
locally. Hu gave a number of fi rm, decisive speeches supporting the
64
repressive actions at the time,31 and I have encountered no evidence
published since then to suggest that Hu regretted or felt forced to
take these actions.
Nevertheless, it is diffi cult to infer Hufs contemporary attitudes
toward suppressing protest from 1989 Tibet\Hu is now general
secretary, not Chinafs most junior provincial secretary, and Chinese
leaders have, in any case, long been quicker to use force against
protests in minority regions than in the Han heartland. More recent
press reports, based on conversations with Hufs advisors and his
responses to the protests after the Belgrade embassy bombing,
suggest Hu will be more willing to tolerate social unrest and protest
as a gsafety valve,h or attempt to turn such unrest to the CCPfs
benefi t.32
In recent years, Hu has often invoked Deng Xiaopingfs
conservative dictum that gStability is of overriding importance.
Without a stable environment we can accomplish nothing, and may
even lose what we have gained. This is a major principle for running
the country, which overrules many minor principles.h33
While quoting Deng, however, Hu has also suggested a
tantalizing willingness to consider more sophisticated approaches
toward social control and stability. He has argued that the leadership
needed to gkeep a cool head . . . and enhance its political fl air and acuity
in handling contradictions among the people . . . particularly ones that
emerge as a result of economic development.h34
Hufs July 1 Speech.
As a step forward in Hufs development as a national security
leader, Hufs heavily anticipated July 1 speech on the state of the party
provided the ideal opportunity for Hu to explicate the intellectual
roots and justifi cation of his own internal security strategy and how
he will handle gcontradictions among the people.h The annual July
1 gstate of the Partyh speech represents the ideal venue for laying
out an explanation of the growing sources of tension and unrest
in Chinese society\tracing their roots to the spin-offs of economic
growth, cultural change, institutional failure, enemy instigation, or
so on. Such an interpretation would logically be followed by the
65
general secretaryfs vision of the Partyfs proper role in dealing with
social tension, plus a series of specifi c policies for managing confl ict,
deterring or containing unrest, and reaffi rming the Partyfs leading
place in society.
In the weeks running up to Hufs July 1 speech, it was widely
reported that Hu would take advantage of his faster-than-expected
consolidation of power to put forward a major institutional critique
of Party-society relations, and fl oat a number of trial proposals for
intra-Party and constitutional reforms. So many different Beijingbased
correspondents reported these rumors that one strongly
suspects they were more than just smoke.35 Some cite an article
in Qiushi as setting the stage by arguing that the collapse of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics demonstrated that the failure
to reform the political system was as much of a dead end as the
failure to reform and develop the economy. Among the reforms Hu
was rumored to be considering were expanding experiments with
competitive elections for some Party posts, revising the constitution
to give greater protection to private property, loosening control
over mass media to encourage their active supervision of politicians
(including authorizing greater foreign investment), strengthening
the autonomy of the democratic parties (for example, by no longer
having CCP members serve on their leadership bodies), and
perhaps considering means to permit dissidents self-exiled after
1989 to return home to live and work without punishment.36 In
Party journals such as Qiushi and mass press outlets such as Ta Kung
Pao, the institutional reform proposals of several Party intellectuals
received the kind of prominent attention that typically precedes the
embrace of these ideas by senior leaders.
In the end, however, Hufs speech provided no hint of his future
internal security strategy. Several Hong Kong sources contend that
allies of Jiang forced Hu to beat a strategic retreat. Other Chinese
analysts argued that Hu Jintaofs overall vision was to increase state
effi ciency rather than promote a more fundamental democratization.37
Whatever the explanation, Hufs speech was not only devoid of
specifi c reform proposals, but even of language hinting that the
Party urgently needed signifi cant institutional reforms to save its
hold on power.38 Rather, Hu delivered a rather general gloss on
66
the alleged virtues of the Three Represents ideal. The speech took
virtually no note of the growing tensions, confl icting interests, or
unrest in the society the CCP rules. Nor did he try to provide any
explanation for social tensions and unrest, except to make a vague
suggestion that he subscribes to Beijingfs current mainstream theory
that contradictions in economic growth are the major sources of
social unrest. Among the Partyfs three major tasks, for example, was
to gproperly understand and handle the main social contradictions
created by the peoplefs growing material and cultural needs and
backward social production.h
Nor did Hu annunciate any vision of how the Party could
contain, suppress, cope with, or manage unrest to help preserve its
leading position. The speech was also shorn of any of the rumored
institutional or legal reforms to revive the CCP as a ruling Party,
or provide better avenues to allow citizens to voice complaints and
peacefully defuse tensions and unrest.39 Hu only noted very generally
that one key aspect of the Three Representations was properly
handling the relationship between reform, development, and stability, and
building a socialist country ruled by both law and ethical conduct.
In the end, although Hu called for building a stronger Party of
members better able to govern well, resist corruption, and grally and
lead the people,h he offered no credible analysis of how the CCP can
confront its problems, overcome growing social tensions, and reach
this goal.
Although Hu has failed since becoming general secretary to
annunciate a more general vision of or approach to unrest, his
response to specifi c cases of unrest suggests more fl exibility (some
might even say indecisiveness) in responding to protests. The BBC,
citing Chinese press reports, indicated in January that Hu personally
intervened to try to end the large student demonstrations in Hefei,
Anhui. Hu reportedly ordered that local offi cials accede to a key
student demand that a truck driver who ran down a student be
severely punished. Hufs handling of this incident does not yet
indicate any particularly clear set of views about the origins of
unrest, but it shows a willingness to order concessions in the face
of demonstrations. This may encourage demonstrators like the
students to perceive Hu as a potential benefactor. At the same time,
67
it risks creating dangerous incentives by encouraging citizens to
believe that protests get results.40
Hu also gave ambivalent signals on protest in his response
to the controversy over the Hong Kong governmentfs proposed
National Security Bill. After the unexpectedly massive protests
forced Tung Chee-hwafs government to reconsider the bill, Hu and
Wen Jiabao initially responded with a fairly tough line. In their July
19 meeting with Tung, Hu politely but forcefully reminded Tung of
the importance of gmaintaining social stability.h Hu also pointed out
that gfor the Hong Kong SAR to draw up itself law for safeguarding
national security and unity is the inevitable demand of implementing
the Basic Law, and is also the responsibility that Hong Kong must
undertake as a SAR of the Peoplefs Republic of China.h41
But despite this seeming unwillingness to back down in the face
of protest, Hu apparently acquiesced shortly thereafter when Tung
decided to table the draft law for the foreseeable future. While it is
very diffi cult to extrapolate Hong Kong experiences to the mainland,
in this case at least, Hu and the rest of the leadership seemed willing
to compromise in the face of popular protest.
As an internal security leader, Hu has also tried quietly to step
up pressure for ongoing efforts to rein-in law enforcement abuses
that undermine the governmentfs legitimacy and fan unrest. One
focus has been increased pressure for police professionalization.
Zhou Yongkang, in a major speech to public security offi cials,
revealed that Hu Jintao and unspecifi ed other Central leaders had
issued a series of directives designed to rectify police work and
limit abuses. In his speech, Zhou suggested that these moves were
motivated by a series of recent high-profi le incidents of police
malfeasance and brutality. Although he did not specify these cases,
they very likely included the widely publicized death in March of
a 27 year-old student, Sun Zhigang, who was detained for failure
to show adequate identifi cation and was subsequently beaten to
death by one of his cell-mates.42 Another widely publicized case
was that of the 3 year-old daughter of Li Guifang, a Chengdu
heroin addict. Li was arrested by Chengdu police, but despite her
persistent pleas, she was not permitted by police to return to take
care of her daughter, nor did the police send anyone to look after
68
the child, who subsequently starved to death and was discovered by
neighbors. Beijing soon responded to these tragedies with a reform
of the regulations for police handling of migrant workers. To put
his personal stamp on the changes, in September Hu Jintao made
a personal inspection tour of local police stations in Jiangxi, during
which police press reports indicate he quizzed street-level police on
the new regulations and their meaning for the rights of citizens.

HANDLING THE SARS CRISIS

On the face of it, Hufs boldest leadership departure of the year was
only tangentially related to national security issues\specifi cally his
relationship to the military, and the prospects for social instability.43
This was, of course, his early-mid April effort with Wen Jiabao to
force the government and military to take the SARS epidemic more
seriously, and release the kind of accurate information necessary for
China to cooperate effectively with the WHO and the international
community in reining-in the disease. Hu appears to have responded
to international pressure, in particular business concerns, criticism
from the WHO and other international organizations, as well as the
prospect of a potentially destabilizing social panic and economic
downturn caused by the governmentfs inevitable loss of control over
information about the epidemic.44 All of these forces underscored
dramatically the increasing impact of new technologies\in this
case, text-messaging in particular\on the governmentfs capacity to
control information and keep issues off the political agenda. They
also demonstrated Hufs willingness, at least sometimes, to take bold
action in response to such pressures.
Hu reportedly began pushing for greater reporting of
information on the disease as early as late February, when he
overrode Guangdong CCP Secretary Zhang Dejiang and sided with
Governor Huang Huahua in permitting provincial media to report
more detailed information on the spread of the virus. It is not clear
that Hu by this date had already decided to push for a widespread
opening up of information, and it seems that he hesitated and
attempted to rein-in the reporting in mid-March, when the Politburo
reportedly directed the Propaganda Department to order Chinafs
media not to report WHO warnings about the virus. But it seems
69
clear that by early April\particularly after Dr. Jiang Yanyong
publicly criticized Health Minister Zhang Wenkangfs prevarications
that China was safe and that SARS had been placed under effective
control\Hu saw the game beginning to slip away, and became more
strongly committed to changing the Politburofs handling of SARS.
This clearly placed Hu at loggerheads with several offi cials allied
with Jiang Zemin who opposed more open admissions about the
virus. Soon thereafter, Wen Jiabao on April 7 and Hu Jintao on April
11, criticized the army and the Party for lying about the scale of the
epidemic and urged more honest reporting, greater openness, and
stronger cooperation with international health authorities. They then
fi red the Health Minister and Beijing Mayor Meng Xuenong. Some
sources report that Jiang took the fi ring of Zhang\reportedly his
former personal physician\badly, and made efforts to rehabilitate
Zhangfs reputation.45
The move demonstrated that despite his well-deserved reputation
for caution, Hu is capable of bold action in a crisis, even at some risk
to his relationship with Jiang.46 Jiang and his allies, moreover, obliged
Hu by sticking to dangerously stale gdeny everythingh tactics in
their initial response to SARS, even long after popular alarm had
reached high levels. In the end, the move redounded to Hufs benefi t
politically, and proved to be the turning point in Chinafs handling
of the epidemic as well as international perceptions of Chinafs
willingness to admit the scope of the problem. Chinafs subsequent
success in controlling SARS made Hu and Wenfs actions look even
wiser in hindsight.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: HU JINTAO AS NATIONAL
SECURITY LEADER IN YEAR ONE

Coming to power with a weak personnel base in nearly all
sectors of Chinafs national security system, Hu Jintao apparently
has moved with expected caution on most\but by no means all\
signifi cant security policy issues. In foreign and military affairs in
particular, Hu has focused on securing for himself as many of the
key authoritative positions as possible, trying to supplant Jiang as
the authoritative public voice of Chinese foreign policy on key issues
such as Taiwan and Korea, while subtly reasserting the role of the
70
Politburo (vs. the CMC) as a venue for discussing military affairs. On
substantive issues, however, Hu remains solidly on-message and in
the mainstream, and has given observers little evidence from which
to infer his personal vision of national security policy (his personal
activism on Korea is the main exception here).
Hu came to offi ce with far more experience in internal security,
based on his days in Guizhou and Tibet, and his record suggested
both that he was willing to use repression, but also that he might
consider bolder, more sophisticated strategies for internal security
than Jiang. In the end, however, in his July 1 speech he missed his
major opportunity of the year for annunciating a personal vision of
internal security policy\perhaps because of opposition among Jiang
supporters within the leadership. Instead, his handling of specifi c
cases\Hefei, Hong Kong\suggests a leader who is still reactive and
a bit ambivalent when faced with mass protest.
The SARS case, however, raises interesting questions about
Hu, and suggests a little about his crisis decisionmaking style. It is
unclear how deeply committed Hu really is to greater transparency
in government, in particular a truly free fl ow of policy-related
information. Some of his public statements in this regard are clearly
designed to create a powerfully reformist image.47 Hu has indeed
pushed to have Chinese authorities release more information,
but still at the governmentfs discretion. On Hu and Wenfs watch,
Chinese police arrested large numbers of citizens for gspreading
rumorsh about SARS via cell-phones and there is no sign that Hu and
Wen have criticized these arrests, ordered these persons released,
or directed that the Implementing Regulations of the State Secrets
Law that make such actions a crime be revised or repealed. So for
now it appears that Hu and Wenfs preference is not necessarily for
a much freer fl ow of information. It is possible they prefer a regime
of greater information and transparency, but one in which the
government is able to get out ahead of information fl ows rather than
being manipulated by them and placed in a passive position.
This case merits closer scrutiny as we consider how Hu might
respond to future crises. The case also makes clear that, despite his
well-deserved reputation for caution, Hu is able to respond to crises
with some boldness and marshal his forces to overturn past policy
consensus. In the SARS case, Hufs relative boldness was rewarded
71
handsomely\Hu seems to have won increased popular support,
and soon after the policy shift, China began to see greater success in
its handling of the disease. Perhaps more importantly, by the sheer
popularity of their demarche, Hu and Wen were able to compel
the more recalcitrant members of the Politburo\most of whom
did not owe their promotions to them\to embrace their position.
The impressive payoffs from this early test may encourage him to
respond in similar fashion in future crises.48
But Hufs efforts to portray himself as a leader who is more in
favor of public discussion, reform, openness, transparency, and
accountability is also potentially very risky. In particular, it risks
sending many disgruntled citizens in Chinese society a possibly
mistaken message\that Hu Jintao is signifi cantly more liberal than
Jiang Zemin\an assertion for which we have very little hard evidence
as yet. Such a public perception risks creating false perceptions of a
reformer/conservative split in the leadership and unrealistic public
hopes that might encourage greater dissent or unrest. Moreover,
Hufs apparent willingness to respond to protests with concessions
certainly risks creating incentives for more protests. These could
place Hu Jintao in a dangerous situation (the overly effusive,
populist, and reformist wording used by some offi cial media outlets
in describing Hu is, in this respect, risky and perhaps even unwise).
If Hu is attempting to paint an image of himself as more populist
and pro-reform than he is in order to broaden his popular base of
support (perhaps as compensation for his weak personnel base in
the top leadership), he needs to proceed with greater caution, lest he
seem to promise more than he really intends to deliver.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley, Chinafs New Rulers: The Secret Files, New
York, New York Review Books, 2002. See especially chapter 2, pp. 36-73.
2. Joseph Fewsmith, gThe Sixteenth National Party Congress: The Succession
that Didnft Happen,h The China Quarterly, No. 173, pp. 1-16.
3. For an article that stresses the large number of Fu allies in the new leadership,
see Oliver Chou, gPLAfs Old Guard Makes Sure the New Faces Fit,h South China
Morning Post, internet version, December 2, 2002.
72
4. According to various press sources, by mid-year Hu was reportedly the
secretary of the Central Leading Groups for Foreign Affairs, National Security,
and Taiwan Affairs. Like other Party leaders before him, he has not chosen to chair
the Leading Groups on Political-Legal Affairs (Luo Gan does). I have no sources
on the current chair of the Leading Group for the Protection of State Secrets.
5. See, for example, gBeijing Bids Farewell to Beidaihe,h Japan Times, July 29,
2003.
6. A May 23, 2003, Xinhuanet report claims that Hu Jintao has ended the
practise of giving leaders big airport sendoffs when they go overseas, beginning
with his fi rst foreign trip to Russia, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia, to make the
leadership appear more professional and less distant and regal.
7. The text of the speech was published by Xinhua, July 1, 2003, BBC translation,
accessed on Lexis-Nexis.
8. On this trend, see Evan Medeiros and Taylor Fravel, gChinafs New
Diplomacy,h Foreign Affairs, November 2003.
9. gMr. Hu, 59, is the enforcer who was the top offi cial in Tibet when China
imposed martial law in 1989 to quell unrest. He is the nationalist who supported
anti-American protesters after a United States bomb destroyed the Chinese
Embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999.h Joseph Kahn, gMystery Man At the Helm: Hu
Jintao,h New York Times, November 15, 2002, p. A-1.
10. Based on a Lexis-Nexis world news search by the author.
11. See, for example, Xinhuafs April 21, 2003, report on Hufs meetings with
Senator Frist.
Hu Jintao said: The nature of the Taiwan issue is an issue of sovereignty
which involves the question of Chinafs reunifi cation or separation. The
Chinese governmentfs position on the Taiwan issue has been consistent
and clear. We appreciate the U.S. sidefs reaffi rmation on several
occasions of adherence to the one-China policy, of abiding by the three
Sino-US joint communiques, and of opposing gTaiwan independence.h
It is hoped that the U.S. side will keep its commitments, not send wrong
signals to the gTaiwan independenceh forces, and play a constructive
role in Chinafs peaceful reunifi cation. It is also hoped that friends in the
U.S. Congress and senators will exert a positive impact to this end.
12. Xinhua Domestic Service, March 11, 2003, translation BBC/SWB.
13. See the statement by Taiwan Affairs Offi ce spokesman Zhang Mingqing,
AFP, November 27, 2002. Also, at a January 2003 Hong Kong symposium
73
commemorating the eighth anniversary of Jiangfs geight point proposal,h Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region (H.K. S.A.R.) Taiwan Offi ce Director General
Xing Kuishan reaffi rmed the continuity and stability of the policy.
14. Xinhua Domestic Service, March 11, 2003, translation BBC/SWB.
15. Ibid. Hu announced gfour viewpoints on work toward Taiwan in the new
situation,h though it was unclear what was gnewh about the situation, especially
given that he has endorsed the success of policies in the past. The four viewpoints
were (1) always uphold the one China principle; (2) vigorously promote crossstrait
economic and cultural exchanges; (3) thoroughly implement a policy of
placing our hopes on the people of Taiwan; and (4) uniting compatriots on both
sides of the straits in joint effort for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.
16. Jiang actually said little about Taiwan at the Congress.
Fresh progress has been made in the great cause of national reunifi cation.
The Chinese Government has resumed the exercise of sovereignty
over Macao. The principle of gone country, two systemsh has been
implemented, and the basic laws of Hong Kong and Macao special
administrative regions have been carried out to the letter. Hong Kong
and Macao enjoy social and economic stability. Personnel, economic
and cultural exchanges across the Taiwan Straits have kept increasing.
The fi ght against gTaiwan independenceh and other attempts to split the
country has been going on in depth.
He went on to say:
Here, on behalf of the CPC Central Committee, I wish to express our
heartfelt thanks to the people of all our ethnic groups, the democratic
parties, peoplefs organizations and patriots from all walks of life, to
our compatriots in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the
Macao Special Administrative Region and Taiwan as well as overseas
Chinese, and to our foreign friends who care about and support Chinafs
modernization drive.
gFull text of Jiang Zeminfs report at 16th Party congress,h Xinhua, November 17,
2002, accessed on Lexis-Nexis.
17. Xinhua Domestic Service, March 11, 2003, translation BBC/SWB.
18. South China Morning Post web site, June 19, 2003.
19. Leslie Fong, The Straits Times, May 24, 2003.
74
20. Interview with Interfax, May 22, 2003.
21. Ibid.
22. In their February meeting, Hu tried to reassure Secretary Powell that China
was working through private channels to deal with the North Korean government
and urged the United States to hold direct dialogues with the North as soon as
possible. Washington Post, February 25, 2003, p. A-19; New York Times, February 25,
2003.
23. Interview with Interfax May 22, 2003.
24. Ibid.
25. Zong Hairen: gHu Jintao Writes to Kim Chong-il To Open Door to Six-
Party Talks,h Hsin Pao, Hong Kong, BBC translation accessed on Lexis-Nexis.
26. Wu Chenguang, gChina Pushes forward Military Transformation,h
Nanfang Zhoumo, internet version, June 12, 2003, Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS) translation.
27. Ibid.
28. South China Morning Post, online edition, May 26, 2003; also Nanfang
Zhoumo, June 12, 2003.
29. South China Morning Post, online edition, May 26, 2003.
30. I have analyzed this debate in a forthcoming chapter in a book on law and
society in China, edited by Kevin OfBrien, Stanley Lubman, and Neil J. Diamant
(Stanford University Press).
31. Hufs comments at the time are nicely summarized in Richard Daniel Ewing,
gHu Jintao, the Making of a Chinese General Secretary,h The China Quarterly, No.
173, March 2003, pp. 22-25.
32. Susan Lawrence, gPrimed for Powerh Far Eastern Economic Review, February
22, 2001.
33. Xinhua, March 6, 1997.
34. Ibid.
35. Note, for example, the unusual publicity given by the PRC-owned HK
daily, Ta Kung Pao, to an August forum in Jilin on intra-Party democracy featuring
several Party academics.
75
36. For a sample of these rumored reforms, see John Pomfret, gChinese Leader
Solidifi es Power,h The Washington Post, June 28, 2003, p. A18; Luo Bing, gHu Jintao
Promises eReforms in Four Fieldsf,h Zhengming, June 1, 2003, pp. 11-13.
37. John Pomfret, gChinese Leader Solidifi es Power,h The Washington Post,
June 28, 2003, p. A18.
38. This lack of even a strong statement on the need for reform is striking.
Willy Lam, writing on the eve of the speech, reported that Hu had dropped his
reform proposals, but would at least say that gthere is no way out for the Party
save political reform.h gChinafs Conservative Backlash,h CNN.com, June 24, 2003.
39. On p. 6, however, Hu discusses at some length the need to build a Party
that serves the interests of the people, and rules the country for the people\that this is
an essence of the Three Representations. But the speech says nothing about the
desirability of involving the people more in their own government\an omission
that may undermine the justifi cation for any such institutional reforms for the time
being.
40. BBC.co.uk, January 9, 2003. This report notes the PRC-owned Wen Wei Po as
one source.
41. Xinhua Domestic Service, July 19, 2003, FBIS translation.
42. Yao Ye, gChildfs Death Turns Up Heat on Chinafs Police,h Asiatimes online,
June 28, 2003.
43. John Pomfret, gOutbreak Gave Chinafs Hu an Opening,h Washington Post,
May 13, 2003, p. A-1.
44. Ibid.
45. Jonathan Ansfi eld of Reuters reports that in late May when Hu Jintao was
overseas, Jiang lunched with Zhang in Beijing, and Zhangfs former deputy, Vice
Minister Gao Qiang, made a public statement defending Zhang, which he was
forced to retract under intense media criticism. gHu, Jiang Intrigue Clouds Chinafs
Reform Outlook,h Reuters, June 29, 2003.
46. Rupert Wingfi eld-Hayes, gHu Jintao and the Handling of the SARS
Epidemic,h BBC.co.uk.
47. Note, for example, the widely quoted statement, attributed to Hu and Li
Changchun, that the press must be gcloser to life, closer to reality, and closer to the
people,h and must honour the peoplefs gright to knowh (zhiqingquan). Willy Wo-
Lap Lam, gChinafs Conservative Backlash,h CNN.com, June 24, 2003.
76
48. The case, of course, still leaves open the question of just what types of
issues and problems make Hu seize the initiative and what types of policy actions
he might consider in a crisis.
77

CHAPTER 4

CHINAfS RULING ELITE:
THE POLITBURO AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Joseph Fewsmith

The 16th National Party Congress met in Beijing on November
8-14, 2002, to select a Central Committee consisting of 198 full
members and 158 alternate members (very close in size to the 193
full members and 151 alternate members named to the 15th Central
Committee in 1997). When the fi rst Plenary Session of the new
Central Committee met on November 15, it named 24 people to
be full members of the Politburo and one person to be an alternate
member of the Politburo. It also named seven people to the partyfs
Secretariat, the body that assists the Politburo in its day-to-day work
by overseeing propaganda and the general fl ow of documents that
implement policy decisions; and it appointed eight people to the
Central Military Commission (CMC), which oversees the Peoplefs
Liberation Army (PLA). The Politburo, in turn, named nine people
to the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), which makes up the
heart of Chinafs political system. Collectively, these people can be
considered Chinafs ruling elite.1 Who are they, and what does their
composition tell us about contemporary Chinese politics?
The focus of this chapter is on the 198 full members of the
Central Committee; it is doubtful that alternate members of the
Central Committee can be considered a part of the ruling elite, or
even the ruling elite in waiting. Of the 151 alternate members of the
15th Central Committee, only 30 (19.9 percent) were elevated to full
membership in the 16th Central Committee. Interestingly, the one
place in which being named an alternate member of the Central
Committee is suggestive of future advancement is among the
provincial cadres\22 of the 30 alternate members of the 15th Central
Committee who were promoted to full membership were provincial
cadres. That is just over one-third the number of provincial cadres
named to full membership in the 16th Central Committee (65). In
contrast, only 3 (12.5 percent) of the 24 military personnel who were
78
alternate members of the 15th Central Committee were advanced
to full membership in the 16th Central Committee. There were 40
alternate members of the 15th Central Committee who continued on
as alternate members of the 16th Central Committee, but judging by
age (most were born in the early 1940s), few are likely to be named
full members of the 17th Central Committee. Fully 53.6 percent of
the alternate members (81 people) of the 15th Central Committee
were retired from membership at the 16th Party Congress.
We do know that there was a lot of fresh blood injected into the
16th Central Committee. Of the 198 full members, 112 were new,
a turnover rate of 56 percent, just about the same as 5 years ago
when the turnover rate was 57 percent. Since 30 were elevated from
alternate membership in the 15th Central Committee, that means 81
were promoted without prior experience in the Central Committee.
The number of provincial representatives (65) was very close to the
number in the 15th Central Committee (61), and the number of State
Council seats was up somewhat from 5 years ago (60 compared to
51). The number of national minorities (15) was about the same as
last time (14). The number of women decreased from seven to fi ve
(2.5 percent).
Military representation was nearly equal to 5 years ago. Whereas
there were 42 PLA representatives (22 percent) on the 15th Central
Committee, there were 45 (23 percent) on the 16th Central Committee.
At least in formal terms, the makeup of the Central Committee
appears increasingly institutionalized. That is to say, people
occupying certain positions in the central government, military, and
provinces are routinely appointed to the Central Commission\but
that observation does not answer the crucial question of who gets
appointed to those positions.2
There were a few surprises in the selection of the 16th Central
Committee. Hua Guofeng (born in 1921) was fi nally retired, despite
Deng Xiaopingfs apparent promise that he would have a life-time
appointment. Two members of the new Central Committee were
born in 1937, though they should have retired if the retirement age
of 65 was strictly adhered to. One was Li Guixian, the former head
of the Peoplefs Bank of China, and the other was Xu Kuangdi, who
was unceremoniously dismissed as mayor of Shanghai in May 2002
(and appointed head of the Chinese Academy of Engineering).
79
Some limitations of the data should be acknowledged at the
outset. Even a year after the convening of the 16th Party Congress,
Xinhua News Agency has still not published standard biographical
information on the full (or alternate) members of the Central
Committee (though most are available from the Xinhua website).
Apart from knowing in greater detail the career paths of the members
of the Central Committee, one would ideally like to know about the
pool of people these people were picked from. After all, focusing on
the biographies of those that were picked tells us something about
the makeup of Chinafs political elite, but it does not say anything
about those not selected. If one wants to make more defifi nitive
statements about institutionalization, we will need much greater
biographical information. Alas, this chapter can only gselect on the
dependent variable,h as the social science literature would put it.3
Other chapters in this volume deal with the top civilian and
military leadership, so this chapter will look at the demographic and
career paths of the ruling elite more broadly. Overall, the Central
Committee draws its membership from four broad constituencies:
Central Party cadres, the State Council system, the provincial elite,
and the military. This chapter will look at each of these constituencies
in turn.

THE CENTRAL PARTY CADRES

The Politburo.

The Politburo and its Standing Committee stand at the apex of
the political system. The only member of the Politburo of the 15th
Central Committee to retain a seat on the new standing committee
was Hu Jintao, who was named as General Secretary of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), as expected. The retirement of the other six
members of the standing committee was largely anticipated, though
Li Ruihuan was only 68 at the time of the congress and by past
precedence could have anticipated another term on the PBSC. One
explanation for his retirement was that he had already served over
two full terms (Li was elevated to the Politburo after the Tiananmen
debacle), though his notoriously bad relationship with Jiang Zemin
80
appears to be the reason the gtwo termh rule was invoked (such term
limits had not been in evidence in the past).
Rumors in the summer of 2002 had raised the possibility that
Jiang Zemin might stay on the PBSC and continue to serve as general
secretary. Such rumors were probably always intended as leverage
in inner-party negotiations; if so, they worked. The PBSC has never
exceeded seven members in size during the reform era, but the First
Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee named nine members
to it. At least fi ve, and perhaps six, of the nine members had close
personal relations with Jiang Zemin, thus ensuring him infl uence
over party affairs.
Of the other 15 full members of the 15th Central Committee
Politburo, seven moved up to the PBSC of the 16th Central Committee
(Huang Ju, Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun, Luo Gan, Wen Jiabao,
Wu Bangguo, and Wu Guanzheng). Of the other eight originally
appointed in 1997, one (Xie Fei) had died and the other seven all
retired\including Li Tieying, the then 66 year-old son of Party elder
Li Weihan. Again, one could invoke the gtwo termh rule to explain
Lifs retirement, though it is more likely that Lifs clashes with Jiang
Zemin over ideological issues (particularly the admission of private
entrepreneurs into the Party) account for his early departure.
How institutionalized was this transfer of power? The retirement
of all those 70 or older suggests an incremental institutionalization
of binding norms. But the increased size of the PBSC, the apparent
stacking of it with Jiangfs proteges, the early retirement of two
Politburo members, and the leap frogging of Zeng Qinghong from
alternate status on the Politburo to Standing Committee status
(as well as being named head of the Secretariat) point both to the
arbitrariness left in the process as well as the success Jiang had at
the 15th Party Congress in getting so many of his followers onto the
Politburo.
Much has been made of the number of provincial leaders who
made it onto the Politburo.4 Ten of the 24 people named to the
Politburo were serving as provincial leaders when they were named,
and 20 have experience as provincial leaders. It appears at fi rst
glance that provincial infl uence is growing at the expense of central
authority. There are, however, several reasons to be skeptical of this
thesis. First, throughout the reform era, certain seats on the Politburo
81
have been reserved for leaders of important provincial-level areas,
most notably Beijing and Shanghai. Other Politburo seats have been
given to the leaders of Sichuan, Henan, Tianjin, and Guangdong,
though not all at the same time. So it is normal to have four or fi ve
sitting provincial leaders serving concurrently on the Politburo. This
local representation perhaps injects consideration of local reality into
central discussions but it also, and more importantly, ensures central
control over the localities. Second, a distinction must be made
between offi cials whose careers have been primarily at the center
but have been gsent downh for tempering (a trend that has increased
in recent years) and those whose careers have been primarily in the
provinces. Thus, Hu Jintao, He Guoqiang (head of the Organization
Department), and Zhou Yongkang (named Minister of Public
Security shortly after the Congress) have served primarily as central
offi cials who have gained local experience before being brought back
to the center. Third, a considerable portion of those with provincial
administrative experience who were named to the Politburo appear
to have been brought in as supporters of Jiang Zemin, and refl ect
Jiangfs career path, particularly his time in Shanghai. Such leaders
include Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju, Li
Changchun, Chen Liangyu, Liu Qi, and maybe Zhang Dejiang.
The promotion of such fi gures refl ects less provincial infl uence
than it does the personal infl uence of Jiang Zemin. Fourth, several
provincial leaders named to the Politburo quickly exchanged their
provincial portfolios for posts at the center, where they will no
doubt look out for the centerfs interests. Such leaders include Wu
Bangguo, who became head of the National Peoplefs Congress
(NPC); Jia Qinglin, who was named head of the Chinese Peoplefs
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC); Huang Ju, who became
a vice premier; Li Changchun, who took over the ideology portfolio;
He Guoqiang, who became head of the Organization Department;
Hui Liangyu, who became a vice premier; Liu Yunshan, who
became head of the Propaganda Department; and Zhou Yongkang,
who became minister of public security. When such changes are
taken into account, only six of the 24 full members of the Politburo
grepresenth provincial interests. While provincial experience may
become a more important criterion for promotion to the highest
levels, it is evident that the interests of the center still prevail.
82

Other Central Party Cadres.

Other than the 25 full and alternate members of the Politburo,
there are 27 members of the 16th Central Committee who oversee
important Party organs, two less than the number in the 15th Central
Committee. Even a cursory look at the functions of these Central
Party cadres suggests the functions that the Party feels are most
critical to its political control: Organization, propaganda, security,
and united front work of various sorts. Thus, although Politburo
members direct the departments of organization and propaganda
as well as the Ministry of Public Security, other full members of the
Central Committee include two deputy heads of the Organization
Department (Huang Qingyi and Li Tielin), the editor-in chief of
Peoplefs Daily (Wang Chen), the head of the Xinhua News Agency
(Tian Congming), the head of the State Press and Publication
Administration (Shi Zongyuan), the director of the Central Offi ce
for Overseas Propaganda (Zhao Qizheng), the Minister of State
Security (Xu Yongyue), and a vice minister of public security (Liu
Jing). Wang Huning, the newly promoted head of the Central
Policy Research Offi ce, was also named to the Central Committee,
while the former head, Teng Wensheng, remained on the Central
Committee and took over as director of the Central Party Literature
Research Center (which overseas such things as the compilation of
the collected works of senior leaders).
Foreign affairs (although primarily under the State Council\see
below) is also another area of Party concern. Liu Huaqiu, head of the
Partyfs General Offi ce for Foreign Affairs, is one of these central Party
cadres, as are Dai Bingguo (head of the International Liaison Offi ce),
Gao Siren (director of the Liaison Offi ce of the Central Government
in Hong Kong), and Bai Zhizhen (director of the Liaison Offi ce of the
Central Government in Macao). United front work is represented
by Liu Yandong (director of the United Front Work Department),
Zhang Junjiu (fi rst secretary of the All-China Federation of Trade
Unions), Zheng Wantong (secretary general of the CPPCC), and Bai
Lichen (Vice Chairman of the CPPCC). One might note in passing
that sports are also important to the CCP; Yuan Weimin, Executive
President of the 29th Olympic Games Organizing Committee (under
83
the overall direction of Politburo member and Beijing CCP secretary
Liu Qi) made the Central Committee.
This group is a generally well educated group. The diplomats\
Dai Bingguo and Liu Huaqiu\are both graduates of the Foreign
Affairs College in Beijing. Lu Yongxiang, the President of the
Chinese Academy of Sciences, obtained a Ph.D. degree from
Aachen Industrial University in East Germany in 1981 and taught
at Zhejiang University through the 1980s. Wang Huning attended
Fudan University as a gworker, peasant, soldierh student during the
Cultural Revolution, but was able to overcome this to become dean
of the School of International Relations at Fudan. Zhao Qizheng
graduated from Chinese University of Science and Technology in
Anhui in 1963, but his career then went in decidedly untechnical
directions (e.g., heading the Organization Department in Shanghai).
Liu Jing, the vice minister of public security, graduated from Beijing
Polytechnical University, but did so only in 1968, presumably after
his college education had been disrupted for 2 years.
Others are less well educated, at least in a formal sense. Shi
Zongyuan, the Director of Press and Publication Administration,
spent most of his career in the propaganda and party school
apparatus of Gansu and Jilin provinces. Bai Lichen, a member of
the Hui minority, graduated from Shenyang Agricultural College,
but then rose through organization and personnel work to be vice
governor of Liaoning and Chairman of the Ningxia Autonomous
Region before being named to the CPPCC.
At least two members of this group\Liao Hui (director of the
Hong Kong and Macao Offi ce) and Zhang Junjiu (First Secretary of
the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU)\have extensive
military backgrounds. Liao graduated from the Military Engineering
Institute of the PLA, and Zhang spent most of his career in the
ordnance industry.

The State Council System.

Of the 198 people named full members of the Central Committee,
45 had posts in the State Council system at the time of being named.
Because the State Council system is responsible for overseeing the
administration of the country, including the economy, one would
84
expect to see the highest concentration of technocrats here. Of
course, not all posts in the State Council system require technical
expertise. The Foreign Ministry requires professionalism, but
not technical profi ciency. The Ministry of Supervision, the State
Nationalities Commission, the Ministry of Culture, and similar posts
similarly require competence and experience, but not a technical
background. Altogether, 23 of the 45 postings of those named to the
Central Committee seem to require, or at least would benefi t from,
technical expertise (these include the Peoplefs Bank of China, the
Auditor General, Ministry of Finance, the State Administration of
Environmental Protection, and so forth). Nevertheless, only about
half of these posts\12\are fi lled by people who could be considered
real technocrats (as opposed to those who might have had technical
training but have long since gone onto other fi elds of endeavor). At
least one of these, Xiang Huaicheng, has since given up his portfolio
as minister of fi nance to become mayor of Tianjin, a position that
certainly requires administrative ability but not technical expertise.
Overall, this is a very well educated group. Six attended
Qinghua University; three, Beijing University; and others attended
the Tongji, Fudan, and Nanjing Universities. Central leaders tend
to be somewhat older than provincial leaders (see below), so most
who attended college were able to graduate prior to the start of the
Cultural Revolution. Still, 11 of the 45 people had their educations
curtailed in some way by the Cultural Revolution, including three
who graduated in the 1970s and must have attended college as
gworker, peasant, armyh students (one of whom, Zhou Xiaochuan,
then attended Qinghua University after the Cultural Revolution).
Three of these cadres have no college background; one (Du Qinglin)
appears not to have attended college but nevertheless attained an
M.A. degree in law through correspondence. Others appears to
have followed less than rigorous academic paths. For instance, Tian
Fengshan, who was arrested on corruption charges shortly after the
16th Party Congress, attended the PLAfs Second Artillery Technical
College. Similarly, Li Dezhu, of Korean nationality, attended
Yanbian University before taking up a career in nationalities work;
and Mou Xinsheng, the director of the General Administration of
Customs, attended Northwest China Institute of Politics and Law to
prepare himself for a career in public security.
85
Of these 45 people, 6 have spent their careers primarily in the
provinces, coming to Beijing in recent years to take up central
administrative posts. It is not apparent from their offi cial biographies
why these people were able to make the jump from what appeared
to be successful, but limited, provincial careers to high-level central
administrative positions. For instance, Jin Renqing, the director
of the State Taxation Administration, attended the prestigious
Central Institute of Finance and Banking (as did Dai Xianglong, Jia
Chunwang, and Li Jinhua), but then spent 23 years in Yunnan, rising
to vice governor before being promoted to vice minister of fi nance
in 1991. Tian Fengshan spent his whole career in Heilongjiang,
rising to be governor (1995-2000), before coming to Beijing (and was
subsequently arrested for corruption). Wang Zhongfu graduated
from the Changsha Institute of Railway Construction and then
served 20 years in Hunan before becoming vice-mayor of Shenzhen
and then coming to Beijing as director of the State Administration of
Industry and Commerce. What accounts for the sudden promotion of
such people, when others in similar positions did not get promoted,
is not clear.

Provincial Leadership.

For at least a decade-and-a-half, it has been apparent that China
has been moving toward a system in which membership in the
Central Committee would be determined by position in Chinafs
political hierarchy; model workers and others selected because of
age or personal favoritism would be eliminated in favor of grationalh
criteria of position. In the past, it has been the general practice that all
provincial Party secretaries and about half of provincial governors
were selected to the Central Committee. At the 16th Party Congress,
for the fi rst time, all provincial party secretaries and all provincial
governors were named to the central committee. Although this
indicates progress toward institutionalizing the allocation of seats on
the Central Committee, it is premature to conclude that it indicates a
growing clout of the provinces.
Looking at those who rose to positions of provincial leadership and
thus were qualifi ed to be named to the Central Committee suggests
that some correction is in order in our usual characterizations of the
86
Chinese leadership. It is often agued that Chinafs leadership is better
educated, technocratic, and increasingly institutionalized. I would
suggest that a close look at the career paths of Chinafs provincial
leadership suggest that there are very different career paths, which
may suggest a lower degree of institutionalization than sometimes
depicted; that the leadership is, on the whole, not as well educated
as often thought, and that despite technical education, most have not
followed what might be considered a technocratic path.
Education.
Those who lead Chinafs provinces are generally in their late
50s (provincial Party secretaries averaged 58 years old in 2002;
provincial governors, 56 years old), and so were born in the mid-
1940s. The oldest was Wu Guanzheng, born in 1938, who was
also named to the Politburo and as head of the Central Discipline
Inspection Commission (CDIC), thus removing him from the ranks
of provincial leaders. The youngest was Li Keqiang (governor of
Henan at the time of the congress, and since elevated to Henan Party
secretary), who was born in 1955. (Subsequently, Zhao Leji, born in
1957, was named Party secretary of Qinghai, becoming the youngest
provincial leader.) Of the 31 provincial party secretaries, only 8 were
able to fi nish college before the Cultural Revolution.5 Three others
were young enough to attend college after the Cultural Revolution,
and the education of these three appears to be much superior to that of
their elders.6 Of the other 20 provincial party secretaries, 4 appear to
have no college education,7 and 1 (Zhang Dejiang, Guangdong Party
Secretary) has the dubious distinction of having studied economics
at Kim Il-sung Comprehensive University. The other 16 are credited
with having gone to college, but in each case their higher education
was disrupted to one degree or another by the Cultural Revolution.
Moreover, some of these colleges must have been somewhat limited
in their focus. For instance, Zhang Lichang, Tianjin party secretary,
is credited with gaining a college degree by correspondence with
Beijing Economic University. One wonders what sort of an education
Wang Taihua, Anhui Party Secretary, received at Jiangxi Teachers
College: he graduated in 1968, 2 years after the Cultural Revolution
87
disrupted higher education. Wang Xiaofeng, Hainan Party Secretary,
received a college education at Beijing Mining Institute, graduating
in 1969. Even Xi Jinping, Xi Zhongxunfs son who studied at Qinghua
University, received his education 1975-1979 as a gworker, peasant,
PLAh student (gongnongbing xuesheng). It was probably a decent
education, but not as good as he would have received prior to, much
less after, the Cultural Revolution.
Governors, being on average 2 years younger than provincial
party secretaries, were even more affected by the Cultural Revolution.
Only six governors made it through college before the onslaught
of the Cultural Revolution.8 Only two (Bo Xilai and Lu Hao) have
completed college since the end of the Cultural Revolution. Three
(Han Yuqun, Han Zheng, and Lu Zhangong) show no evidence
of college, and eight had their college careers interrupted by the
Cultural Revolution.9 Many others followed less orthodox patterns
of achieving higher education. Six attained college degrees from the
Central Party School.10 Jia Zhibang, governor of Shaanxi received a
college education through correspondence with Chinese Peoplefs
University. Xiang Bapingcuo, named to the Central Committee at
the 16th Party Congress and then elevated to be chairman of Tibet,
has 2 years of tertiary education at the Chinese Nationalities Institute
in Beijing.
In short, 19 of the 63 provincial leaders named to the Central
Committee have a 4-year college education. Others may have
patched together something resembling a college career in the
course of their careers, but it is diffi cult to say that they are gcollege
educatedh in the normal sense of that term. Many, including those
with degrees from the Central Party School, appear to have been sent
for further education as they rose in party ranks and were picked as
potential future leaders. This may be a smart group, but their formal
education is limited.
Career Patterns.
If the provincial political elite turns out to be less well-educated
than Xinhua statistics of the number gcollege educatedh (daxue
xueli\a vague term), then that seems to be a function of their career
patterns. Looking at the career pattern of provincial party secretaries
88
and governors, they seem to fall logically into fairly distinct groups:
Those who have worked their way up from the bottom, those who
have received a college education (even if interrupted by the Cultural
Revolution) and have subsequently advanced quickly, a few who
have worked in the military or military industry, a few who have
gparachutedh in from the center, and those whose careers can only
be described as gblessed,h usually because of their parentsf political
standing. On balance, however, provincial political leadership is
dominated by those who have spent long periods of time at the grass
roots; roughly half of the 63 provincial leaders selected for Central
Committee membership fi ts into this category. Even if some of these
people received technical educations while young, they quickly
followed political paths and can hardly be considered gtechnocrats.h
They are politicos.
A couple of examples will illustrate this point. Meng Jiangzhu,
who was appointed Jiangxi Party secretary in April 2001, is a case
in point. Meng joined the CCP in 1968 (which, at the age of 21 was a
fairly early date), and then spent almost the next 20 years in various
capacities at the Qianwei farm in suburban Shanghai. It was not until
1986 that he was promoted to Party secretary of Chuansha county
(also in Shanghai). And it was only in 1991 that his career began to
take off when he became secretary of the rural work committee in
the Shanghai Municipal government. The following year, he became
deputy secretary-general of the Shanghai municipal government,
and the following year (1993) he was named vice mayor of Shanghai
and head of the Economic Reform Commission. Obviously he had
caught someonefs eye.
Similarly, Zhang Lichang, Party secretary of Tianjin Municipality,
spent a long time at the grass roots. Zhang graduated from the
Tianjin Matellurgical Industry School in 1958, and then spent the
next 22 years in various capacities in the seamless steel industry
in Tianjin. It was not until 1980, when he was named as deputy
director general of the National Metallurgical Industry Bureau in
Tianjin, that his career began to take off. Yet it was only 2 years later
when he was named an alternate to the 12th Central Committee, and
only 3 years later when he became deputy general director of the
Municipal Economic Commission in Tianjin. In 1985 he was named
vice mayor.
89
Those with a greater pretense to a college education generally
moved along faster, and their jobs tended to be more urban. For
instance, Li Jianguo, Shaanxi party secretary, graduated from
Shandong University in 1970. He then worked in a number of
positions, perhaps simultaneously (his biography is not clear)
including the Culture and Education Bureau of Ninghe County
in Shandong, the propaganda department of the county, then to
the propaganda department of the Agricultural Committee of
Tianjin, and, most important, as a worker in the general offi ce of
the municipal government. He had not yet joined the Communist
Party, though he did so the following year (1971). In other words, Li
was already working in key organizations in the Tianjin municipal
government only a year after graduation, whereas Zhang Lichang,
rising in the same municipality, spent 22 years reaching roughly the
same level.
Although few provincial leaders\with the notable exception
of Song Defu, Party secretary of Fujian\have had military careers,
quite a few have experience in military industries. Examples of such
cadres would include Bai Keming, who studied missile engineering
at the Military Engineering Institute of the PLA; Chen Liangyu, who
studied at the PLA Institute of Logistics Engineering and served 2
years in the military upon graduation; and Yu Zhengsheng, who
studied missile engineering at the Harbin Institute of Military
Engineering along with Bai Keming. In addition, quite a number of
provincial leaders studied at technical institutes, where the study
may have been oriented toward military needs (e.g., Cao Bochun,
who studied at the Zhuzhou School of Aeronautics Industry and
then worked as Deputy chief of No. 331 Factory, which made aircraft
engines). Thus, although one generally thinks of the provincial
leadership as civilian, there is some overlap with the military. The
gap between civilian and military cultures may not be as large as
sometimes supposed.
Finally, there is a small group who have led charmed careers
due to their fathersf infl uence. Some of these had careers stall in the
Cultural Revolution, but others were largely able to avoid that fate.
For instance, Hong Hu, Hong Xuezhifs son who is currently governor
of Jilin, worked at the Liming Chemical Industry Factory in Qinghai
during the Cultural Revolution, but once that cataclysm was over,
90
he was able to move back to Beijing, taking up responsible positions
as head of the Comprehensive Planning Division of the Ministry
of Chemical Industry, as Vice Minister of the State Commission
for Restructuring the Economy, and as member of the CDIC. Bo
Xilai, Bo Yibofs son who is now Minister of Commerce, worked in a
factory during the Cultural Revolution, but was able to enter Beijing
University in 1977 (where he studied history). His fi rst real job was
as a staff member at the Research Offi ce of the Secretariat, followed
by a stint as a staff member of the General Offi ce of the Central
Committee. In short, he started by getting a fi rst hand look at policy
and power.

The Military Leadership.

The 16th Party Congress saw 45 PLA cadres named as full
members of the Central Committee, including three leaders of
the Peoplefs Armed Police (PAP). Of these 45 people, two (Cao
Gangchuan and Guo Boxiong) serve on the Politburo, though not on
its Standing Committee. It has become the practice in recent years for
the PLA to be grepresentedh on the PBSC only by the CCP general
secretary, although the fact that Hu Jintao is only a vice chairman of
the Central Military Commission (CMC) while Jiang Zemin, who is
not a member of the Central Committee, continues to head the CMC
makes this an awkward, uninstitutionalized relationship.
Born in 1935, Cao Gangchuan is the oldest member of the 16th
Central Committee, and he serves as a vice chairman of the CMC
as well as Minister of Defense (as of March 2003). He is also the
only military leader who has studied overseas. Cao spent 1957-63
in the Soviet Union studying at the Leningrad Advanced Artillery
Military Engineering School. As observed elsewhere in this volume
(see Chapter 6 by Kivlehan-Wise, Cheng, and Gause), Cao has spent
his career as a military modernizer. From a political perspective, it
is important to note that his big promotion came in November 1992
when, in the wake of the purge of Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibing,
Cao was made Deputy Chief of Staff under Zhang Wannian. Thus,
Cao was very much part of the effort to bring new leadership to
the PLA as Jiang Zemin tried to consolidate his power. Cao was
91
promoted to lieutenant general in 1993, a decision that would have
been made personally by Jiang, and then to general in 1998.
Guo Boxiong, the other military vice chairman of the CMC, has
focused much of his attention on fi ghting under high technology
conditions and indeed edited a volume that the General Staff
Department distributed to the PLA for use. Guo, too, was promoted
in the shake-up following the removal of the Yang brothers, albeit
a bit later; in December 1993 he was made deputy commander of
the critical Beijing Military Region (MR). In 1997 he took over as
commander of the Lanzhou MR, and the following year he was
promoted to lieutenant general.
A third PLA leader, Xu Caihou, is a member of the seven-person
Secretariat and a member of the CMC. Although a graduate of Harbin
Military Engineering Academy, Xu has specialized his whole career
in political work. He started as a political cadre in the Jilin provincial
military district in the 1970s, attended the PLA Political Academy
(Jiefangjun zhengzhi xueyuan) 1980-82, and in November 1992 became
an assistant to the chairman of the General Political Department. This
was, of course, the time when Yu Yongbo replaced Yang Baibing as
head of the General Political Department and helped Jiang Zemin
gain control over the military. Xu is from the same county in
Liaoning as Yu Yongbo (Xia county). In May 1993, Xu took over as
head of Peoplefs Liberation Army Daily, a position he held for 5 years.
A tour as political commissar in the Jinan Military Region qualifi ed
him to become brigadier general (in 1990) and lieutenant general (in
1993).
The other three members of the CMC\Li Jinai, Liang Guanglie,
and Liao Xilong\are director of the General Armament Department,
Chief of the General Staff, and director of the General Logistics
Department, respectively. Li is a graduate of Harbin Institute of
Technology and has spent much of his career in the Second Artillery,
where he did political and organization work. In the mid-1980s,
he worked in the General Political Department (rising to become
deputy director), before moving to the Commission on Science,
Technology and Industry (COSTIND). Liang worked his way up
through the ranks, attending PLA Military Affairs Academy in 1982
and National Defense University in 1987 and 1991. In December
92
1993, Liang became chief of staff of the Beijing MR\the same
time Guo Boxiong became deputy commander. Liao rose through
the ranks quickly, becoming deputy commander of the Chengdu
Military Region in 1985 and commander in 1995.
These six military members of the CMC are better educated
and more professional than their predecessors, but at least four of
them advanced their careers in the wake of the removal of the Yang
brothers. All were promoted to their current ranks in the mid-1990s
by Jiang Zemin. Although no doubt professional soldiers, their
career paths suggest that they were all hand picked by Jiang and
remain an important source of Jiangfs infl uence.
Of the other 39 military members of the 16th Central Committee,
Xinhua has published biographical information on 15 of them
(the other 24 were neither members nor alternate members of the
15th Central Committee). Almost all of these 15 people were born
in the early 1940s, suggesting that this will be their last term on
the Central Committee. One, Air Force Chief of Staff Xu Qiliang,
was born in 1950 and thus is likely to serve another term. All are
lieutenant generals, except for Wen Zongren, who is a brigadier
general. Like the provincial offi cials, these are people who spent
long years working their way up through the ranks. Only 1 of these
15 is identifi ed as having a college education, and only 1 is identifi ed
has having only a junior high school education. The others received
specialized training (dazhuan), though all have gone through one
or more military academies. All received their highest promotions
in the mid-1990s, and so they were picked for promotion by Jiang
Zemin.

Conclusion.

We often think of China as being governed by an increasingly
well-educated and technocratic elite. Such generalizations may be
true of the higher reaches of the political system (e.g., six of the
nine members of the PBSC graduated from Qinghua University)
and (partially) of the State Council system, but as a characterization
of the overall political system it seems exaggerated. Indeed, as the
examination above suggests, much of the current Central Committee
93
is not that well-educated. Many had their educations interrupted
by the Cultural Revolution, others attended undistinguished
universities, and many others substituted professional education (in
the military), correspondence school, or the Central Party School for
a real 4-year education. This does not mean that they are not welltrained
at what they do, but they are not, by and large, a meritocracy.
Those people who received technical educations rarely used them,
switching quickly to political tracks. Some pursued careers in the
Communist Youth League, others in the Organization bureaus at
different levels, others in the propaganda sector, and many (of the
provincial cadres) as regional administrators. There are few examples
of economic or other administrative specialists who have risen to the
top ranks of Chinafs political system by plying their trades.
Most of the provincial political elites spent roughly 2 decades at
lower administrative levels, some working in factories, others rising
in county and the prefectural hierarchies. These are people who know
local-level power, and appear to have been promoted because of
their understanding of local power (and, no doubt, connections with
higher levels). In short, they are more politicos than technocrats.
This fi nding should not be surprising. Jiang Zemin had a decade
to promote those he felt were loyal to him and administratively
competent. At local levels, those who have succeeded are adept
at dealing with social and political diffi culties\and at cultivating
relations. In the military one sees a combination of long service at
lower levels, professional military education, and\at the highest
levels\political loyalty to Jiang.
This fi nding should caution us against expecting rapid political
change in China. Jiang had 10 years to build his network, and the
16th Party Congress only represented the beginning of a process
of generational succession. Although Hu Jintao has succeeded to
political power, the process of political transition is by no means
over. This hybrid political system is likely to surprise us over the
coming years, either moving quickly or suffering from immobilism,
depending on the situation. Those people who made their way to
the top at the 16th Party Congress are no doubt willing to tackle
problems of economic development and perhaps address some
popular complaints. But overall, this looks like a fairly conservative
group of people in political terms.
94

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. Joseph Fewsmith, The 16th National Party Congress: The Succession that
Didnft Happen,h The China Quarterly, No. 173, March 2003, pp. 1-16.
2. Li Cheng and Lynn White, gThe 16th Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party: Hu Gets What?h Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 4, July/August 2003,
pp. 553-597.
3. Data in this chapter is drawn primarily from the Xinhua News Service
biographies of Chinese leaders posted both on the www.xinhuanet.com and the
Peoplefs Daily website at www.people.com. I have also consulted the biographies on
www.chinavitae.com. For the military leadership, Ling Haijian, Zhonggong jundui
xin jiangxing (New stars in the CCP military), Hong Kong: Pacifi c Century Press,
1999, has been useful. For biographies of full and alternate members of the 15th
Central Committee, see Zhonggong di shiwu jie zhongyang weiyuanhui, zhongyang jilu
jiancha weiyuanhui weiyuan minglu (Names of members of the 15th Central Committee
and Discipline Inspection Committee).
4. Cheng Li, gA Landslide Victory for Provincial Leaders,h China Leadership
Monitor, Vol. 5, Winter 2003, available at www.Chinaleadershipmonitor.com.
5. Bai Keming, Cao Bochun, Huang Zhendong, Liu Qi, Song Fatang, Wang
Yunkun, Wen Shizhen, and Zhang Xuezhong.
6. Li Keqiang attended Beijing University; Li Yuanchao attended Fudan
University and later received an MA degree in economic management from
Beijing University; and Zhao Leji attended Beijing University, where he studied
philosophy.
7. Song Defu, Su Rong, Yu Zhengsheng, and Wang Lequan.
8. Hong Hu, Huang Zhiquan, Ji Yunshi, Liu Zhenhua, Shi Xiushi, and Zhang
Zuoji.
9. Dai Xianglong graduated in 1967; Liang Baohua, Lu Bing, Ma Qizhi,
Wang Hongju, Wang Jinshan, Wang Xiaofeng, and Wang Qishan, who studied
at Northwest University 1973-1976, but is credited with having studied economic
management at Qinghua University and fi nance at China Institute of Finance,
albeit on a part-time basis.
10. Huang Huahua, Li Chengyu, Lu Zhangong, Luo Qingquan, Zhang
Zhongwei, and Zhou Bohua.
95

CHAPTER 5

PREMIER WEN AND VICE PRESIDENT ZENG:
THE TWO CENTERS OF CHINA FOURTH GENERATION

John Tkacik

Those who thought Chinafs politics would fi nally settle down
into something more recognizable to Westerners with the putative
ascendance of the a pro-reformist gFourth Generationh of leaders in
November 2002 must be disappointed. As China moves into the 21st
century, Chinese politics continue to be bedeviled by the traditional
gStruggle Between Two Lines.h In the past, the two lines were
Maoists and Rightists, or the Cultural Revolution Group and the Old
Party, or the Gang of Four and everyone else. Now, the struggle is
between the reformist line and the Communist Party apparatchiksf
line. Beijingfs leadership factions are centered on Chinafs outgoing
and incoming general secretaries of the Chinese Communist Party,
Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.
Historically, communist China could not be governed effectively
unless the paramount leader has full control of the Army. And
historically, the Army has made itself subservient to the dictates
of the Party. But the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is now
split between two rival, though not necessarily hostile, leadership
factions. And both camps see the Chinese Peoplefs Liberation Army
(PLA) as the strategic pivot of their political competition.
No sooner had the new general secretary of the CCP, Hu Jintao,
been named on November 15, than Jiang Zemin, the outgoing
general secretary, had himself renamed to a fourth term as chairman
of Chinafs all-powerful Central Military Commission (CMC). Jiangfs
insistence that he remain as military commander while nominally
relinquishing his political authority to the nine-member Standing
Committee of Hufs Politburo was a blunt political maneuver
designed to buttress the Old Manfs tight but indirect grip on the
Politburo with a tight and direct grip on the military.
In the Politburo, fi ve, perhaps six, of the nine Standing
Committeemen are Jiangfs hand-picked cronies. In fact, in Chinafs
supreme governing body, the Politburo Standing Committee (SC),
96
incoming Party chief Hu Jintao (the top ranked member of the
SC) can only count on Premier Wen Jiabao, the SCfs third-ranking
member, for consistent support. By contrast, in the previous
Politburo, perhaps only one of Jiangfs colleagues on the seven-man
standing committee could be counted on to vote solidly with Jiang.
In short, the retired Jiang is much more infl uential in the current
16th Party Congress Politburo than he ever was in the 15th Congress
leadership.
Can President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao break Jiangfs
grip on power? Do they have what it takes to maneuver Jiang out
of the Central Military Commission? Have they already tried? Are
they succeeding? As one wag puts it, gHu and Wen are the main
questions of Chinafs politics.h1

INTRODUCTION: CHINAfS gTWO CENTERSh

At the close of the CCPfs 16th Party Congress in November
2002, the Party/Government leadership center of power (now with
gComrade Hu Jintao as its General Secretaryh) was left without
control of the military for the fi rst time since Mao Zedong wrested
power from the Party Center in 1930. Aligned against President Hu
and Premier Wen are Jiangfs people in the Party/Government and
Jiang himself as military commander-in-chief in the CMC.
The fi ve major fi gures of the SC Jiang camp include Wu Bangguo,
the new chair of the National Peoplefs Congress (NPC) (and secondranking
to Hu in the party hierarchy) who was Jiangfs vice mayor
in Shanghai during the 1980s and Jiang elevated him to Party
chief/mayor in 1991. Fourth-ranked Politburo member, Jia Qinglin
who chairs Chinafs gsecond legislature,h the powerless Chinese
Peoplefs Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), is another Jiang
loyalist. In 1995, Jia was chosen by Jiang to replace Beijingfs corrupt
but powerful mayor Chen Xitong, but Jia has his own unsavory
reputation.2
Zeng Qinghong, the fi fth ranking member of the SC and successor
in Hu Jintaofs ceremonial position as vice president, had also been
with Jiang continually since the 1980s and remains Jiangfs most
trusted confi dant. Huang Ju, Jiangfs hand-picked successor to Wu
97
Bangguo as Shanghai party boss, was as colorless and unimaginative
an apparatchik as Shanghai had seen in decades.3 And the former
Guangdong Party chief, Li Changchun, was Jiangfs choice to be
premier rather than Wen Jiabao\a decision that not even Jiang
could push through, given Lifs own shady reputation.4 The two
others in the SC are Central Discipline Inspection Commission chair,
Wu Guanzheng\also thought by some to be a Jiang protege5\and
Luo Gan, a co-factionalist of outgoing NPC Chairman and former
Premier Li Peng, have less loyalty to Jiang, but are hardly stalwart
supporters of the Hu/Wen reformist line. By all accounts, Luo was
not chosen to help Hu and Wen balance Jiang Zeminfs infl uence
on the SC, but rather to look after former Premier (and orthodox
hardliner) Li Pengfs affairs.
In this context, when the smoke-fi lled rooms of the 16th Party
Congress had cleared, Jiang Zemin was in a far more powerful
position than he was before his retirement from the Party and State
chairmanships.6 Most of his traditional rivals and opponents in the
top leadership (Li Ruihuan, Qiao Shi, and even the long-suffering
Zhu Rongji, to name a few) were gone.7
In short, Jiang Zemin has not even pretended to transfer power
to the rising and young(ish) gFourth Generation.h Instead, he
plans to rule through them. But just in case his proteges prove
not to be as loyal as he might want, Jiang decided to retain his
control of the PLA by keeping his CMC chairmanship. This was a
certain disappointment to Hu Jintao and about-to-be Premier Wen
Jiabao who had reportedly plotted through the summer of 2002 to
maneuver Jiang into retirement.8 But both of those gentlemen are
well-tempered in the twilight struggle of Beijingfs internecine power
plays, and both are by all accounts superbly intelligent, so they must
know their limits.
Their stratagem in a subtle campaign to pry Jiangfs fi ngers from
the reins of power is to to play along for the time being. Immediately
upon being named CCP Party head on November 15, 2002, Hu Jintao
pledged fealty to Jiangfs gThree Representsh theory and quickly
assured the elder leader that in all gimportant mattersh he would
see to it that the Politburo sought Jiangfs guidance and leadership
before a decision is reached.9 Of course, this raised the embarrassing
98
possibility that Hu might not take power at all, but rather cede it by
default to Jiang and his cohorts.
Then came the fi rst clear evidence of gTwo Centers.h On Saturday,
November 17, 2002, the militaryfs propaganda organ, the Peoplefs
Liberation Army Daily (PLAD), proudly declared the loyalty of
the gbroad mass of the offi cers and ranks of the entire armyh to
the new Party Center and to the CMC with gComrade Jiang Zemin
as core of the collective leadership of the Third Generation.h gWe
absolutely and unwaveringly adhere to the principle of the Party
controlling the Army, and will resolutely obey the commands of the
Party Center and Chairman Jiang Zemin.h10 gChairman Jiangh was
mentioned six times in the editorial, and only once was Hu Jintao
mentioned by name\and then only in the context of gthe Party
Center with comrade Hu Jintao as its secretary generalh which will
unswervingly hold high the banner of the gimportant theory of the
Three Represents.h (The gThree Represents,h of course, are Jiangfs
signature contribution to the ideology of Chinese communism.) By
Monday, November 18, two Taiwan newspapers reported on the
anomalous split loyalty.11
Fast forward to March 2003 and the eve of the NPC which\some
observers devoutly but vainly prayed\might see CMC Chairman
Jiang fi nally relinquish leadership of the military and turn over this
fi nal, essential rein of power to the younger, fresher, more reformist
Hu Jintao. But it was not to be. The NPC merely reaffi rmed Jiang as
the chairman of the state CMC, a protocolary nicety for the already
incumbent Party CMC chair.
What was odd, however, was the appearance in print\in the
PLAD, no less\of a number of comments and quotable quotes from
upper ranking PLA offi cers in the Armyfs NPC delegation.
After listening to a speech given by Jiang Zemin (reported by the
March 4 PLAD), generals Gu Huisheng and Ai Husheng serving as
PLA deputies to the NPC, complained that gmany centers means
no center, which will lead to no achievement.h They then explained
the metaphysical truth behind the Chinese characters for gcenterh
(zhong), gloyaltyh (zhong), and gdisasterh (huan). gOne ezhongf
(center) and one exinf (heart) together make one loyalty, but piecing
two ezhongsf together to one exinf gives one ehuanf, a disaster.h
They explained that ghaving etwo centersf means no center at all.h12
99
These were not just your average PLA malcontents speaking, either.
Major-General Gu was deputy chief of the Nanjing Military Region
(MR) political department and General Ai ran the PLAfs Information
Technology Warfare Unit, although he is gfar better remembered
as the colonel who led the fi rst regiment to occupy Tiananmen
Square on June 4, 1989, and got rid of demonstrating students with
bloodshed.h13
What makes this gstruggle between two linesh different from
those of the past, is that the PLA doesnft seem to have the same
reverence for their chairman, Jiang Zemin, that they had for his
predecessors, Deng Xiaoping and Mao Zedong. As of September
2003, as a clear dividing line emerged between the inchoate Hu
Jintao faction and the fi rmly-established gShanghai Factionh (or the
gShanghai Gangh as the Hong Kong press irreverently calls them)
under gChairman Jiang,h there are signs that the military leadership
may actually prefer Hu Jintaofs competent leadership to Jiangfs.
How Hu and Jiang manage their relationship with the PLA will
depend greatly on the talents of their top political allies: Premier
Wen Jiabao and Vice Premier Zeng Qinghong.

WEN AND ZENG: FACTION LEADERS

This chapter contrasts these two secondary fi gures at the top of
the two Beijing leadership factions now vying for preeminence in
Chinafs political structure. Wen Jiabao is the urbane, intellectual,
greformisth and self-effacing premier of China who has been at the
center of power in Beijing for nearly 15 years. Zeng Qinghong is
the ambitious, canny, determined capo de capo of Jiangfs Shanghai
Gang who is Chinafs titular vice president. Premier Wen has quietly
built up a base of support among Beijingfs party and government
bureaucracy over a decade-and-a-half of competent management in
the CCP Politburo Secretariat. Vice President Zengfs infl uence, on
the other hand, has come with a decade of service as Chairman Jiang
Zeminfs chief of staff in both the Party and the Army.
Wenfs ties with the bureaucracy are bolstered by a reputation for
scholarly and serious analysis of issues, proven leadership in crises
and genuine consideration of all sides of a policy debate. Zengfs ties
100
with the party and military come from a career of recommending
suitable promotions and appointments for Jiang loyalists during a
period when Jiangfs leadership suffered from sniping and harassment
from other Politburo heavyweights. But more importantly, Zengfs
ties with the military are the rightful legacy of a man to the revolution
born. His father, Zeng Shan, headed the CCPfs main base area before
the legendary gLong March,h his mother was one of only 27 female
cadres to survive the March, two of his brothers are generals, and
his sister, Major General Zeng Haisheng, is apparently the highestranking
woman in the PLA.
Both Premier Wen and Vice President Zeng are technocrats of a
sort. The premier is a published geologist with the equivalent of a
doctorate, while the vice president graduated from an aeronautical
college with a degree in automated systems and served as a rocket
engineer with the military in the 1960s. But they are completely
different creatures in every other way.
Given these contrasting fi gures holding rival positions in the
Chinese leadership, what are the implications for Chinafs economic
future if either gains ascendancy\or if both manage to coexist in
separate leadership spheres for an extended period?
Wen Jiabao: The Early Years.
As Chinese politicians go, Wen Jiabao is an attractive fi gure. He is
fi t and trim, with a well-chiseled face; he is from humble origins, and
by all accounts he is personable and engaging. He is also an avowed
reformist with a feeling of dedication for Chinafs common people,
a policy trait that is far less obvious in Zeng Qinghong, or indeed
anyone in the gShanghaih camp. Premier Wenfs policy focus since
his promotion to vice premier in 1998 has been Chinafs fi nancial
crisis\perhaps the single biggest challenge facing Chinafs economic
planners in the early 21st century. But when he appeared at the
Great Hall of the People on March 18, 2003, for his inaugural press
conference with foreign reporters, he promised to narrow Chinafs
widening income gap and make rural and urban development a
gpriority of priorities.h14 A look at Wenfs background may help to
illuminate his policy predilections.
101
Wen Jiabao was born in the outskirts of Japanese-occupied
Tianjin in September 1942 to a rural school teachersf family. His
father, Wen Gang, was a geology instructor at a Tianjin middle
school and his mother, Yang Xiulan, taught grammar at a Tianjin
elementary school. Young Jiabaofs grandfather, Wen Yingshi, ran a
rural schoolhouse at the Wen family home at No. 8 Wenjia Hutong,
in the village of Yixingfu just north of the city. Jiabao thrived in a
simple brick and adobe compound, taught by his grandfather during
the days and by his parents in the evenings. Though impoverished,
young Jiabao absorbed an appreciation for Chinese calligraphy and
painting that has lasted his lifetime.
Another thing that served him well in later life was his
grandfatherfs passion for Tang Dynasty poetry. Young Jiabao was
said to have memorized half of the ancient classic 300 Tang Poems,
roughly the equivalent of memorizing three Shakespeare plays.15 In
addition to his innate intelligence, Jiabaofs excellent memory made
him a star pupil. His interest in geology came at his fatherfs knee.
In addition to gaining a deep appreciation for literature and science
early in life, Wen also got his fi rst taste of war and the value of
family. Certainly, one of the most traumatic experiences of his early
childhood was the sacking of his village, the torching of the family
compound and school, and the murder of his grandfather at the
end of 1948 during the civil war.16 In January 1949, the Tianjin area
was occupied by the PLAfs Fourth Field Army, and fi nally Jiabaofs
granduncle, Wen Pengjiu, an aide to Zhou Enlai, turned up to help
the family of his dead brother along the road to recovery.
Premier Wen hasnft been shy about describing his early childhood
to American audiences. He told an audience at Harvard University:
As you probably know, Ifm the son of a schoolteacher. I spent my
childhood mostly in the smoke and fi re of war. I was not as fortunate
as you as a child. When Japanese aggressors drove all the people in my
place to the Central Plaza, I had to huddle closely against my mother.
Later on, my whole family and house were all burned up, and even the
primary school that my grandpa built himself all went up in fl ames. In
my work life, most of the time I worked in areas under the most harsh
conditions in China. Therefore I know my country and my people quite
well, and I love them so deeply.17
102
To an audience in Washington, DC, Wen confided:
My childhood was spent in hardships of war. Even today, I still could
remember that. Because even a child had to face the bayonets of fascist
aggressors, and he huddled against his mother. And I still remember how
it felt, and I personally experienced that. And my familyfs and my house
was all burned up in the war, and even the school, the modest school
that my grandfather built with his own hands, was all destroyed.18
With his family tutelage in literature and science, and a wartime
childfs determination to survive, Jiabao was a precocious student.
In 1954 he was admitted into Tianjinfs prestigious Nankai middle
school, the alma mater of Chinafs revered Premier Zhou Enlai. Middle
school must have been a glorious time for the youth. His teachers
remember him fondly\but Wen is now Premier, so that is to be
expected. Still, Wen has made three unannounced private trips back
to the Nankai campus since 1990, where he called on his old teachers
and gave encouraging talks to the startled youngsters who hadnft
been notifi ed of the old boyfs appearance. The dean of Nankaifs
junior class in 1959 claims to have a clear memory of young Jinbaofs
gfocus, discipline, and fi rm-study habits,h but she also recalled Wen
as being introverted and gfrustrated if he wasnft quickly able to eeat
upf what he read.h19
Upon graduating from Nankai and getting top marks in the
national university exams, Wen was guaranteed acceptance to any
of Chinafs most impressive schools, and certainly nearby Beijing or
Tsinghua universities must have been attractive. But Wen chose his
fatherfs profession and took a place at Beijing Institute of Geology,
the countryfs top geology school, which boasted a teaching staff with
American and European (rather than Soviet) training. Again, Wen
performed superbly, and on the eve of his May 1965 graduation,
the institutefs party organization approved Wenfs membership
in the Chinese Communist Party. Immediately, he was accepted
as a research student in the institutefs graduate program to study
gsectoralh geology, with a concentration on mining. The graduate
program exposed him to scholarly journals from a broad range of
foreign countries\mostly in English, a language in which he is said
to have a fairly advanced reading facility.
103
An unhappy drawback of the Beijing Geology Institute was its
centrality in the bloody Red Guard rivalries in Beijing during the
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) which exploded on
the scene in May 1966. As a gred and experth student, Wen penned
a big character poster urging the schoolfs party committee to gshake
up a revolutionh (nao geming) and attacking the schoolfs gbourgeois
educational mindset.h But it didnft insulate Wen from being attacked
by his fellow students for his dubious class background. Wasnft his
grandfather a petit bourgeoise, after all? Perhaps so, but fortunately
his grandfatherfs elder brother, Pengjiu, had also been a roomate of
Premier Zhou Enlaifs top aide [later foreign minister] Qiao Guanhua
and was a senior Tianjin cadre in his own right.20 Pengjiufs infl uence
was not enough to save Wenfs parents from doing an obligatory
year in the countryside for their pre-revolutionary sins of capitalism,
but Jiabao himself suffered little. Little, that is, until 1968, the
year of the cataclysmic July 27 Red Guard battles in Beijing, when
screaming fanatics from the Geology Institutefs gEarth Factionh and
the Aeronautical Universityfs gHeaven Factionh (all joined by cofactionalists
from Tsinghua University) butchered and maimed each
other in fi ghting that lasted the entire day. The g7-27 Incidenth was
the breaking point for Mao Zedong who fi nally ordered the PLA to
clean out the city of students and ship them all off to the countryside
to cool off\forever, as far as he was concerned.21 But Wen missed the
July violence because he was already off in the western deserts.
In the Gansu Wilderness.
Up to the previous February, Wen Jiabao remained at the
Institute, unable to continue his studies but already fi nished with
the equivalent of a doctoral program. That month he received
his orders to serve as a gtechnicianh with the Gansu Provincial
Geodynamics Unit in Jiuquan\a Gobi Desert town near gJade Gateh
at the distant extremity of the Great Wall of China. Shivering in the
late winter winds on the platform at Beijing Station, he didnft realize
how fortunate he would be to miss the upcoming violent climax
of political radicalism at his alma mater. As his granduncle, Wen
Pengjiu, saw him off at the train station, the words of a Tang poem
beclouded him: gThe Spring Breezes never reach Jade Gate Pass.h
104
Winds came with a vengeance during one of his fi rst fi eld studies
that summer. In the wastes of Gansu, he and three fellow cadres were
caught in a black-night rainstorm which collapsed their tents three
times before it was over. The rains fl ooded their camp, and Wen is
credited with saving the lives of his colleagues that night. Wen later
came to be an expert in fl ash fl ooding, something that came in handy
later in his life when he was put in charge of relief work for the oncein-
a-century Yangtze basin deluge of 1998.
One account says that young Wen hadnft been in Gansu long
before gfactional strugglesh sent him to a farm to do manual labor.
Nearly two decades later, after Wen had been named deputy
director of the Central Offi ce, gsome people in Jiuquan sent a letter
to Beijing accusing Wen of being in the gvanguard of the eCriticize
Lin Biao, Criticize Confuciusf movementh in the town, and said that
he was a gardent critic of Deng Xiaoping,h and had gdestroyed old
cadres.h In an attempt to get to the bottom of the matter, the Central
Organization Department sent inspectors to Jiuquan four separate
times, and in the end gave Wen a thumbs-up.22
After a decade working as a fi eld geologist in outback Gansu, Wen
amassed an encyclopedic knowledge of the provincefs geoforms and
used his superior analytical and literary skills to produce volumes of
valuable and unprecedented scientifi c reporting for the Ministry of
Geology in Beijing.
gSpring Breezesh eventually came to gJade Gate Passh when
Jiabao met a young female gemologist from the 1966 class of the
Lanzhou University geology department, Zhang Peili.23 In Beijing,
Wen had been seeing one young woman, but she was assigned away
from Beijing after graduation. Wen is also said to have had three coeds
eyeing him while he was in Jiuquan, but Zhang Peili gtook the
most initiative,h often volunteering to do his laundry and gsnagging
his heart.h24 Zhang is considered an extrovert, nicely balancing
Wenfs natural reticence.
Two children (a son, Wen Yunsong, and a daughter, Wen Ruchun)
eventually came to the couple\both of whom reportedly studied
in the United States.25 And eventually a promotion came to Wen
as well. In 1978, after a decade of mapping geologic outcroppings
and tapping at rocks and crystals in the Gansu desert, Wen was
appointed as gMember of the SC of the Party Committee of the
105
Geomechanics Survey Team under the Gansu Provincial Geological
Bureau and Deputy Team Chief.h His service as part of the Teamfs
party committee must have convinced higher-ups in Lanzhou
that Wen Jiabao had what it took to be a management-level cadre,
because in 1979 he was promoted to be a deputy section head in the
Gansu Provincial Geological Bureau and given the academic title of
gengineer.h In 1981 he was promoted yet again as deputy executive
director of the provincial geology bureau.
It was also fortunate for Wenfs career that the Communist
Party Chief in Gansu Province happened to be Song Ping, a former
secretary to Zhou Enlai. In August of 1980, Song mulled a new
directive from Beijing ordering the retirement of overage cadres
and their replacement with signifi cantly younger ones. A seasoned
veteran of Beijingfs intrigues, Song also knew that the Beijing was
going to need a new generation of cadres to fi ll slots in the central
party and government bureaucracy that had been decimated in the
Cultural Revolution. He began to look around his Gansu domain for
likely candidates. His fi rst choice was an obvious one\one young
Hu Jintao who was a graduate of Tsinghua University (Songfs alma
mater of sorts) and a protege of Songfs wife, Chen Shunyao, who
had been the Universityfs deputy Party chief in the early 1960s when
Hufs application for Communist Party membership was approved.
There is no doubt that Mrs. Song knew and liked young Jintao.26
But Songfs other choice for promotion to Beijing was Wen
Jiabao, although Song apparently did not know Wen personally.
Rather, visiting Beijing Minister of Geology Sun Daguang made
the recommendation to Party Chief Song Ping after a particularly
successful visit to Gansu in early spring of 1982. Minister Sun had
been impressed by the quality of reporting from Gansu and went
out to see the province himself. He was also in the process of hacking
away the ministryfs deadwood and was on the lookout for new
talent. A few days with Wen Jiabao convinced him that he had found
a good prospect. gWen Jiabao, thatfs the man I want, bring him to
Beijing, he has the makings of a minister,h is how Sun approached
Song Ping with the idea.27 Song then canvassed the provincial
geology bureau with a questionnaire\gwho would be best suited
for a job in Beijing?h and the answer was pretty unanimous\gWen
Jiabao.h
106
According to the Yang Zhongmei biography, Song then did his
own background check. Satisfi ed that Wen had the right stuff, he
gave Wenfs transfer his personal seal of approval.28 And by October
1982, just as the 12th Party Congress was ending, Wen arrived in
Beijing to take up his post as director of mining policy and a member
of the geology ministryfs party committee.
Wen Jiabao in Beijing.
The scholarly and thoughtful Wen Jiabao continued to impress
his colleagues and after a certain probation period, Minister Sun
Daguang promoted him to vice-minister of Geology and Mineral
Resources, deputy secretary of its gLeading Party Members
Group,h and director of the ministryfs political department where
Wen served for two years overseeing the ministryfs planning and
fi nancial policies.
By this time, Song Ping had been transferred to the Party Center
in Beijing where he took over the all-powerful State Planning
Commission. When Wenfs boss, geology minister Sun Daguang,
heard through the grapevine that the Partyfs general secretary,
Hu Yaobang, was looking for a bright young candidate to be
deputy director of the CPC Central Committeefs General Offi ce,
he immediately called Song Ping and suggested they push to get
Vice Minister Wen into the job. Other candidates for the slot were a
deputy party secretary in Shanghai, Wu Bangguo, and State Council
Secretary General Wang Zhongyu. And in October 1985, after all the
dossiers were reviewed, Wen Jiabao got the job.
It was the fi rst completely nontechnical job Wen had ever had.
Again, Wen apparently fi t right in with Party General Secretary Hu
Yaobangfs frenetic, avuncular, and free-wheeling style on the party
side and Premier Zhao Ziyangfs worried, methodical, and theoretical
reformism on the government side. In 1987, after Hu Yaobangfs fall
from grace and Zhaofs appointment as Party Chief, Wen was put
on Zhaofs gPolitical Structural Reform Small Grouph and also had a
hand in economic reform policies. Zhao also placed Wen as deputy
director of the preparatory commission for the 13th Party Congress
in October, and Wen is said to have ensured that Zhaofs policies
survived the debates of that seminal meeting.
107
Zhao also rewarded Wen Jiabao with a seat on the Communist
Partyfs Central Committee and was made the only alternate member
of the infl uential party centerfs Secretariat. It is notable that at this
time, although Hu Jintao was the Partyfs youngest provincial leader,
Wen Jiabao ranked well ahead of Hu in the party structure\and
was a scant three months older. But China was going through a
rough adjustment to Deng Xiaopingfs capitalistic reforms. Not only
was infl ation nearing 40 percent at one point in 1987, but political
relaxations had released an extravagance of new thinking among
intellectuals. There was a clamor to re-impose the discipline of
central planning structures to stabilize commodity pricing and a
howl for gspiritual civilizationh to counteract political forces that
undermined the Partyfs legitimacy.
Tiananmen Boils Over.
This reactionary countercurrent was resisted by Chinafs young
intelligentsia, and their frustrations erupted in mass demonstrations
on April 17 when their patron saint, Hu Yaobang, died unexpectedly.
The demonstrations grew and expanded and accreted all manner
of sympathizers\students, laborers, government bureaucrats,
even police. Housewives, shopkeepers, private entrepreneurs, taxi
drivers, all joined in. The demonstrations moved early on to Central
Beijingfs 98-acre Tiananmen Square and there they stayed, day and
night, drawing masses of over a million to tell the central authorities
they were fed up.
By the evening of May 19, 1989, Wen Jiabao had become known
in Party circles as General Secretary Zhao Ziyangfs man in the
Secretariat and the Central Offi ce. So it was unsurprising that
Wen accompanied Secretary Zhao in the persistent drizzle that
night to Tiananmen Square for a call on hunger-strikers. As Wen
somberly held an umbrella over Zhaofs head, Zhao choked out
a rambling apology that the students did not quite understand.
That day, unbeknownst to the demonstrators in the Square, the
Party Center had approved the use of force in the Square. As Zhao
spoke, hundreds of thousands of PLA troops were mobilizing for
deployment to Beijing.
108
On May 23, Deng Xiaoping summoned Shanghaifs party
secretary Jiang Zemin to Beijing to inform him that he was to replace
Zhao Ziyang as the CCPfs general secretary. Deng then ordered Jiang
to return to Shanghai and detain NPC Chairman, Wan Li, on his
emergency return to China from the United States. Jiang was gentle
in his detention, placing Wan in a local hospital to help him recover
from the stresses of the demands of the Tiananmen demonstrations.
Of course, some believed that Wan would have mobilized the NPC
to support Zhao Ziyang had he been able to return to Beijing, but
fortunately, his plane was scheduled to arrive in Shanghai fi rst.29
Wenfs survival of the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre is a case study
in communist party ethics. Shortly after the June 4 disaster, Wen
remained prominent in the media, while Zhao Ziyang became a
nonperson. A bit tardily, on June 8, Wen wrote on behalf of the gLabor
Committee of Central Government Agenciesh to congratulate the
Party Center for crushing the Tiananmen gturmoilh and returning
the country to stability, and signed as the committee chief.30 On June
12, Wen accompanied CCP Central SC Member Qiao Shi to call on
the martial law troops and a number of Peoplefs Armed Police (PAP)
units which had participated in the Tiananmen operation, followed
by a visit to wounded soldiers being cared for in Beijingfs hospitals.
On June 19, he accompanied Premier Li Peng on calls to family
members of PLA and PAP soldiers killed in the action.31
Despite Wenfs outward expression of support for the
Tiananmen action, there were those in the leadership who wanted
a thoroughgoing housecleaning of all Zhao Ziyang factionalists. Li
Xiannian and Wang Zhen, among others, called for Wenfs removal
explicitly, and Li Peng and the Executive Vice Premier Yao Yilin
seconded the motion. The Hong Kong press was rife with rumors
that the head of the young, intelligent, attractive reformist of the
Zhao camp was on the chopping block.
I remember asking knowledgeable party cadres in Guangzhou
about Wen Jiabao in September 1989, with the thought that if Wen
went, reformism in China was dead. But I was universally assured
that Wen would not only endure, he would prevail.32 I did not
know that party leaders in Beijing had already decided to keep Wen
Jiabao on the job. Wenfs guardian was retired Geology Minister
109
Sun Daguang who sent a note to the Party Center declaring that he
had nominated Wen for the Central Offi ce directorfs job only after
a rigorous review of his political background. He was certain that
Wen was sound. Sun, a reliable gold revolutionaryh sent his report
to Party elders Peng Zhen and Bo Yibo, both of whom had also dealt
with Wen. They, too, seconded Sunfs testament.
Perhaps Wenfs most important post-Tiananmen support came
from Song Ping who had just been named as one of the six top
Party leaders in the Politburo SC. Although Song had not directly
recommended Wen for any positions, he had signed off on all of
them, and even he agreed that Wen Jiabaofs credentials as a reliable
communist were impeccable. By accompanying Party General
Secretary Zhao Ziyang to Tiananmen Square on the night of May
19 and holding his umbrella in the drizzle, Wen was only doing his
job. It demonstrated gloyalty to the organization,h he said, not to the
man.33 Wen has since put the Tiananmen issue behind him, at least
in public.34
Wen remained in the central offi ce, but had to deal with a new
reality. Incoming Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin had arrived
in Beijing with only one assistant, Zeng Qinghong from Shanghai.
All Jiang asked was that Zeng be placed in the CCPfs Central Offi ce
as a deputy to Wen Jiabao. Whether this refl ected Jiangfs or Zengfs
appreciation of the importance of the CCP Central Offi ce in shaping
political agendas is unknown, but it is clear that from the beginning,
Wen expected Zeng to replace him as the policy traffi c-cop in the
CCPfs Central Committee. Wen apparently got along splendidly
with newcomer Zeng.35
Reform, PLA Infi ghting and the 14th Party Congress.
In January 1992, Deng Xiaoping was frustrated by the lack of
progress on economic reforms at the hands of Premier Li Peng and
the central planners of the CCPfs orthodox wing. Time was running
out for Deng. He was becoming ever more frail, and the 14th Party
Congress to be held that October would be his last chance to leave
his imprint on Marxist thought. Forging a coalition that would pay
obeisance to reforms and establish gDeng Theoryh in the canon of
110
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics became a desperate priority
for him. He launched the so-called gSouthern Progressh (Nanxun)
in Guangdong to popularize his new ideology\gwhatever benefi ts
increasing the comprehensive strength (zonghe liliang) of the socialist
state, whatever benefi ts the improvement of the peoplefs standard
of living, that is socialism.h He urged the Party to reject its obsession
with grightisth tendencies, and instead focus on the gimportant
thing, to oppose eleftismf.h36
Jiangfs aide Zeng Qinghong was instrumental in getting Jiang
to buy on to this vision, and Wen Jiabao aided Zeng in this effort.
With a bit of maneuvering, Zeng and Wen managed to put Jiang
Zemin in Deng Xiaopingfs camp\in opposition to Li Peng and
Lifs mentor, Chen Yun, who was Dengfs rival in the top ranks of
Chinafs powerful but rapidly aging ranks of gOld Revolutionaries.h
But more importantly, Deng had the unswerving loyalty of the
PLA. Jiangfs chief rivals, President Yang Shangkun and his ghalfbrother,h
Yang Baibing, hoped to gain Dengfs acquiescence in their
bid to supplant Deng as the paramount force in the military. In the
Byzantine machinations of Beijingfs factional struggle, the gYang
Brothersh were on the verge of outfl anking Jiang Zeminfs titular role
as CMC chair by offering Deng Xiaoping the PLAfs support of Dengfs
reforms in marked contrast to Jiangfs evident lack of enthusiasm for
ideological battles.
Instead, Zeng (with Wen Jiabaofs help) convinced Jiang not only
to support the reforms against the Old Revolutionaries but also to
enlist the sympathies of Old Soldiers who implacably hated the
gYang Brothersh and their bald-faced attempt to consolidate their
hold on PLA promotions.
By September 1992, an impressive phalanx of old generals wrote
an open letter to Deng Xiaoping and the CPC Central Committee
hinting, in the words of one Hong Kong journal, that the gYang
Brothersh were gleft one moment, and right the next,h and gfeigning
compliance with Deng Xiaoping.h The old generals had no beef
with Deng, but their real targets were the Yangs.37 In the end, Deng
determined that the gYang Brothersh were a divisive force in the
military and ordered that they be removed from authority in the
PLA. With them gone, Jiang Zemin was the undisputed chief civilian
leader in the CMC, and the way was open for him to exert his
111
infl uence in the Army ranks by virtue of his prerogative in general
rank promotions.
In the run-up to the 14th Party Congress in October 1992, Wen
worked closely with Zeng, as well as with Song Ping (in charge of
CCP organization work) and Songfs protege, then-Tibetan Party
Chief Hu Jintao, to map out the blueprint for the Congress.38 The
Party Charter (Dang Zhang) for the 14th Congress also did something
remarkable\it elevated gDeng Xiaoping Theoryh to equal status
with gMao Zedong Thought.h39 At the same time, Jiang Zemin read
the Party Work Report to explain what it meant for him to be the
gCore of the Third Generation of Leaders.h40 The term gcoreh had
little meaning in the CCP glossary until it was defi ned formally in
Jiangfs Political Report to the 14th Congress: gthe central leading
collective of the fi rst generation, with comrade Mao Zedong as the
core . . . [and] the central leading collective of the second generation,
with comrade Deng Xiaoping as the core. . .h
In the process, Hu Jintao managed to snag himself a prize\a
seat on the CCP Politburo SC, leap-frogging into the top council
of Chinafs leadership at the age of 49. Wen was just as happy to be
promoted to an alternate Politburo position and retain his seat in the
CCP Secretariat.
Truth be known, Wen was in line for a vice premiership. Jiang
Zemin hoped to buy Wenfs loyalty by putting him in charge of the
State Councilfs agricultural policy, but the ardent lobbying of Premier
Li Peng turned a vice premiership over to Jiang Chunyun, a Li Peng
partisan, and the Agricultural portfolio went to new executive Vice
Premier Zhu Rongji. Although Zhu had been Jiangfs successor as
Shanghai Party chief, he owed little (or nothing) to Jiang. Rather, his
ascent to the senior vice premiership was at the insistence of Deng
Xiaoping who had been consistently impressed by Zhufs capable
management of Shanghaifs reforms following Jiangfs promotion to
the top spot in Beijing.
Premier Zhufs Idea Man on Agricultural Policy.
But Zhu seemed to appreciate Wen Jiabaofs talents as much as
Jiang, and Zhu named Wen to be his deputy in the Partyfs newly
created gLeading Group on Agriculture.h41 In January 1993, Zeng
112
Qinghong formally replaced Wen Jiabao as Central Offi ce director,
and Wen was left with little else to do but assist Vice Premier Zhu
in agricultural policy as an alternate member of the Politburo. It was
a daunting task. At fi rst, the vice premier focused on the plight of
the peasant, viewing rural poverty and the growing income gap
with the urban coastal regions as a potential source of catastrophic
instability. Throughout 1993, Wen Jiabao penned all central-level
directives and media commentaries on rural policy. Moreover,
agricultural issues were a back-burner case for Jiang Zemin, and
Wenfs task rapidly became a thankless one\one for which he
would bear the responsibility if rural development suddenly were
to become a crisis. Jiang was becoming adept at giving hard tasks to
cadres outside his own faction. They were, after all, expendable.
Even so, Wen Jiabao had nothing else to do, so he took it as his
own. Over the coming months and years, Wen successfully kept
agricultural issues on Vice Premier Zhufs radar screen, drafting a
fi ve-point policy directive in May 1993 calling for reductions in the
peasantsf growing tax burdens, opening credit channels via state
banks, and slamming local cadres who levied arbitrary and (more
often) capricious fees on the already poverty-stricken farmers. Vice
Premier Zhu, who by this time had taken over the most substantive
economic portfolios from Premier Li Peng, was impressed by Wenfs
tenacity. Zhu himself declared that gAgriculture is the foundation
of the nation, without the farmers there is no stability.h Wen
accompanied the vice premier on an inspection tour of rural Hunan
in May, and was shocked to learn of the dire straits the locals had
landed in. At Wenfs suggestion, Vice Premier Zhu ordered the locals
in Changde district to get development capital via the state banks
and said gherefs my telephone number, call me when you get the
money.h Zhu wanted to know if his orders would be followed.
With the full backing and authority of the vice premier (though
perhaps without his constant attention), Wen Jiabao pushed ahead
with agricultural policy development. In June 1994, Wen penned
a major commentary in Qiu Shi (Seek Truth), the Partyfs most
prestigious theoretical journal. The Partyfs policy goals in the rural
areas included effi cient distribution of farm inputs and produce,
stable prices for inputs but steadily increasing prices for farm
outputs, the development of rural industries and services, expansion
113
of market structures, and extended land use contracts. Wen called
for increased government investment in the agricultural sector and a
systematic reform of the pricing structures.
In March of 1995, Wen wrote another commentary for Qiu Shi
outlining the gSeven Major Problems In Agricultureh and discussed
their remedies in terms of creating an exchange market for land
use rights, vastly improved rural education, relaxing rural labor
mobility, developing the light industrial potential of the farm
sector, strengthening political supervision at the basic levels, and
fi nally deepening gspiritual civilizationh in the countryside with an
emphasis on gdemocratic rule of law.h
By the time of the CCPfs 15th Party Congress in October 1997,
Wen Jiabaofs stock had risen so high that he was fi nally put in
charge of the Central Committee Secretariat, and in 1998 he was
appointed to a vice premiership\that year, he was the only new vice
premier. For the rest of his 5-year tenure as vice premier, Wen made
agricultural reforms the centerpiece of his accomplishments.
Wen Jiabao and the Floods of 1998.
In April 1998, he was also made head of the emergency fl ood
task force, and in May he was named head of the State Councilfs
gLeading Small Group on Agricultural Poverty.h42
August 1998 saw the heaviest fl oods in recent Chinese memory.
On August 1, the Jiayi Levee in Hubei burst its banks killing and
injuring several thousand PLA troops assigned to engineering
work on the structure. On August 4, the Jiangzhou levee collapsed,
making 40,000 homeless in the rains. On August 5, the Hubei
provincial government reported that waters from the Yangtse
river had challenged the lip of the Xingzhou Levee two or three
times. If the Levee were breached, it would endanger the entire
Wuhan municipal region. According to the Yang Zhongmei book,
the summer leadership meeting at Beidaihe on August 7 placed all
the responsibility for fl ood emergency operations and relief on Vice
Premier Wen Jiabao (though it seems that the Center had taken its
sweet time about even calling a meeting to address the issue).
The vice premier fi nally arrived in Xingzhou on August 9 to take
charge of the engineering work and ordered up 4,000 troops from the
114
15th Airborne Army and the Guangzhou MR. For the next several
days, state television repeatedly aired footage of the vice premier
directing rescue efforts while, in the words of the Los Angeles Times,
gtreading through muddy waters and shouting through bullhorns
in the rain.h43 Itfs hard to see what Wen actually did, however. The
Yang Zhongmei biography essentially had Wen ordering the PLA
engineers not to take action that might exacerbate fl ooding in other
areas, but not doing anything at the scene that actually helped the
situation.44 In the months following the fl ood, however, Wen turned
his attention to avoiding the problems that magnifi ed the disasters
of the August 1998 fl oods and promulgating relief and insurance
policies that would aid the victims.45
Nonetheless, Wen once again snatched success from the jaws of
a very nasty mess. Had the Xingzhou levee disintegrated and the
fl oodwaters inundated Wuhan, vice premier Wen would probably
have been forced to resign. As it was, he gave every appearance of
being a cool, intelligent, take-charge leader.
Learning the Complexities of State Finance.
As if Wen didnft have enough to do in 1998, he was named to the
gCCP Central Financial Work Committeeh in June to help cope with
the growing dislocations sparked by the Asian fi nancial crisis of
1997-98. He also held the posts of secretary general Central Financial
and Economic Leading Group and deputy head of the State Scientifi c
and Technical Leading Group, the highest decisionmaking body
on Chinafs economic and fi nancial policies. Jiang Zemin chaired
the task force, with Zhu Rongji and Wu Bangguo as deputies, but
Wen was the workaday chief, backed up by Chinafs central bank
(Peoplefs Bank of China or PBOC), governor Dai Xianglong as his
deputy, and a dozen or so other members, including the governors
of four state-owned commercial banks, i.e., the Bank of China, China
Agricultural Development, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of
China, and China Construction Bank\all concerned with banking
sector reform, specifi cally the management of nongovernmental
deposits, credits, enterprise fi nancing, current account settlements,
foreign exchange transactions, and other activities. Over the next 5
years, China would confront a series of highly complex adjustments
115
in its fi nancial structures, including developing institutionalized
fi nancial oversight and supervision, resolving the nonperforming
loan and bad asset crisis in the state-owned commercial banks,
marketizing interest rates, and creating a competition environment
for the fi nancial industry.
Although Vice Premier Wen Jiabao was seen as an intelligent
and organized man, his appointment as the primary manager of
Chinafs fi nancial reforms gastonished the outside world.h Wen,
after all, had never been involved in fi nancial policies before. But
he had a knack for pulling teams of experts together and coming
up with effective strategies. Together with PBOC Governor Dai,
Bank of China Governor Wang Xuebing, Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China Governor Liu Tinghuan, China Construction Bank
Governor Zhou Xiaochuan, China Agricultural Bank governor He
Xianglin, and PBOC South China chief Wang Qishan, Wen formed
a very infl uential policy team, though it is debatable how well they
worked together. Certainly, Zhou Xiaochuan and Wang Qishan
were\and remain\part of Jiang Zeminfs Shanghai faction and are
more infl uenced by the central planning policies of their respective
mentors than by the reformist views shared by Wen Jiabao and
Premier Zhu Rongji.46
Nonetheless, by working painstakingly for a consensus, Wen
was effective in moving fi nancial reforms ahead and gaining
general acquiescence that Chinafs membership in the World Trade
Organization was essential to economic growth. Wen argued that
acceding to Western demands for access to Chinafs fi nancial markets
meant that Chinafs banks had to be competitive before foreign banks
were allowed entry, and that meant that fi nancial reforms had to
come sooner rather than later.
By December 2000, Vice Premier Wen Jiabao was considered a
lead-pipe cinch to replace Zhu Rongji as premier. He had proven his
talents to relieve the two biggest headaches in the Chinese economy,
agriculture and fi nance, but he had served three CCP general
secretaries loyally and, in the end, even Jiang Zemin was said to
have gbasically acceptedh Wen.47 If so, Jiang continued to play hardto-
get with Wenfs promotion to the premiership. In the Spring of
2002, several Hong Kong and Japanese media reports suggested that
Wen Jiabao had submitted his resignation to the Politburo after a
116
particularly fractious session of the Central Financial Work Group
which had been wrestling with Chinafs accession to the World Trade
Organization. One account said gJiang Zemin openly censured Wen
Jiabao for not doing his best in his work.h But other analyses from
Hong Kong indicate that, if Jiang really had made a scene about
Wenfs fi nancial work, it was in the context of assuring that Zeng
Qinghong would be guaranteed to join Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao in
gfully taking over the reins of power.h48
In January 2003, after his elevation to the Politburo SC assured
his appointment as Premier, Wen Jiabao outlined views on the
changes in the international economic systems and his vision for
Chinafs place in them. China must make better headway in dealing
with international fi nancial risk and competition, while at the same
time protecting fi nancial stability and security at home. He then
listed the fi ve priorities for fi nancial policy over the coming year: 1)
cut bank bad debt ratios; 2) implement continued fi nancial reforms
in a gstableh manner; 3) improve and perfect fi nancial statistics data
collection and monitoring, raise the overall standard of fi nancial
supervision, and perfect the institutions administering the fi nancial
sector; 4) gradually expand the opening of fi nancial markets to
foreign banks; and, 5) raise the standard of fi nancial services.49 Rather
than present a comprehensive reformist outlook, it was clear that the
new premier-designate foresaw a movement toward marketization
of Chinafs fi nancial sector with gall deliberate speed.h
Wen Jiabao as Premier.
Wen was fi nally named Premier at the March 2003 NPC, elected
with the largest vote total of any candidate\2,906 or 99.4 percent
of the ballots, with three against and 16 abstentions, comparing
favorably to Zhu Rongji who gonlyh got 97.9 percent in 1997.50 But
despite having been in the central government for over two decades,
including 15 years at the absolute center of power, he did not bring
into his cabinet a coterie of like-minded reformists. In fact, the
Jiang faction surrounded him with Shanghai Gang fi gures which
promised to rein-in any move by the new Premier\or new President
Hu Jintao, for that matter\to exercise real power.51 A good chunk
of the new State Council are Jiang faction appointees, and Secretary
117
General of the State Council Hua Jianmin is a long time Jiang loyalist
who served as Jiangfs chief confi dential secretary in Shanghai and
came to Beijing in 1994 to work with Zeng Qinghong.52 At least two
of Wenfs four vice premiers are direct Jiang loyalists, senior vice
premier Huang Ju and junior vice premier in charge of agriculture
Hui Liangyu. Zeng Peiyan reportedly has been a Jiang aide since
1992. Meanwhile, Vice Premier Wu Yi is a protege of outgoing vice
premier Li Lanqing\sympathetic with Wenfs situation, but no one
believes she will fall on her sword for the new Premier.53 Most key
State Council ministers are also Jiang partisans.54
It is debatable, however, how much Premier Wenfs agenda differs
from the Jiang factionfs. gStability is the Mission that Supercedes
All Othersh was the mantra of the more conservative wing of
the Party, and by defi nition gstabilityh in China means dealing
with unemployment in the cities and poverty in the countryside.
Premier Wen Jiabao proposes to tackle these issues by buoying
state enterprises as long as possible through state fi nancial support,
and addressing the heavy fi scal burdens placed on the farmers
by rapacious local cadres, hog-tied distribution systems, securityconstrained
labor mobility, and inadequate returns on farm outputs.
He will probably also resist efforts by U.S. and other agricultural
trading partners to open Chinaf farm markets to international
competition.
One top farm lobbyist in Washington complained in March 2003
that gat the end of [WTO] negotiations, China was a $2 billion market.
We expected substantial growth, but we havenft seen that growth
because China hasnft done what itfs supposed to.h U.S. exports like
cotton, grains, and vegetable oils have had particular trouble getting
through Chinafs opaque quota system and into Chinafs domestic
markets. On the other hand, China is now a net exporter of cotton,
maize corn, honey, and apples, and has become a major competitor
in international markets with U.S. producers.55 Moreover, China is
utilizing a number of pseudo-quarantine measures to exclude other
U.S. farm products, particularly soybeans. Given his sympathy for
the average Chinese peasant, Premier Wen Jiabao can be expected to
continue a policy of stubborn resistance to agricultural imports. But
his fi rst order of new business will be to cut taxes on farmers and his
118
second order of business will be to vastly reduce the size of the rural
cadre bureaucracy.56
Wen pointed out that despite Premier Zhufs attempts to cut the
governmental bureaucracy by 50 percent, the vast proportion of
those offi cials stayed on in local offi ces. Altogether, there were about
45 million bureaucrats in China, with an average of 28 peasants
feeding gimperial grainh (i.e., grain intended for the welfare of
the empire) to each one of them. Wen explained that gin Chinese
history, the average has surely been less than 1 offi cial per 100
farmers in the Two Han dynasties, the ratio was one to 945; while in
the Tang dynasty, it was 1 to 500, and even in the early stages of the
Peoplefs Republic of China (PRC), the ratio was about 1 to 600, but
that slipped to 1 to 50 by 1978.h Wen is convinced that the present
situation is untenable, an attitude that may win him great adulation
in the countryside from everyone but the bureaucrats and offi cials
who run things.57
One thing that Premier Wen is highly unlikely to do is acquiesce
to Western (especially American and Japanese) pressures to revalue
upward Chinafs renminbi currency.58 On technology policy and the
development of an advanced defense industrial infrastructure, Wen
is likely to be supportive of the PLAfs priorities. A scientist himself,
Wen is convinced that technological transformation holds the key
to unlocking Chinafs vast production potential.59 By July 2003,
Premier Wen had also seized on the idea that internet commerce
was a promising way to encourage better distribution networks in
China.60

SARS: Showdown with the PLA\and Jiang.

The outbreak of a particularly virulent strain of gatypical
pneumoniah (fei dianxing feiyan) in South China, perhaps as early
as November 1, 1992, surprised nobody. South China has been the
human racefs perennial stewpot for new strains of infl uenza. What is
surprising is that the Chinese government treated it as a state secret
shortly after its recrudescence. Public health authorities in Beijing
knew that a new killer disease\soon to be dubbed gsudden acute
respiratory syndrome,h or gSARSh by the World Health Organization
(WHO)\was gripping Southern China as early as January 27 when,
119
according to the Washington Post, the Guangdong provincial health
department received a gtop secreth document from Beijing which
outlined the extent of the contagion. Unfortunately, no one in the
Guangdong health department had the security clearances to read
the document, so it remained unopened until the department chief
returned from holiday some time later.61
There has been some fi nger-pointing about what Chinese
President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao knew and when they
knew it\Washington Post reporter John Pomfret says gfrom the
start, Chinese sources said, the new government of President Hu
Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, who formally took power in March,
approved the coverup.h62 But the sequence of events leading up to
Pomfretfs story indicates that both the President and the Premier
already had blown the top off the cover-up, while Jiang Zeminfs
crony, PLA general Zhang Wenkang (Chinafs feckless and pompous
minister of public health,) was still spreading lies.
There are other indications that Hu and Wen discovered the
PLA to be Jiangfs gAchillesf heelh in the SARS crisis. As early as
March, SARS patients began appearing at the PLAfs 301 Hospital
in Beijing for treatment and were then shipped over to the 302
Hospital, infecting scores of hospital staff on the way. Minister
Zhang Wenkang, a former vice president of the Second Military
Medical University in Shanghai still holding the rank of major
general, was a typical cadre of the old school\hsubmit meaningless
reports of political accomplishments, report only happy things,
donft report worrisome thingsh is the way Zhang is described by
Yang Zhongmei.63
Yang Zhongmei also reports that the ministry of health had
coordinated their SARS research with PLA medical hospitals as
early as February, but declined to publicize their fi ndings because of
objections from the military. (In April, the WHO reported that about
8 percent of SARS victims in China were in the PLA, but the fi gure
was certainly higher.) On March 2, the PLA had already begun its
in-depth investigation of the SARS etiology, and by March 21 had
discovered it emanated from a gcoronavirus.h But the results of this
research was classifififi ed gtop secreth (ji mi) and was never shared with
the government to help with SARS control,64 although the military
120
health system did report up its own chain of command\directly to
Jiang Zemin\according to the Washington Post.65
The Chinese leadership was acutely aware that SARS was
beginning to spread international alarm. Surely, SARS had been
identifi ed fi rst in South China, and the Guangdong provincial medical
authorities were providing what statistics they had (on a low-keyed
basis) to the WHO.66 Moreover, Hong Kong and Taiwan were both
suffering from a fearsome spread of the disease, and Singapore was
also hard hit. Canadian and European health authorities reported
numerous cases and some deaths. SARS was not a mystery in
Beijing. But President Hu and Premier Wen probably only began to
focus on the issue in late March. Yang Zhongmei reports that there
was a directive from the Ministry of Public Health in mid-March
directing that operations preventing SARS should not impact the
smooth progress of the NPC, and that SARS information must not
be disseminated abroad.67
On April 3, the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular
Affairs issued a formal Travel Warning to U.S. citizens advising
that all nonessential offi cial personnel and dependents at the
U.S. Embassy in Beijing and the Consulates General in Chengdu,
Shanghai, Shenyang, Guangzhou, and Hong Kong SAR, were being
evacuated gas a precautionary measure due to the Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) situation.h
In an attempt to assuage international (and domestic) criticism
over Beijingfs offi cial cover up of the epidemic, Minister/General
Zhang Wenkang briefed foreign reporters on April 3; but rather than
admit the disease was still on a rampage, he insisted the gepidemic is
effectively under control.h68 Moreover, he declared gChina is a safe
place to work and live, including to travel.h It wasnft safe for Pekka
Aro, a Finnish staffer with the United Nationsfs (UN) International
Labor Organization offi ce in Beijing. He died of SARS on April 7.
Even Chinese physicians were outraged at Minister Zhangfs effort to
downplay the seriousness of the ongoing health crisis. Retired senior
military surgeon Colonel Jiang Yanyong, who worked one day a
week with patients at the 301 hospital, tried to tell China Central
Television network about the cover-up but was ignored.
On April 7, Premier Wen and Vice Premier Wu Yi inspected
the national center for disease control where Minister/General
121
Zhang gave them the same happy-faced reports he had been giving
foreigners all along. In private, according to the Washington Post,
the Chinese CDC workers at that meeting were encouraged that
the scales were fi nally falling from Premier Wenfs eyes. gHe talked
about the military,h said a witness, ghe said it was wrong that the
military was not reporting cases of SARS. He said we have to start
telling the truth to the people. He asked us how many people had
SARS in Beijing. We couldnft tell him.h69
Nonetheless, Premier Wen himself told the foreign press that
same day that China had gcooperated closelyh with international
and foreign health centers to control the outbreak. This was too
much for Colonel Jiang Yanyong. He tracked down National Public
Radiofs correspondent in Beijing, Rob Gifford, and gave taperecorded
interview saying that gThis is a matter of life and death, it
is very irresponsible what the Health Minister did.h Jiang cautioned
gif you deliberately give fake numbers and play down the situation,
more might die who shouldnft die and more might be infected who
shouldnft be infected.h70
Still, that same day, April 9, Vice Premier Wu Yi continued to
give assurances that SARS was not a problem in Beijing to foreign
diplomats and senior international civil servants resident in Beijing.
On April 12, the WHO fi nally lost patience with the PRC government
and issued a SARS travel warning for Beijing.
Jiang Zemin Evacuated from Beijing.
The WHO travel warning was a wake-up call to President Hu and
Premier Wen. They immediately began to reassess the situation.71
On April 11, President Hu made an emergency visit to Guangdong
in an attempt to publicize the gravity of the SARS epidemic\outside
Beijing. And at about the same time, CMC Jiang Zemin decamped
to Shanghai.72 Later in April, Jiang Zeminfs faction tried to explain
the evacuation as a prudent step to ensure leadership continuity in
gwartime.h
As Beijingfs SARS crisis drags on, knowledgeable sources in Beijjng
report that the leadership, in order to avoid a situation where the
leadership is affected by the SARS infection, the Party Center and the
122
State Council has in recent days launched an offi cial mobilization of the
gWartime Leadership Structure.h This is the fi rst time that Zhongnanhai
has had such an emergency structure in 50 years.
Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao,and Public Health Minister Wu Yi will remain in
Beijing as the gA Team Leadershiph in work against the disease.
The gB Team,h consists of Zeng Qinghong, NPC Chairman Wu Bangguo,
Executive Vice Premier Huang Ju, et al. gThe B Teamh offi cials will make
all arrangements possible to lessen the chance that SARS infections will
impact open governmental actions.
The Central Offi ce of the CPC has arranged for leadership families to
depart the crowded leadership compound at Zhongnanhai and go to
other areas to live, or to go stay with relatives.
News has it that Shanghainese like Jiang Zemin and Huang Ju have
evacuated themselves to Shanghai. But this was the fi rst time since the
founding of the nation that the wartime leadership structure has been so
mobilized.73
Whether Hu and Wen\and the doughty female Vice Premier
Wu Yi\were fl attered to be Chinafs gA Teamh is unknown, but
they quickly began to take charge. The entire Jiang Zemin faction
had abandoned Beijing, leaving them in charge. While Hu was still
in Guangdong, Premier Wen chaired an emergency meeting of the
State Council on April 13. He warned that the countryfs economy,
international image, and social stability could be affected and that
gthe overall situation remains grave.h
For some reason, Beijingfs mayor must not have been clued in
on the decision. On April 13, Beijing mayor Meng Xuenong (one
of President Hu Jintaofs few allies in Beijing) adamantly insisted
that gBeijing Cityfs atypical pneumonia epidemic situation has
already been effectively controlled and suspect cases are currently
decreasing . . . Six atypical pneumonia patients have to date been
discharged from hospital after recovery, and a Canadian among
them continues his normal work in Beijing.h74 Also on April 13, as
if to make a liar out of the hapless mayor, WHO scientists in China
complained bitterly that they still were not getting the cooperation
they needed from the Chinese authorities, especially from Chinafs
military hospitals in the Beijing area.75
123
On April 16, something totally separate from the SARS epidemic
shook the PLA high command. Diesel-powered PLA Navy submarine
No. 361 suffered an accident while on exercises in the Yellow Sea
between the Shandong and Korean peninsulas when a gmechanical
malfunctionh killed all 70 crew members on board.76 It is likely that
the PLA command did not brief anyone outside the military or the
CMC on the accident at the time, although certainly President Hu
Jintao, vice chairman of the CMC, must have been informed.
Whether the submarine disaster was on his mind or not, the
president and the premier may have made up their minds at that
time to fi re Minister Zhang, but given his support from both CMC
Chairman Jiang, as well as his putative support in the PLA, they had
to plot their strategy carefully. On April 17, Party General Secretary
Hu Jintao called the full Politburo together in an extraordinary
session in Beijing. According to the Washington Post:
Hu and Wen had spent more than 10 days preparing for the
confrontation. Hu ordered Chinafs offi cials to stop lying about the
extent of the SARS epidemic sweeping the country and vowed an all-out
war against the disease. The orders appeared on the front page of every
Chinese newspaper the next day.77
The April 20 Storm.
In addition to the April 17 meeting recorded by the Washington Post,
Yang Zhongmei describes an gexpanded session of the Politburoh on
April 19 that was full of gacrimony and argumentationh but which
fi nally passed three resolutions:
1) Zhang Wenkang and Meng Xuenong would be removed
from their Party positions (only the NPC could remove them
from their government offi ces). And they would be replaced
by Vice Health Minister Gao Qiang and Hainan Party chief
Wang Qishan, respectively. Because Comrade Liu Qi had been
remiss in his work directing the Beijing effort at combating
SARS, his case must also be looked into.
2) As the SARS situation had become the gravest of the grave,
Premier Wen Jiabao would be given plenipotentiary powers
to deal with it.
124
3) The full extent of the governmentfs SARS information will be
made public, and the government will cooperate fully with
the WHO in an effort to ease the fl ow of information.
On April 20, the sackings were announced, and Vice Chairman
of the CMC Hu Jintao, accompanied by PLA Chief of General Staff
General Guo Boxiong, inspected the PLA Institute of Military Medical
Sciencesf Institute for the Study of Infectious Microorganisms to
express his deep appreciation for their work.78
The heat was building on Jiang Zemin. On April 24, he greeted
visiting Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes in Shanghai,
thus reminding everyone that he wasnft in Beijing. While meeting
with Fernandes, Jiang remarked gThe Party Center and the State
Council are responsible to the people,h pointedly neglecting any
mention of the Armyfs responsibilities.79 Neither NPC Chairman Wu
Bangguo nor CPPCC Chairman Jia Qinglin had appeared in public in
weeks. Executive Vice Premier Huang Ju, Wen Jiabaofs deputy, was
nowhere to be seen. And Beijingfs people noticed. College students
(naturally) were the most cynical.
Beijing Universityfs web site has a gstudentfs internet newsh
page and on April 26, students posted a number of articles pointing
out with considerable irony that Jiangfs Shanghai appearances were
evidence that gShanghai should be safer than Beijing, since our
Military Committee Chair Jiang Zemin is in Shanghai.h80 Another
student noted that g(Jiang) didnft even set an example and ran away
to seek shelter in Shanghai! (He) fears death! No wonder the Party
Central Committee asked the nation to guarantee (the safety of)
Shanghai with all onefs strength!h81
Other internet articles noted with gratifi cation the visits of
gbrother Baoh (Wen Jiabao) and gsister Wuh (Wu Yi) who dined
with students in Bei-Dafs cafeteria on April 26.82
On April 28, Jiang Zemin signed an order assigning 1,200
military medical service personnel to aid Beijing in SARS control,
placing for the fi rst time in the SARS crisis the General Logistical
Departmentfs medical services units under the unifi ed leadership of
the National SARS Control Command Center. Within 7 days, these
troops managed to construct a 1,000 bed SARS quarantine facility in
Xiaotangshan on the outskirts of Beijing.83
125

SARS Aftermath: Jiang Struggles to Maintain Prestige.

The SARS experience was an unhappy one for the PLA. The
Army ranks certainly knew that the PLA had failed the people by
withholding vital public health information, and the offi cers and
commanders certainly felt vulnerable without a leadership capable
of meshing the requirements of the military with the exigencies of
public emergencies. The entire episode must have been adequate
proof to the High Command that the PLA cannot function effectively
under gTwo Centers.h Had Jiang Zemin taken it upon himself to
coordinate what the PLA knew and when they knew it with the
civilian leadership\primarily under Premier Wen Jiabao\the PLA
would have wound up being a positive force in Chinese life\similar
to their infl uence in the disastrous fl oods of 1998. As it was, CMC
Chairman Jiang was apparently asleep at the switch and became
more disengaged when he decamped to Shanghai with his coterie of
hangers-on.
On May 2, two weeks after the fact, Xinhua wire service fi nally
reported the April 16 submarine disaster. gThe most startling
thing about this episode is that they issued a public report,h Rand
Corporation China specialist Evan Medeiros told the Washington
Post. gMaybe Jiang Zemin just judged that, in this crisis of faith and
accountability, it would be better to get out in front of something like
this.h84
Indeed, for the rest of May, Jiang Zemin appeared off-balance,
while the national media extolled the capacities of President Hu
Jintao as he prepared for his state visits to Central Asia and the G-8
Summit in Evian les Bains, France. Indeed, for about a week prior to
his travel to Europe and a week thereafter, Hu Jintaofs photographs
graced the front pages, every day, of all Chinafs major newspapers,
including the PLAD. Perhaps Chairman Jiang got tired of seeing
Hufs picture on the front page of his morning PLAD every day
and ordered additional coverage of his gThree Represents.h85 But if
coverage in the PLAD is any indication, Hufs own stock seems to
have fi rmed up among the military.
126

ZENG QINGHONG, A CONTRASTING LEADERSHIP PROFILE

Over drinks in Beijing in early November 2003, a prominent U.S.
journalist gave me his impression of Zeng Qinghong, whom he had
seen once or twice playing tennis at the China World Hotel. Zeng
is an outgoing, affable man of supreme confi dence. gThere was a
rumor going around that while Hu Jintao was preparing to leave
the country for the Central Asia and G-8 tour, a proposal was raised
in the Politburo SC that Vice President Zeng Qinghong should take
over the reins of power while President Hu Jintao was out of the
country.h The vote was two for and six against, with Zeng recusing
himself for the obvious reasons. Rumors had it that the only two
SC members supporting Zeng were CPPCC Chairman Jia Qinglin
and executive vice premier Huang Ju\the core of the Jiang Zemin
faction.
Whether the story is true or not is less relevant than it is as
a parable of Zeng Qingongfs position in the Communist Party
hierarchy. Zeng increasingly sees himself as a separate center of
power in the Party, both as Jiangfs representative and as a principal
actor in his own right. He does not see himself as an ideologue or a
member of the Partyfs orthodox faction. Rather, he considers himself
a reformist, a far-thinking visionary, and a generally good old boy.
But others apparently donft see him in quite the same light. Older
cadres in the Party and the Army openly call him a gconspiratorh and
a power-seeker. Several years ago, for example, some unauthorized
biographies of Zeng were fl oating around Hong Kong, and Zengfs
sister, PLA Major General Zeng Haisheng, found one for him to read.
After reading it, Zeng had only one comment: gAm I that bad?h and
he threw it back at her.86
It doesnft seem that Zeng is as bad as all that. In 1999, an exiled
Chinese writer in the United States named Li Jie wrote a futuristic
fantasy about Chinese politics entitled gThe Last Struggle in
Zhongnanhaih (Zhongnanhai Zuihoude Douzheng) in which a fi gure
named gZheng Qingshanh was the real power behind the throne
for a feckless Party general secretary modeled on Jiang Zemin. Li
Jie portrayed the Zheng Qingshan fi gure as a democratic reformist
struggling against Party ideologues. To make a long story short, a
heroic fi gure is assassinated after forming a Democratic Chinese
127
Federation, leaving Zheng Qingshan to take up the mantle of
leadership and undertake the daunting and complex task of turning
a democratic Chinese Federation into the reality of a future Chinese
democracy.87
Li Jie admits he patterned gZhengh on Zeng Qinghong. Li, a
former professor at Huadong Normal University, was a supporter
of the Tiananmen Student Movement, spent some time in a lockup,
and had his career ruined because of it. In disgust with China, Li
emigrated to the United States in 1998. But Li tells a story that when
he was released from jail after serving his Tiananmen time, Zeng
Qinghong sent for him via an intermediary. Li Jie showed up for the
meeting but sat in sullen silence as Zeng spoke. Zeng pleaded for
understanding about the Tiananmen suppression\it had to be done,
the government was disintegrating. Li Jie left without responding,
but evidently was left with a favorable impression of Zeng. While
Li Jie didnft know Zeng well, he felt well-disposed enough to base a
sympathetic and heroic character in his novel on Zeng.88
Zeng Qinghong, it seems, strives to be all things to all men. He
plays the reformist to the reformers, the nationalist to the military,
the technocrat to the scientists, and all the while plays the Machiavelli
to Prince Jiang Zemin.
In the tumultuous, unpredictable, and capricious world of
Chinese politics, Zeng seems miraculously to have avoided being
purged, struggled, or criticized or being related to anyone who
was. He grew up in an environment of privilege (if not wealth)
and superlative connections. He is the son of a revered Red Army
general, the aide to a top PLA general, and the older brother to three
other mid-ranking PLA generals\who, for some reason, didnft
progress quite as smoothly as their elder brother did.
His Fatherfs Son.
Qinghong is the son of the late Zeng Shan, former minister of
commerce who passed away at the age of 72 in April of 1972, just a
few months after the purge of Lin Biao. Zeng Shan was a member
of the Maoist faction during the Cultural Revolution, and in fact
had been a protege of Chairman Maofs since the earliest days of the
128
Jiangxi Soviet. The elder Zeng was born in 1899 in Jifan county in
isolated Jiangxi province, and was a well-known local butcher. He
gjoined the peasant movement in 1925h and in 1926, Zeng Shan joined
the Chinese Communist Party.89 He was named party secretary for
the base area in Jishui county in the winter of 1928. In June of 1929
he was named chairman of the West Jiangxi Soviet Government.
Within a year he was running the entire CCP operation in Jiangxi
province under Mao Zedong,who was chairman of the CCP Front
Party Committee and the Jiangxi-Fujian regional committee.
After the break between Chiang Kai-shekfs Kuomintang (KMT)
Party and the Communists in 1927, intense sweeps of Shanghai by
Chiangfs secret police in 1930 and 1931 made the city too hot for
the Communist Party Central Committee Offi ce, which disbanded
and migrated secretly to the partyfs Jiangxi base areas. At this point,
perhaps, Zeng Shanfs pre-revolutionary career experience came
in handy. As the Central Offi ce cadres arrived in the base areas
from Shanghai, Mao felt his authority eroding and in November
1930 ordered Zeng Shan to arrest 4,400 offi cers and men of the Red
Army who were under the command of General Peng Dehuai. The
arrestees were dubbed the gA-B corpsh (for ganti-Bolsheviksh), and
those who werenft killed during arrest were held in stockades in the
hamlet of Futian. On the evening of December 7 or 8, one of Pengfs
subcommanders launched an unsuccessful counterattack against the
prison, and in the gun-battles that persisted for days after the gFutian
Incident,h the hapless anti-Maoists were eliminated. For at least a
year afterwards, Zeng was one of the Partyfs three top offi cials in the
Jiangxi Base Area\ranking after Mao himself and General Zhu De.90
According to one communist not murdered by Mao, gthe Fu.Tfien
Incident was entirely a plot on the part of Mao Tse-tung to kill off the
southwest Kiangsi Leadership and to bring about his own personal
counterrevolution.h Zeng Shan was the manager of gMaofs machine
within the Partyh and served as a member of the nine-man Soviet
Area Central Bureau chaired by Zhou Enlai.91
Zeng was Party Chairman for Jiangxi and ran the Front Partyfs
internal affairs ministry until Chiangfs Fifth Encirclement Campaign
fi nally forced the bulk of the Communist Partyfs structure onto the
Long March. Zhou Enlai, however, ordered Zeng Shan, Marshal
129
Chen Yi, and Qu Qiubai to remain in the base areas and organize a
guerrilla movement. And at some point, Zeng Shanfs father, Zeng
Caiqin, was arrested and ultimately died in a KMT prison, and two
of Zengfs brothers and their wives were killed by KMT forces.92 At
some point after the Long March, Mao dispatched Zeng Shan off to
the Soviet Union where he studied at Moscowfs Lenin Institute. It is
possible that Zengfs reputation as Maofs hatchet-man had generated
bitterness in the Party and Mao wanted to remove Zeng from the
scene until the heat was off. In any event, Zeng returned to China
in 1937 and was promptly sent back to the newly reconstituted East
China Bureau in Southern Anhui where he was the director of the
Bureaufs Organization Department.
Comrade Zeng probably met his bride-to-be before the Long
March. Zengfs Fujianese comrade Deng Liujin was a mere child of
20 when she joined the Communist Party in 1931, and by 1934 Zeng
had appointed her director of the Fujian Party Committee Womenfs
Affairs offi ce. The Elder Zeng, half Hakkannese, may have been
attracted to Ms. Deng by her full-blooded Hakka heritage.93 She was
attached to the Red First Front Army when the Army pulled out of
Jiangxi to join the Long March in 1935. Several accounts have her as
one of only 27 women to have survived the March, but by 1938 she
was back in East China where she married Zeng Shan. Her fi rst born
son, Qinghong, appeared unexpectedly on August 29, 1939, as she
marched through the countryside in the South Anhui Base Area.94
Ms. Deng had no time to get back to her camp and instead sought
out a peasant home in gDing Family Mounth (Dingjiashan)\where
she gave birth to gLifl Dingh (Ding-er), her pet name for baby Zeng
Qinghong.95
After a month, when she had recovered suffi ciently from the birth
at the peasant home, Comrade Deng carried her babe back to the
South Anhui Base Area and presented him to a very happy General
Zeng. Before long, Japanese pressure on the Base Area made it an
unsuitable place for an infant, and in April 1940, Ms. Deng took the
child to General Zengfs home village in Jifan, Jiangxi, where he lived
with Zengfs mother, sisters, and Zengfs fi rst wife who had borne
Zeng two other children. In the spring of 1941, Deng Liujin bore
the general another son, Qinghuai, who was also sent back to the
130
village. One story says that Chiang Kai-shekfs soldiers surrounded
the village, and brutally interrogated Zengfs grandmother. Infant
Qinghong escaped with some relatives and literally spent two
nights in a nearby tree to avoid capture. At least four or fi ve of
Zengfs relatives had been killed by Kuomintang troops during the
fi rst Chinese Civil War\including Zengfs grandfather.96 Female
Comrade Deng must have missed her toddlers terribly, because in a
short time she pleaded with the Base Area leadership\of which her
husband was organization chief\to let her open a nursery for cadre
children in South Anhui, and the two children returned to live with
their parents.97
Zeng Qinghong may already have started networking in nursery
school. One account reveals that Qinghongfs younger brother
Qinghuai shared a wet nurse with Chen Haosu, the infant son of the
Chairman of the East China Bureau, General Chen Yi.98 In any event,
several biographers of Zeng assert that Zengfs mother cared for
virtually all the younger children of the East China Bureau leadership
in the years before the formation of the PRC.99 Meanwhile, Zeng Shan
had become a fi nancier of sorts, having received orders from the
Party Center to set up the Central China Bank which subsequently
opened a branch in Shanghai. Among the young cadres he recruited
for the Partyfs fi nancial and banking work in East China were Fang
Yi, Li Renju, Chen Guodong, Wang Daohan, Sun Yanfang, and Xu
Xuehan. The Elder Zeng himself even served as a vice mayor of
Shanghai until 1949. Chen Guodong, Wang Daohan, and Hu Lijiao,
who all had held the top government and party posts in Shanghai in
the 1980s, had been proteges of Zeng Shan at one time or another.
In his fi nancial career, Zeng pere was said to have had gexcellent ties
with Chen Yun,h Dengfs major rival in the elder hierarchy during
the 1980s and 1990s.100
Zengfs Early Career.
When the communist bureaucracy moved to Beijing, Zeng Shan
went with it to serve in a variety of upper-level party and state
council jobs, eventually topping out as commerce minister. His son,
Qinghong, continued to be with the scions of Chinese Communismfs
leading families at Beijingfs 101 Middle School, graduating in
1958.101
131
He evidently was not a very serious student because, even
with his fatherfs prestige, his grades werenft good enough to gain
entry to Beijing or Tsinghua university. Instead, he entered the
Beijing Industrial Institute, matriculated in the automated controls
department, and entered the Communist Party in his second year.
His biographer, Zong Hairen, notes that gat the time he was not seen
much among his fellow students.h102
Upon graduating, probably in 1962, Zeng joined the PLA and
was assigned to the PLAfs 743 Unit where he served for two years
probably as a missile technician. Zeng is the oldest of fi ve children,
three of whom are apparently still in the PLA. Qinghongfs next
brother is Qinghuai, originally a driver for the Cultural Ministry,
and is now a bureau chief in charge of major national artistic
performances and competition. Next is Zeng Qingyang, initially a
corps level cadre in the Academy of Military Sciences and now a
major general. Third is Zeng Qingyuan, once a lieutenant colonel at
the Air Force Command School (Kongjun Zhihui Xueyuan), and now
a major general serving as deputy director of the Air Force logistics
department. Then comes younger sister Zeng Haisheng, recently
promoted from director of the PLA personnel fi les offi ce (Jiefangjun
Dangan Guan Guanzhang) to be cadre director in the General Staff
Department of the PLA, and is also a major general.103
In 1965 Zeng Qinghong apparently left the PLA to join the
Seventh Ministry of Machine Building (also known as the Ministry of
Aeronautical Industry) that had responsibility for the PLAfs rockets
and missiles, where he continued to work with rockets in Laboratory
Six of the Second Department in the ministryfs Second Institute.
Zeng was at the Seventh Ministry in August 1966 at the start of
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and soon found himself in the
throes of political violence. By September, the Seventh Ministry was
split between the g915 Factionh from the ministryfs administrative
offi ces and the g619 Factionh dominated by engineers. By January
1968, a young missile engineer forcibly overthrew Minister Wang
Bingzhang and the other senior cadres and paralyzed the ministry
for nearly two years. In June 1968, a mob murdered one of Chinafs
foremost missile designers, Yao Tongbin, obliging then-Premier
Zhou Enlai to intervene to protect Chinafs top minds in rocketry.104
132
It would be interesting to know which faction Zeng joined, but
whatever one it was, he paid for his sins in 1969 when he was sent off
to Chikan Naval Base near Zhanjiang in Guangdong province, and
thence to a production base in Hunanfs Xihu county to do a yearfs
manual labor.105
A year was enough. In 1970 Zeng returned to the Second
Institute in the Seventh Ministry and resumed his work. He was in
the Institute when his father, a long-time Mao loyalist, died in April
1972 unscathed by the GPCR. At his death, Zeng Shan was gone of
the few old cadres not to have been purged by Mao in the Cultural
Revolution.h106 Zeng Qinghong left the Seventh Ministry in 1973
for another technical assignment in the militaryfs Commission on
Science and Technology for the National Defense (COSTIND) offi ce
in Beijing. He apparently remained at COSTIND for 6 years until
1979.
When one of old General Zengfs comrades in arms from the
Jiangxi Soviet days, General Yu Qiuli, was appointed vice premier
and chairman of the State Planning Commission in 1979, Zeng
Qinghongfs mother interceded. She asked the vice premier to hire
her son away from the COSTIND Beijing offi ce to be his aide in the
State Planning Commission. By September 1980, the transfer was
fi nalized and Zeng Qinghong, aged 41, became Vice Premier Yufs
personal secretary with the title of deputy offi ce director in the State
Energy Commission and later as chief of liaison in the Ministry of
Petroleumfs Foreign Affairs Offi ce. Dr. Cheng Li, an astute chronicler
of Chinafs leadership dynamics, notes that Vice Premier Yu was one
of the many in Chinafs leadership who were proponents of having
the gchildren of old leadersh move into top-tier positions (tixie lao
shouzhangde haizi), and Yufs sentiments probably predisposed him to
take on Qinghong as his protege.
In July 1982, Deng Xiaoping, as chair of the CMC, ordered
Vice Premier Yu back into uniform to take over the PLAfs Political
Department, a top military slot that also included seats on the CMC
and the Politburofs Secretariat. Zeng Qinghong once again put on a
uniform and followed General Yu over to the PLA High Command.
Zeng soon fi gured out that his prospects for improvement were
somewhat greater if he could return to the Petroleum Ministry than
133
at PLA headquarters. After assisting General Yu to settle in, Zeng
asked to go back to the Ministry. Yu was amenable, and that was
that. Back at the Ministry, under Yufs continuing patronage, Zeng
was promoted to deputy foreign affairs chief, then to Party secretary
of the South Yellow Sea Oil Corporation at a fairly senior cadre
grade of bureau director (Juji).107
In the Shanghai Party Committee.
Zeng Qinghongfs rank of Bureau Director now made him eligible
for a serious provincial-level leadership job. In late 1984 and after
importuning his late fatherfs proteges at the old Central China Bank,
Chen Guodong and Wang Daohan, respectively Party Chief and
Mayor of Shanghai, Qinghong was appointed deputy organization
chief in the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee. Within 6 months,
he was promoted again to organization chief, just in time to welcome
Jiang Zemin, who was appointed mayor of Shanghai that June.
Interestingly, once Zeng gained a real leadership position\and a
seat on the Shanghai Partyfs SC\he didnft just focus on feathering
his own nest, but became intent on making a reputation for himself as
a reformer. Deng Xiaopingfs motto for his new agenda to reform the
Party was gmore revolutionary, younger, more educated, and more
professionalh (geminghua, nianqinghua, zhishihua, zhuanyehua). Zeng
made it his motto, and ordered sweeping new party recruitment and
personnel requirements on age and education levels. He launched
Chinafs fi rst journal for the Party organization sector, Organizational
and Personnel Information News (Renshi Zuzhi Xinxi Bao). He ordered
the young general editor of the paper to maintain daily contact
with the Party Centerfs Organization Department and prepare
information reports on the latest directives from an increasingly
reformist party and governmental leadership. Soon, Zeng had made
a reputation for himself as Shanghaifs most dynamic reformer.108
Zeng also had a softer side\for old Maoists. When Qi Benyu was
released from 18 years in Beijingfs Qincheng prison in 1985 and was
sent back to Shanghai to live out his days, Zeng interceded to make
his life easier. Qi was a radical protege of Mme. Jiang Qing and a
Cultural Revolution Group polemicist who penned vituperative
attacks on Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai and had been arrested in late
134
1968 and thrown in jail. In 1983, he was fi nally convicted in a Beijing
court of gcounterrevolutionary propaganda incitement to violenceh
and sentenced to time served plus two years.109 When the middleaged
Qi fi nally wandered into Shanghai with nothing but a Beijing
cadre stipend, Zeng Qinghong took up his cause, declared that the
cost of living in Beijing was considerably lower than Shanghai and
poor Mr. Qi, now at the ripe age of 54, was entitled to a cost of living
increase. For some reason, Zengfs pseudonymous biographer Zong
Hairen seems to believe that Zengfs advocacy on the part of a true
Gang of Four criminal from the Cultural Revolution is evidence of a
humanitarian streak, because the incident warrants nearly a full page
in Di Si Dai and prominent mention in the Nathan-Gilley book.110 It
could just as easily demonstrate Zengfs continued affi nity for Maoist
loyalties. But that may be another story.
In any event, Zeng got along famously in Shanghai with his boss,
Party Chief Rui Xingwen, and after a year Rui promoted Zeng to be
a deputy Party secretary for the Shanghai Party Committee (with
oversight of organization and propaganda work), joining the more
senior deputy Party secretaries Wu Bangguo and Huang Ju, both
native Shanghainese. Both Rui and Zeng were outsiders, neither
could speak the cityfs distinctive dialect, and the two men tended
to look out for each other. At the time, Zeng did not come into close
contact with his future patron Jiang Zemin, because Zeng worked
the Party structure and Jiang was mayor of the cityfs governmental
organs.
Finally, in the summer of 1987, as the city prepared its delegation
to the Reform-or-Retrenchment 13th Party Congress in Beijing,
Jiang and Zeng began to consult closely on who would be in the
delegation, and how to prepare Jiang to take over the Shanghai
Party Secretary slot\and a seat on the Central Politburo.111 In the
interregnum between 1987fs 13th Congress and 1989fs Tiananmen
incident, Zeng oversaw Shanghaifs newspapers and media\and for
a while was particularly fond of Shanghaifs edgy, outspoken, and
market-oriented World Economic Journal which he saw as a useful tool
to ingratiate the city with the Reformist Faction in Beijing headed by
Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang.112
But by the end of April 1989, after the death of the sainted
135
(but ousted) former Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang sparked
massive demonstrations in support of drastic political reforms, the
Party Center had split. Zeng Qinghong was in Beijing sounding out
his contacts in the military, the party and the media, and came to
the conclusion that the demonstrations would soon be labeled as
gcounterrevolutionary turmoil.h He sent word back to Shanghai that
his favorite newspaper, the World Economic Herald, had to be watched.
On April 20, Zeng and Shanghai cityfs propaganda chief, Mme.
Chen Zhili (now state councilor and education minister) met with
the Heraldfs editor-in-chief, Qin Benli, demanding that the municipal
party have the right to clear articles calling for a reassessment of the
gmistakenh purge of the late Hu Yaobang. Although Qin agreed to
delete problematic portions, the April 22 issue of the Herald included
the offending paragraphs.113 Sure enough, on April 24, Jiang Zemin
announced to a plenary meeting of several thousand Shanghai Party
cadres that the Herald was closed for investigation and Qin Benli had
been removed from his position. The Heraldfs transgression was to
publish a lengthy and laudatory report on a symposium entitled
gComrade Hu Yaobang Still Lives in our Heartsh attended by 40 of
Shanghaifs most noted scholars.114
Shanghai Mayor and Party Secretary Jiang Zemin, working off
Zengfs reports from Beijing, took immediate steps to defuse growing
demonstrations in the city and ordered that all city offi cials gsupport
order.h The move drew Deng Xiaopingfs attention and convinced
Deng that Jiang was a capable administrator. On May 21, when the
Deng family convened a meeting in Beijing of the so-called gEight
Immortals,h115 Chen Yun and Li Xiannian both recommended that
Jiang replace Zhao Ziyang as general secretary, a nomination that
Deng fi nally confi rmed on May 27, a week before the June 4 massacre
at Tiananmen. Zeng Qinghongfs part in Jiangfs rise was the deciding
factor.116

Jiang Moves to Beijing.

When Jiang fi nally moved his offices to Beijing, the stories go,
he only brought one Shanghai aide with him, one of the Shanghai
Communist Party Committeefs deputy secretaries, Zeng Qinghong.
To be perfectly honest, Jiang hadnft a clue about how politics
136
worked in Beijing, while Zeng had his fatherfs friends, his highschool
buddies, and fellow cadre-kid connections to serve as his eyes
and ears in the capital. Jiang was reluctant to take his position as the
Communist Partyfs new general secretary too seriously lest he run
up against a phalanx of resistance. So Zeng Qinghong, a lofty man
in the Shanghai Party structure, was taken over to the Central Offi ce
of the CCP and introduced to his new boss, Central Offi ce Director
Wen Jiabao. Wen himself was in a precarious position and was
seen as part of the disgraced pre-Tiananmen Zhao Ziyang clique.
Still, Wen Jiabao was amenable to according his new deputy senior
protocolary rank (over another sitting deputy offi ce director), while
keeping Zengfs duties light enough to give him time to work with
Jiang Zemin.117
Zeng was also given responsibility for Central Offi ce personnel
issues, and it seems that he was quite happy with this key portfolio.
Given that Zengfs father was adept at party organization work, it
is not too much of a stretch to imagine that Zeng inherited a knack
for it. Did he talk with his father about his work? Did his motherfs
skill at networking infl uence him? Did his fatherfs friends give him
advice? Probably all of the above. Zengfs biographer Zong Hairen
says:
Qinghong, who didnft go for reading books, found himself forming a
deep interest in the intrigues of the Ming and Qing courts, and read
vast volumes of Ming and Qing fi les, focusing on the lessons of how
to protect oneself, attack the enemy, how to gain the upper hand in
complex situations, resolve contradictions, how to consolidate onefs
power, and how to advance oneself a step higher when onefs base is
consolidated.118
There was a problem with Jiang Zemin, however. His fi rst three
springs in Beijing were rather passive as Premier Li Peng took the
lead in economic policy, making gRectifi cation and Controlh (zhili
zhengdun) the guiding catch-phrase, eclipsing Deng Xiaopingfs
gReform and Openingh (gaige kaifang). Nonetheless, as Deng
Xiaoping continued his habit of wintering in Shanghai and in the
winter/springs of 1989-90 and 1990-91, Zeng took over all advance
work for Dengfs Shanghai vacations. From his offi ce in Beijing,
Zeng arranged for Dengfs visit to the fl at rice paddies of Shanghaifs
137
Pudong development zone on January 21, 1991, where he got a
briefi ng from Shanghaifs mayor Zhu Rongji on plans to develop
the real estate into a fi nancial and commercial base. Maintaining
some infl uence on Shanghaifs media, Zeng arranged for the cityfs
Liberation Daily to publish a series of lengthy articles entitled gReform
and Opening need a new way of thinking.h119 In attempt to keep up
the momentum of his reforms, Deng made a series of tours in the
summer and fall of 1991 to Hubei and Jiangxi where he was quoted
several times as vowing that ganyone who doesnft reform must step
down from powerh (shei bu gaige, shei jiu xiatai).120
The following year, when Deng Xiaoping made his now-famous
gSouthern Progressh (Nanxun)121 of Guangdongfs special economic
zones, Zeng saw to it that Dengfs visit concluded in Shanghai. Zeng,
at least, seemed to sense whither the wind was blowing, even if Jiang
was a bit timid to get involved. During the Nanxun, the key meeting
was an informal gathering of top PLA leaders in the Zhuhai Special
Economic Zone for an audience with Deng, including CMC vice
chairman (and State President) Yang Shangkun, Politburo Politics
and Law Czar (and Jiang rival) Qiao Shi, the PLAfs senior military
commander Liu Huaqing, himself a CMC vice chairman. Also
present were CMC Secretary General General Yank Baibing, four
other generals from the PLA high command, and the commanders
of the top military regions. Missing from this meeting was CMC
chairman Jiang Zemin himself!122
The spring and summer of 1992 proved to be the turning point
for Jiang Zemin, whom Deng Xiaoping considered weak on reform
and more afraid of gpeaceful evolutionh than of Chinafs faltering
economy. Zeng could see trouble brewing a mile away, and hastily
arranged a series of meetings between Jiang and Premier Li Peng
to convince them that Dengfs handwriting on the wall would spell
the downfall of both if they didnft mend their ways. Over a span of
several months, Jiang and Li issued over 20 articles from both the
Party Center and the State Council, urging the entire bureaucracies
of both to study Dengfs speeches in the South and boldly implement
gReform and Opening.h It was a 180-degree turn for both men,
which gave them some breathing space to prepare for the 14th Party
Congress scheduled for October.
138
With Jiang and Li now toeing the Reformist line, Zeng began
working on gturning the spear point at Dengfs own supporters.h123
A quick survey of the situation led Zeng to conclude that the only
way Jiang could survive the 14th Congress preparations would be to
engineer the removal of Dengfs closest comrade-in-arms, President
Yang Shangkun. But how?
gThe Hundred Generals List.h
President Yang Shangkunfs infl uence in the party came from his
service as Dengfs top aide in the Communist Party leadership in the
1950s and 60s. His infl uence in the army came from his close ties to
the families of revered PLA generals Liao Hansheng, Xiao Ke, and
He Long, all of whom had suffered or been killed in the Cultural
Revolution. With Dengfs rehabilitation in 1977 and the consolidation
of his power from 1979 through 1982, Yang maneuvered to get the
scions of the old generalsf families into top PLA posts. And for a
decade thereafter, Yang Shangkun and his younger half-brother,
Yang Baibing, began to use their infl uence to affect general offi cer
promotions.
Then came the break Zeng Qinghong needed. In the summer of
1992, Yang Baibing (then secretary general of the CMC) prepared a
list of 100 general offi cer promotions that had to be rubber-stamped
by CMC Chairman Jiang. The promotees were generally supporters
of the Yang brothers,124 and their movement into ever higher PLA
command positions would consolidate the Yangsf grip on the
military.
Normally, Jiang would have felt obliged to pass on them, but
Zeng prevailed on him to hold up for a few days and seek counsel
of a top general who was not a fan of the Yang faction, General Yu
Yongbo, vice director of the PLAfs General Political Department.
General Yu was director of the Nanjing Military Region political
department when Jiang and Zeng were in the Shanghai Party
leadership, and Yu was considered Jiangfs sole ally in the CMC.
When General Yu saw the 100-name promotion list, he was
dumbstruck. CMC Secretary General Yang Baibing had drawn up
the list and had the temerity to submit it to General Liu Huaqing
139
(then the top ranking military offi cer) and then to CMC Chairman
Jiang Zemin without running the names through the PLAfs political
department for vetting. Yu told Jiang and Zeng that it was clear
that the names were all gpro-Yang,h and the action was designed to
gcompletely supplant Deng Xiaopingfs men in the central military
organs with Yang family horse-holders.h125
Zeng Qinghong took this information to two of his gprincelingh
comrades (Yu Zhengsheng and Liu Jing) who had solid ties with
Dengfs son, Pufang.126 These two friends arranged for Zeng Qinghong
to meet face-to-face with Deng Pufang in the midst of a whispering
campaign in Beijing suggesting that gYang Shangkun seeks to replace
Deng Xiaoping,h gYang wants to be CMC Chairman,h and gYang
Baibing will launch a bloodless coup.h Whether Zeng Qinghong was
behind this rumor mongering is conjectural, but the message Zeng
passed to Deng Pufang was that gJiang wasnft disloyal to Deng,
Jiang had been muzzled by Yang Shangkun.h Zeng insisted that
gJiang Zemin was wholly loyal to the Old Man.h127
Zeng then explained the problem of the 100-man promotion list,
and warned that the Yang familyfs power was growing. Zeng also
suggested that Yang was considering the rehabilitation of disgraced
General Secretary Zhao Ziyang. This, he said, would be a disaster
and would be an admission that Deng Xiaoping had been wrong
about the June 4 decision.
Pufang then arranged a meeting for Jiang Zemin and General Yu
Yongbo to brief his father directly about their concerns. When they
arrived, General Liu Huaqing was sitting at Dengfs side, and the two
men said they were ready to hear the Chairman Jiangfs concerns. At
the end of the conversation, General Liu nodded sagely and confi rmed
to Deng the substance of the complaints, that CMC Chairman Jiang
had been frozen out of virtually all CMC decisionmaking, and that
the Yang Brothers had been acting suspiciously.128
All this transpired behind President Yang Shangkunfs back, and
he must have been getting uneasy. A few days later, Yang asked Jiang
what had happened to the promotion list, and was startled to hear
Jiang was gholding it up subject to Deng Xiaopingfs guidance.h
As whispers of Yangfs troubles with the gHundred Generalsh
promotion list spread among the leadership, former Chinese
140
president Li Xiannian (whom Yang Shangkun had replaced when
Li gbecame too oldh\despite the fact that Li was only a year older
than Yang) was seized with an acute bout of schadenfreude. Other
elders, including Chen Yun and Peng Zhen were simply delighted
at the Yang brothersf predicament. They freely offered their separate
advice to Deng that the Yang Familyfs scheming gwas unhelpful to
[army] unity.h Dengfs old Third Field Army comrade and former
defense minister Zhang Aiping urged Deng to put his foot down
and then went directly to Jiang Zemin to offer his wholehearted
support.129
Deng still was disinclined to forsake his loyal friend Shangkun,
but a steady drumbeat of criticism and a heavy lobbying campaign
from the elders obliged him to set up a gleading small group to
prepare for the 14th Party Congressh that would include Jiang, Li
Peng, Song Ping (a mentor to both Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao), and
Party elder Bo Yibo.
When the backroom smoke had cleared, the Yang brothers had
been removed from all PLA positions. And in the end, the only offi cer
on the 100-names list to be promoted was general Xiong Guangkai\
who has ever since been a sworn follower of the Jiang camp. To call
the dismantlement of the gYang Family Armyh a victory for Jiang
Zemin or Li Peng, says Zong Hairen, gis to misunderstand what
happened.h Zeng Qinghong orchestrated the effort on Jiangfs behalf,
and gwithout Zeng to put together this enterprise, it would never
have happened, and as a result the Jiang-Zeng relationship cannot
be supplanted by any other.h130
The Chen Xitong Affair.
Jiang Zeming was acutely aware that getting through the 14th
Party Congress unscathed and visiting confusion upon his enemies
was Zengfs doing (although Jiangfs victory in getting himself named
as the successor ggenerational ecorefh to Mao and Deng was probably
Hu Jintaofs doing). But Jiang still had a number of formidable rivals
and foes in the leadership, all vying for Dengfs blessing and all
trying to maintain the loyalties of their own factions.
One such fi gure was Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong who had long
used his position to ingratiate himself both to Deng and to Dengfs
141
elder comrade and chief rival in the ideological debate, Chen Yun.
Chen Xitong had become such a force in the capital, Zong Hairen
says, gthat Jiang Zeminfs writ didnft run in Beijing City.h131
With the Nanxun of early 1992, as Chen Xitong quickly got on
Dengfs good side by arranging for the old man to tour Beijingfs
Capital Steel Factory in late spring where Deng gave a speech
praising vice premier Zhu Rongji for greally understanding
economicsh and supporting Capital Steel chief Zhou Guanjunfs
reformist innovations at the plant. It was only after Deng had gone
that Mayor Chen notifi ed the Politburo (of which he was a member)
of Dengfs speech and issued press releases under the Beijing Party
Committeefs name. Two years later, in 1994, Chen Xitong was
quoted as questioning Jiangfs authority well after Jiang had been
named gCore of the Third Generationh at 1992fs 14th Party Congress.
gThe core is not bestowed,h Chen reportedly told Beijing cadres, git
is something you have to live up to, you have to rely on everyone to
support you.h132
For Jiang Zemin, this was the last straw. Chen had to go, and once
again Zeng was put on the case. He set aside his General Offi ce duties
and began to study the problem\which turned out to be easier than
the Yang Family affair. Chen Xitong, it turned out, was notoriously
corrupt. Zeng began to collect reports on Chenfs behavior, as well
as stories that Chenfs top aides, vice mayors Zhang Baifa and Wang
Baosen, regularly took bribes. After a while, Zeng began dispatching
agents to report on every speech Chen Xitong gave, every meeting
he had, and every inspection tour he made.133
At last, Zeng discovered a massive corruption case in the East
China metropolis of Wuxi whose threads led back to Beijing. Despite
gseven degrees of separation,h the web of corruption was traced to
the Beijing mayorfs doorstep. Big-ticket real estate deals, billion-yuan
insider trading, and a host of other unsavory practices enmeshed
Capital Steelfs chief Zhou Beifang\with the money coming from
one of the worldfs wealthiest men, Hong Kong tycoon Li Ka-shing.
Li Ka-shing seems to have been well-connected with Jiang Zemingfs
rivals in Beijing\but had little use for Jiang, probably because Jiang
had little infl uence over municipal affairs in the capital.
That was all well and good from Zeng Qinghongfs point of view.
As Zeng was mulling his catch, another fi sh swam into his net. Deng
142
Zhifang, Deng Xiaopingfs younger son, was involved in several
shady business deals with Capital Steel and Li Ka-shingfs real estate
empire, including a land development operation in Hong Kong
called gCapital Steel Four Corners.h
This all began to mesh nicely with a growing scandal surrounding
Li Ka-shingfs shakedown of McDonaldfs Restaurants, which
happened to occupy a prime bit of real estate on Wangfujing Street
in bustling downtown Beijing. Lifs land developers lusted after the
land for a mega-mall shopping site to be called gOriental Plazah and
by liberally greasing several very infl uential palms\including some
in the Deng Xiaoping family and no doubt Chen Xitongfs as well\
Li Ka-shingfs land developers persuaded the Beijing municipal
government to renege on a 20-year land lease that McDonaldfs
had on the Wangfujing parcel. McDonaldfs, accustomed to dealing
with crooks worldwide, knew how to protect itself. They went to
the press, and behind the scenes to the Chinese Communist Partyfs
corruption watchdogs and blew the whistle. By the end of 1994,
the McDonaldfs affair had become a major embarrassment for
the Chinese government, with senior trade offi cials pleading that
McDonaldfs would be well-compensated.134
But the dice were cast\snake-eyes for Chen Xitong. The Central
Discipline Inspection Commissionfs investigation into McDonaldfs
scandal and Chen Xitongfs Capital Steel connections sealed his
fate. Chen was detained on April 26, 1995, and the next day senior
Poliburo member Hu Jintao announced the purge to a gathering
of Beijing municipal offi cials. As Jiangfs biographer described the
scene, on one side of Hu sat discipline czar Wei Jianxing, and on the
other sat Zeng Qinghong. gIf there was any doubt that Jiang was
behind the move, it was dispelled by the prominent and unexplained
appearance of Zeng, who was called a eresponsible person from the
relevant central departmentf.h135
No doubt the Deng family was also somewhat shaken. And
Zeng personally reassured them that Chinafs new leader would take
measures to keep their black sheep out of trouble. Zeng wrestled with
gwhether or not to arrest Zhou Beifang, and if Zhou was arrested
would that implicate members of Deng Xiaopingfs family?h gHow
to dissect the Zhou Beifang-Deng Zhifang relationship?h These
issues were all handled by Zeng Qinghong and not by the party
143
investigation team. Zeng was said to have gcalled on Deng Pufang
several times, and even personally interviewed Deng Zhifang.h In
the end, Zhou Beifang was in jail, while Deng Zhifang sold all his
shares in gCapital Steel Four Cornersh for one yuan, and gthe Deng
family continued to live in peace.h136 Zeng even saw to it that the
Deng familyfs retainer, General Wang Ruilin, was put on the CMC,
and Jiangfs ally from Fujian, Jia Qinglin, was transferred to Beijing to
replace Chen Xitong as mayor.
But Zengfs real stroke of genius was to take advantage of the Chen
Xitong purge to consolidate Jiangfs power in the provinces. Zeng
proposed a fi ve-point program of political oversight that involved
regularizing Central Party inspection missions to the provinces,
permitting all provincial units to report discipline violations of
other units at an equal level, requiring that all provincial discipline
inspectors immediately inform the next highest level of all discipline
complaints they receive, making discipline inspection units part of
all personnel appointments processes, and fi nally, requiring that all
personnel moves get the approval of the discipline inspection unit at
the next higher level of the party bureaucracy.
The effect was to put the entire governing cadre of all 32 provinces
on notice that Jiang would be watching personnel appointments very
closely\through Zeng Qinghong, and over the coming years, Zengfs
reform resulted in the arrests of hundreds of upper level offi cials,
dozens of vice-governor level offi cers, and in the case of Cheng
Kejie, a vice chairman of the NPC, his trial conviction and execution
for his corruption when he was Party secretary of Guangxi. In the
meantime, Zeng seemed to show due solicitude of the views of the
Deng Xiaoping family\which, no doubt, remains eternally grateful.
The purge of Chen Xitong demonstrated that Jiang was ready and
willing to play hardball in the cutthroat jungle of Beijing politics,
and Zeng Qinghong was Jiangfs strategist.137
National Security and Foreign Affairs.
There is no question that economics, agriculture, and fi nance
were the thorniest problems facing China in the 1990s, and they were
issues in which Zeng Qinghong had no expertise. Moreover, should
the country suffer an economic downturn, no doubt Zeng Qinghong
144
wanted Jiang Zemin to have a plausible deniability of responsibility.
Instead, fault for a sputtering economy could be laid at Zhu Rongjifs
and Wen Jiabaofs feet, and they could be sacrifi ced.
On the other hand, Jiang consolidated his power base in the
military. The episode with the ghundred generalsh promotion list
certainly taught Zeng Qinghong that there was considerable potential
to leverage general offi cer promotions into infl uence with the PLA.
Military budgets, equipment technology, procurement strategies,
personnel downsizing, and reorganization of military units into
effi cient fi ghting machines were all issues that had to be addressed
by the CMC, of which Jiang was Chairman. And these were issues
that could be addressed fairly easily by throwing money at them.
Of course, these issues would be much more easily addressed if the
PLA were to have a specifi c mission to focus on.
Taiwan. By December 1990, defense against the Soviet
hegemon had disappeared as a mission. And Zeng Qinghong no
doubt set about coming up with a mission that could crystallize
Jiangfs authority in the PLA. By the end of 1991, Taiwan appeared to
be that mission. Jiang authorized the purchase of 48 Soviet-built SU-
27 jet fi ghters and signed options for 24 more. The sale sparked an
American election year decision to sell 150 F-16 fi ghters to Taiwan,
and a French commercial decision to sell 60 Mirage 2000-5 fi ghters
to Taiwan as well. This demonstration that the Western democracies
were still committed to supporting Taiwan in the aftermath of the
Tiananmen crisis inclined Beijing to follow a two-pronged strategy
of wooing Taiwan with kindliness and accelerating the purchase of
advanced Soviet weaponry. In November 1992, China acknowledged
the so-called gOne China, different interpretationsh formula (except
that Taiwan didnft immediately respond with an interpretation),
and in April 1993 Taiwanese representatives met with Chinese
counterparts in Singapore to start the so-called gKoo-Wang Talks.h
Because national security and Taiwan are central to military
policy, Jiang and Zeng gravitated toward a strategy of seizing the
high-ground in those areas. Early on, Jiang sought to place his
loyalists in key foreign affairs slots, and Zeng apparently took on the
job as Jiangfs alter-ego in Taiwan affairs, Hong Kong and national
security strategies.
145
Zeng may have coveted control of Taiwan Affairs because up to
1992, Taiwan had been the province of Jiangfs nemesis, President Yang
Shangkun. Indeed, Taiwanfs President Lee Teng-hui considered his
contacts with Beijing via gsecret envoysh Su Chih-chfeng and Cheng
Shu-min to have been a direct link to Yang Shangkun via Yangfs
envoy Yang Side.138 The contacts between Lee Teng-hui and Yang
Shangkun were intermediated by a Hong Kong-based gQigong
Masterh cum Zen philosopher named Nan Huaijin who had a
considerable following among neo-Confucian elites in both Taiwan
and the PRC. In early 1988, Master Nan claimed very high level
interest in the Chinese communist hierarchy in establishing a direct
channel of communications to Taiwanfs new president, and over the
following 6 years hosted nine separate meetings between emissaries
from the presidents of Taiwan and China. This channel facilitated the
opening of public contacts between Taipei and Beijing via unoffi cial
instrumentalities deputized to discuss practical ways to deal with
notarial, immigration, criminal, and other administrative issues.
But those talks were not authorized to discuss political differences.
Politics, however, were the subject of the secret meetings.
As Taiwan had become dominant focus of the PLAfs mission
after the fall of the Soviet Union, Zeng and Jiang Zemin may have
presumed that President Yang Shangkun somehow gained leverage
in the PLA through his infl uence on Taiwan policy. By the end of
1992, although Yang Shangkun had lost his authority in the military
and Master Nan had lost the honor of hosting the secret cross-Strait
liaisons (much to Master Nanfs chagrin), Yang still managed to
maintain his presence in Taiwan affairs by continuing the contacts
with Lee Teng-hui via another aide, Xu Mingzhen. Throughout these
early talks, Taiwanfs President doggedly pursued the idea of signing
a cross-Strait nonaggression pact as the fi rst step to opening direct
transportation links between Taiwan and China. After Jiang Zemin
succeeded Yang Shangkun as Chinafs president in 1993, Jiangfs
representative, former Shanghai mayor Wang Daohan, continued
as the main interlocutor with Lee Teng-huifs secret envoy, but Xu
Mingzhen still reported to Yang and other Jiang rivals.
In January 1994, Wang Daohan informed his Taiwan counterpart
that gJiang Zemin had named a new representative and hoped that
146
Su Chih-chfeng would meet with him.h But Wang declined to say
just who this gnew representativeh was. President Lee was obliged
to send his junior envoy, Ms. Cheng, to Beijing to learn the identity of
the new man, and gafter being lead down dark alley after dark alley,
she fi nally came upon a room in which she met the new counterpart,
the director of the Central Offi ce of the Chinese Communist Party,
Zeng Qinghong.h Zeng informed her that ghenceforth, the two sides
need not use any other channel for direct liaison.h139
Taiwanfs President Lee Teng-hui was now confi dent that he had
a direct line to Chinafs President Jiang Zemin and eagerly agreed to
the new contact. Zengfs fi rst meeting with Su Chih-chfeng came on
the not-very-auspicious date of April 4, 1994, after much haggling
about the venue, at a discreet villa in the sleepy Zhuhai Special
Economic Zone abutting the equally sleepy Portuguese enclave of
Macau. Su presented Zeng with a rustic ceramic with a crystalline
glaze crafted by one of Taiwanfs foremost artists. In return, Zeng
presented Su with a gigantic fl ower vase that was so big that it had
to be FedEx-ed to Taiwan a week later. Leefs biography doesnft
say what else happened at that fi rst meeting, but confi rms that Lee
agreed that his emissary could ghave deeper discussionsh at their
next meeting, which took place on November 25, 1994, again in
Zhuhai.
Again, Su Chih-chfeng proposed a peace agreement, but Zeng
demurred that a peace pact gis state-to-state behavior.h Su then
explored the idea of a three-way joint-venture cross-Strait airline
service, with Taiwan and China each holding 45 percent of the
shares and Singapore holding a 10 percent share to avoid any
political implications. Again, Zeng demurred.
Then Zeng broached the idea of arranging for a gspontaneous
meetingh (buqi er dai) between Lee Teng-hui and Jiang Zemin at
some gthird placeh\which, however, could not be an international
forum (guoji changhe). Both men agreed that this should be further
explored, and would help stabilize the situation in the Taiwan
Strait.
On the eve of the announcement of President Jiangfs gEight
Pointsh (Jiang Ba Dian) on Taiwan policy just before Lunar New Year
in January 1995, word got back to Taipei that it would mark a turn
in relations and hoped that Taiwan would respond with goodwill.
147
The word, unfortunately, didnft get to Leefs aides in time, and the
next day Taipei dismissed Jiangfs gEight Pointsh as gnothing new.h
By the end of the Lunar New Year celebrations, President Lee
issued his own observation that gthe Eight Points are worth our
careful attention.h Within a week, Lee had prepared his gLeefs Six
Conditionsh (Li Liu Tiao) as a concrete response to the gEight Pointsh
in hopes of reminding the PRC side gto be a bit more attentive to
Taiwanfs sensitivities.h
In March 1995, Su Chih-chfeng again met Zeng Qinghong faceto-
face in Zhuhai where he gave Zeng a headfs-up that President
Lee was planning visits to the Middle East and the United States,
and hoped that the other side could countenance the trips. gThis is
something we must do, and must do successfully.h At the time, the
PRC believed that there was no possibility that the United States
would approve Leefs visit\after all, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
had already reported to the Party Center that the U.S. administration
had turned down Leefs request. So Zengfs response to Su was gyou
have your own position, we have our position, so when the time
comes, if therefs to be criticism from our side, wefll still have to
criticizeh (dao shihou piping, hai shi yao pipingde).
It was to be the last meeting with Zeng. On April 4, 1995, Lee
Teng-hui completed his visit to the United Arab Emirates and
Jordan. At the end of his visit to Amman, Leefs motorcade drove
out to Mount Nebo overlooking Galilee. Lee trudged to the top of
Nebofs ridge and looked into the ancient land of Canaan and stared
quietly into the Promised Land. He returned to Taipei the same day,
and told the waiting press that
I saw the place where Moses died on Mount Moses. I know the story.
Where did Moses and Joshua go after their departure? It is unclear.
Later on, Joshua went to the Jordan River to develop the area and
rebuild his homeland. We must understand two things in this segment
of history. First, it is about the place where Moses died; this is not clearly
mentioned in history. People say that he died on the mountain. Second,
the mountain is a nice place. Looking down from it, we can see the Dead
Sea; looking across, we can see the entire area occupied by the Jordan
River plain. It is a very interesting place. I approach this matter from
various angles, not from biblical or religious viewpoints.140
148
Zeng Qinghong was good to his word. The PRC press and the
PRC-controlled press in Hong Kong published a number of scathing
articles haranguing Lee for his messianic delusions, and excoriating
his independentist proclivities. And when Lee actually did manage
to wangle an invitation to speak at Cornell University and gain
White House approval (announced on May 21), the Chinese reaction
was initially confi ned to propaganda hot air. In fact, the chief of the
PRC State Councilfs Taiwan Affairs Offi ce, Tang Shubei, arrived in
Taipei on May 24, to do advance preparations for a scheduled visit
of PRC negotiator Wang Daohan.
But it is doubtful that the Lee Teng-hui visit to Cornell in June
1995 had anything to do with the interruption of the gsecret envoyh
channel with Zeng Qinghong. Zengfs meetings with Su Chih-chfeng
were halted in April\apparently because their existence was leaked
by pro-China legislator Yok Mu-ming during a session of Taiwanfs
Legislative Yuan. When news appeared in the Taiwan press, Su
received notifi cation from gthe other sideh that ghereafter, it is
inconvenient to see each other.h Legislator Yok seemed to have had
ties with the Yang Shangkun gAnti-Jiang Factionh in Beijing, and
according to the Lee Teng-hui biography, the leak was inspired by
their desire to undermine Jiang\aided and abetted by pro-China
politicians in Taiwan who wanted to wound Lee.141
There are also rumors that Jiang himself was criticized by the PLA
for allowing the Lee visit to Cornell to take place and for being gsoftheartedh
on the Taiwan issue.142 Zeng apparently used the incident
to discredit the foreign ministry bureaucracy and, in a deft move
designed to protect foreign minister Qian Qichen from excessive
attacks, Zeng coopted Qian into becoming a pliant member of the
Jiang camp.143
China responded to the Taiwan presidentfs visit to Cornell
University in June 1995 with a series of missile tests in the Taiwan
Strait in late July that closed the Strait to international merchant
shipping for nearly 2 weeks and obliged an estimated 14,000 cargo
ships to be re-routed around Taiwanfs eastern coast. It is uncertain
whether Zeng Qinghong had a hand in the decision to go ahead
with the missile tests. One might expect that it would take perhaps
two weeks from decision-time to launch for such a symbolic show
149
of force, and if so, Zeng and Jiang Zemin were on an offi cial visit
of Europe during the time the missile threats were being debated.
It is possible, therefore, that the PLA hatched the idea, and ran it
through the CMC bureaucracy with only minimal involvement from
CMC chairman Jiang and his closest advisor. Similarly, in March
1996, after weeks of signaling that Beijing was unhappy with the
prospect of 4 more years for incumbent Taiwan President Lee Tenghui,
the PLA launched at least three (though some news report say
four) missile tests into the Taiwan Strait which hit waters just a few
miles off Taiwanfs coast. Again, international maritime traffi c was
disrupted. But, again, it is not clear that Zeng had anything to do
with the missile tests.
Nonetheless, it seems likely that Zeng Qinghong has been
intimately involved in all other aspects of Taiwan policy from the
time of the gsecret envoyh meetings until this day. By September
1996, it was widely assumed that Zeng had been named to the
gCentral Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs.h Jiang headed the
Group which also included Minister of Foreign Affairs Qian
Qichen, Zeng Qinghong (as director of the CCP General Offi ce),
Wang Zhaoguo (director of the Taiwan Affairs Offi ce under the
State Council), Xiong Guangkai (assistant chief of the PLA General
Staff), Jia Chunwang (Minister of State Security). When Zeng joined
the Taiwan leading group, the Hong Kong press revealed that the
leading group decided to gslightly readjust its policyh\primarily
with regards to the impact of the PLA on Taiwan policy. Said one
Hong Kong paper: after reviewing gboth the positive and negative
impact of the PLA military exercises during [Taiwanfs] presidential
election period, a new framework has thus been established for the
policy toward Taiwan.h
Zengfs appearance on the Taiwan Group was not a surprise. No
doubt Zeng identifi ed Taiwan policy as critical to the PLAfs mission
and was determined that Jiang Zemin must maintain control of the
Taiwan Group in order to enhance his leverage over the generals.144
At a meeting of the Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs in
August of 1998, Zeng was appointed to gtake charge of the routine
work of the group,h and Wang Zhaoguo was reportedly grelieved
from his post as the secretary general of the grouph when gthe Central
Committee decided to abolish the post of the secretary general of the
150
group.h145 The Taiwan press was certain that Zeng would take over
the day-to-day running of Taiwan work when the Politburo name
list for the 16th Party Congress was published.146 And, judging from
the names of those on the Taiwan Work Group when a more or less
authoritative list was published in December 2003, Zeng certainly
was in a position to exert control on the group\because they were
mostly Shanghai factionalists.147
Most analysts see Zengfs fi ngerprints on Taiwan policy, but it
is evident that Zeng hopes to keep his name out of it. As the grassroots
movement among Taiwanfs people for ever greater gnational
identityh spreads, Taiwan policy now has the potential to turn into a
major disaster for China. True to form, Zeng is perfectly happy with
Hu Jintao as chairman of Taiwan affairs, and hence liable for blame
if the policies backfi re. But Zeng wants his own people running
Taiwan decisionmaking.148
Hong Kong. Jiang Zemin not only trusted Zeng Qinghongfs
instincts in domestic affairs and Taiwan, but from a fairly early
stage, Zeng seemed to have Jiangfs ear on Hong Kongfs transition.
Hong Kong, of course, was Deng Xiaopingfs crowning foreign policy
achievement and, until Dengfs passing in February 1997, Jiang was
reluctant to make any obvious move to bring Hong Kong policy
under his direct control by assigning it to Zeng. Nonetheless, as early
as January 1994, Zeng, as director of the CCP Central Committeefs
General Offi ce, reported to Deng that two opinion polls in major
urban areas and cities showed that, while g99 percent of the people
supported the Central Governmentfs policy on the Hong Kong
issue,h there were still gsome people who thought that the central
government was not tough enough toward Britainh and geven
criticized the central government for being erightistf on this issue.h
Deng reacted defensively, and called on the PRCfs gPreliminary
Work Committeeh on Hong Kong negotiations to gquicken its work
and . . . work in a down-to-earth manner.h Britainfs political attempts
would not be allowed to succeed, Deng said, gbecause Hong Kong
belongs to China.h149
Deng also acquiesced in Jiangfs selection of Hong Kong tycoon
C.H. Tung as the territoryfs fi rst post-British leader, a choice that
Zeng Qinghong no doubt had a hand in. In the early 1980s, when
Tungfs gOrient Overseas Lineh ran into fi nancial troubles, the
151
Chinese government bailed it out. Hence, Tung was beholden
to Beijing. Tung, who spent his youth working in the Shanghai
headquarters of his fatherfs extensive shipping company, could
speak Shanghainese, had impressed Jiang as a loyal Chinese subject,
and has since been considered a Jiang man.
After Dengfs death, Zeng ensured that all the gadvanceh
planning of Jiangfs central role in the July 1, 1997, handover
ceremonies required his personal attention. Ten days before the
reversion, State Council Secretary-General Luo Gan and Hong Kong
and Macao Affairs Offi ce Director Lu Ping were obliged to complete
their consultations in Hong Kong and return to Beijing, and three
days later, Zeng, in his capacity as director of the General Offi ce of
the CCP Central Committee, arrived in Hong Kong to personally
manage the details of Jiangfs visit. Zeng Qinghong informed the
Hong Kong government that he was the senior Chinese offi cial
responsible for the Central Party Security Bureau and proceeded
to review Jiangfs motorcade routes, protective coverage, guest lists,
speeches, hotel and housing for the delegation, and all information
related to foreign participants in the festivities.150
For the next 6 years, Zeng apparently maintained considerable,
albeit discreet, infl uence over Hong Kong policy. Zengfs prominence
in Hong Kong affairs became visible after the Hong Kong
governmentfs attempt to push through harsh sedition laws (known
as gArticle 23h legislation) prompted a series of gigantic street
protests beginning with a march that drew more than 500,000 people
on July 1. Within days, the Politburo had convened an genlargedh
meeting to study the situation. By July 6, reports out of Hong Kong
indicated that there was a split in the Chinese leadership over how to
handle the situation.151 On July 14, Beijingfs offi cial English language
newspaper China Daily slammed the demonstrations and the offi cial
Xinhua news agency insisted that Hong Kong must go through with
legislative consideration of the Sedition Law gas scheduled.h152
All evidence pointed to Beijingfs propaganda arms gearing up
for major pressure on Hong Kongfs government to push through the
legislation. The Politburofs Propaganda Chief was Liu Yunshan\a
protege of Jiang Zeminfs and Zeng Qinghongfs.153 Meanwhile, James
Tien of Hong Kongfs pro-business (and Pro-Beijing) Liberal Party,
and a key legislative ally of the SARfs Chief Executive C.H. Tung,
152
made an emergency visit to Beijing on July 3 and was immediately
seen by Liu Yandong, the head of the Chinese Communist Party
United Front Work Department and ga known protege of President
Hu Jintao.h154
There was no question that the CCP Center\under Hu Jintao\
found it necessary to open an alternative dialogue channel in Hong
Kong instead of relying solely on Tung. In a move that further
undermined C. H. Tung (presumably to the delight of the Hu Jintao-
Wen Jiabao faction), James Tien resigned from the Hong Kong
SAR Executive Council. Tien indicated he was getting signals from
Beijing that the PRC government wanted a ghands-offh stance in an
effort to assuage democratic sentiments in the Hong Kong public.
The Chinese government, he said, had no particular interest in either
the gcontent or the timingh of the Article 23 legislation.155
The information dissonance coming from Beijing alarmed Tung,
who fl ew to Beijing on July 19 to brief the leadership on the situation
in Hong Kong. After meetings with C. H. Tung, President Hu and
Premier Wen issued statements of somewhat faint praise for the SAR
chief, and Hu Jingtao even directed Tung to gonce again seek the
advice and consent of the general publich (zaici xunwen gongzhong)
on the Article 23 legislation. Hu also warned against gforeign powers
or other outside forces interfering in Hong Kongfs internal affairs.h
Premier Wen Jiabao vowed to speed up garrangements to establish
even closer economic and trade ties between the interior and Hong
Kongh in an effort to improve the SARfs stagnant markets.156 But
Wen Jiabaofs comment to the press, that he gas usualh (yiran) had full
faith in Hong Kong, and its government gwith C. H. Tung as headh
was commented upon as a weak endorsement of the embattled SAR
head.157
Tung also met with Jiang Zemin, and interestingly, Vice President
Zeng Qinghong, the ginfl uential ally of the former presidenth (as the
Washington Post put it) participated in that meeting, not in Tungfs
session with President Hu.158 On July 22, Hong Kongfs Economic
Daily reported that Vice President Zeng had taken over the central
task force on Hong Kong policy from State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan,
fearing that Beijingfs handling of the territoryfs affairs was being
conducted at too low a level.159 Shortly afterwards, a gwell-placed
153
sourceh in Beijing confi ded to a Singapore reporter that gVice-
President Zeng Qinghong, now head of a special task force on Hong
Kong, agreed the top priority was to stabilise the situation.h160
By September 16, Zeng had made an emergency inspection
tour of South China to explore ways of gdeepeningh the economic
interdependence of Hong Kong and neighboring Guangdong
province. He then gsummonedh Hong Kongfs beleaguered Chief
Executive, C. H. Tung, to an audience in the East China city of
Hangzhou where Zeng was gvacationingh and impressed on Tung
the gimportance of stabilityh to the situation in the former British
Colony.161
As this paper was undergoing its fi nal proof-read, there were
indications that Zeng had remained at the center of Beijingfs strategic
planning for Hong Kong, but that President Hu Jintao seemed less
agitated about local agitation for democratization. It appeared, then,
that Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao may have adjudged that there
was a good chance Zeng Qinghongfs hardline stance against Hong
Kong democratization may backfi re and thus discredit Zeng and the
Shanghai Gang.
Zengfs Other Foreign Policy Involvement. Beginning in 1997,
before that autumnfs 15th Party Congress, Zeng had already begun
to maneuver his way into foreign policy. His modus operandi was
Machiavellian. Basically, Zeng made the foreign ministry look
incompetent, and then, rather than punish the fools, he would appear
to intercede in their defense. But he also used foreign ministry gaffes
to justify the reinvention of the gCentral Foreign Affairs Leading
Grouph as a national security council directly under Jiang Zemin
(with, of course, Zeng maintaining control of the agenda on Jiangfs
behalf). Through 1997, Zeng accompanied Jiang on his groundbreaking
visits to Russia and the United States and was described
as Jiangfs gspecial assistanth with protocolary rank higher than the
foreign minister. I recall that during Jiangfs October 1997 trip to the
United States, Jiang made a special point of introducing Zeng to
President William Clinton in such a way as to lead the American
side to assume that Zeng was an especially important infl uence on
Jiangfs thinking. Zeng also made his own trips abroad in 1997 and
1998, covering countries in Europe, North America, and Asia\all
154
greeted with raised-eyebrows from China-watchers who interpreted
them as evidence of Zengfs special interest in foreign policy.162
One example of Zengfs tactics came during President Clintonfs
visit to China in June-July 1998. Unbeknownst to either Beijingfs
foreign ministry or the American presidentfs advance team, Zeng
secretly ordered China Central Television to prepare live televised
coverage for Clintonfs two scheduled speeches. But the foreign
ministry was ordered to refuse the Clinton advance teamfs requests
for TV time. On both occasions, it was Zengfs own CCP General
Offi ce offi cial who approved the television broadcasts of Clintonfs
speeches\and then only on the eve of the events. The effect was to
make Jiang look reasonable and moderate to the Clinton people,
while humiliating the foreign ministry.163
Zengfs most remarkable foreign policy maneuver came in
November 1998 surrounding Jiang Zeminfs state visit to Japan.
Chinafs new foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan, a Japan hand, had
somehow been led to believe that the Japanese government would
make two historical concessions: that Japan would issue a written
apology for invading China in World War II, and that Japan would
explicitly commit to President Clintonfs so-called gThree Nofsh on
the issue of Taiwan. Even before President Jiang embarked on his
travels to Tokyo, Zeng was galready very much awareh that Japan
had no intention of budging on these points. Yet, Zeng kept Beijingfs
foreign ministry in the dark, and apparently allowed Minister Tang
to brief Jiang that the concessions were achievable. At the conclusion
of Jiangfs Japan visit, most observers counted it an utter fi asco and
seemed to lay blame for the poor coordination on Minister Tang.164
Which is probably what Zeng Qinghong intended. Wounded by
the debacle, Tang the Japan-hand was no doubt grateful that Jiang
(and Zeng) kept him on the team. Within two years, Zeng was seen
exercising his infl uence on diplomatic personnel and training, and
was generally considered to have established his primacy over the
foreign affairs bureaucracy.165
Another way Zeng seems to have gained infl uence in foreign
affairs after 1997 was to serve as the advance man for Jiang Zemin
on important visits abroad. In March 2001, for example, Zeng spent
two days in Pyongyang conversing with North Korean leader
Kim Jong Il as well as with the Democratic Peoplefs Republic of
155
Koreafs (DPRK) top military leader, Jo Myong Rok. Zengfs mission
apparently was focused on planning for Jiang Zeminfs September
2001 visit to Pyongyang. But Zengfs mission was also to encourage
the DPRK to move toward economic reforms with offers of gChinafs
free assistance.h Kim Jong Il had been in Shanghai just two months
prior to Zengfs Korean visit, and the Chinese press was fi lled
with hope that the spectacle of Shanghaifs transformation since
Kimfs previous visits of over a decade earlier would convince the
DPRKfs god-king that the North had to change. In consideration
whereof, Zeng reportedly offered to increase aid supplies of Chinese
foodstuffs, crude oil, and coking coal.166
To be sure, a key topic of Zengfs talks was the incoming Bush
administrationfs reassessment of Americafs permissive stance
on North Korean nuclear and missile development gand also
reconfi rmed their position on fi rmly opposing the so-called strategy
of hegemonism, such as the National Missile Defense (NMD) system,
pursued by the Bush administration.h167 As it happened, Jiangfs visit
(with Zeng prominently fi guring in the entourage) took place the
week before the September 11 terror attacks in the United States and
repeated the same themes of Chinese aid to the DPRK and Chinese
hopes that the North would reform its economy.
During his two-day March visit, Zeng\at the time the 20th
ranking member of the CCP Politburo\met fi ve or six times with
Pyongyangfs Dear Leader Kim. Dear Leader could no doubt overlook
Zengfs comparatively junior Politburo standing since Jiang himself
reportedly had described Zeng as one of Chinafs gcore leadersh of
the next generation together with Vice President Hu Jintao.168
That Zeng was still very much in the center of North Korean
policy issues on the eve of his ascension into the CCPfs nine-man SC
of the Politburo in October 2002 was evident when Zeng took over
the infamous gYang Binh case. Yang was a big-time tycoon-cum-con
man from China who has wormed (or bribed) his way into the favor
of Kim Jong Il and with his considerable wealth had managed to
become named ggovernorh of the DPRKfs Potemkin-style gspecial
economic zoneh on the Chinese border. Apparently, the Chinese
had advised Kim not to have anything to do with Yang Bin, but
were ignored. Yang was then arrested on fraud and tax evasion
charges and eventually tossed into prison with an 18-year sentence
156
and a $300 million dollar fi ne.169 According to the Hong Kong press,
Zeng coordinated the Yang Bin affair with the foreign minister, the
tax bureau, the public security ministry, the Liaoning provincial
government, and a host of lesser offi ces.170
Given Zengfs central role in Chinafs relations with North Korea,
it was not surprising when Hong Kong analyst Willy Wo-lap Lam
reported in March 2003 that Chinafs new Vice President Zeng Qing
Hong was a member of a newly formed Leading Group on the North
Korean Crisis headed by President Hu. As recently as August 2003,
Zeng was freely expressing himself on the North Korean nuclear
crisis. Zeng evinced a sympathy with North Koreafs security concerns
that seemed co-equal with any desire he may have had about a
nuclear-free Korean peninsula.171 Without knowing the identities of
the others on the gNorth Korean Crisish leading group, it would be
diffi cult to judge whether Zengfs infl uence on North Korean policy
is greater than Hu Jintaofs, but Zengfs grip on the foreign ministry
bureaucracy (through Tang Jiaxuan) and the military (via Jiangfs
CMC chairmanship) suggest that whatever infl uence he cares to
exercise would be decisive.
Zengfs Interest in Military Policies.
Most of the Chinese language press in Hong Kong and Taiwan
has speculated that Jiang has intended to move Zeng Qinghong into
the CMC at least since 1999.172 And it has been an open secret since
Zengfs selection in November 2002 for a seat on the CCP Politburo
SC that his ambitions include a seat on the CMC. Jiang Zemin
himself counted heavily on support from the PLA to tighten his
grip on political power, and one report from Hong Kong indicated
that Zeng Qinghong personally huddled with outgoing PLA chief,
General Zhang Wannian, for over an hour in October to map out
Jiangfs continuation as chairman of the CMC.173
Shortly after Zengfs appointment as Chinafs vice president,
informed observers in Beijing opined that gJiang Zemin has the
major power, Hu Jintao has the position, and Zeng Qinghong holds
real power.h174 Speculation in Beijing calculated that Jiang Zemin
could hold on to the CMC chair as long as the world was gripped
by a series of crises from the Iraq war to the North Korean crisis
157
and from the Taiwan issue to unsettled relations with the United
States, all compounded by the leadership transition, but that Jiang
would be loath to abandon his CMC chair to Hu Jintao without some
confi dence that his infl uence would remain strong. As such, Jiang
could only rest easy if Zeng Qinghong were on the CMC running
day-to-day affairs. By the end of 2003, it was clear that Jiang had no
plans to depart the CMC anytime soon, and perhaps would even
stay on until the 17th CCP Party Congress in 2007. If so, Zeng still
plans to be a CMC vice chairman\despite the fact that he would be
over 68 years old.175 Through 2003, Zeng had already given outward
appearances of being interested in defense affairs. In September he
conferred with visiting defense ministers from Uganda, Canada,
and Australia, and met with the Vietnamese defense minister in
October.176
It may also have been that Zeng sought to take advantage of his
early career in the military missile program to enhance his reputation
as the Politburofs expert on space technology and policies. In March
of 2002, Zeng accompanied Jiang Zemin to Chinafs space center in
Jiuquan to observe the launch of the unmanned Shenzhou-3 space
capsule, and in November Zeng and other Politburo and military
fi gures apparently visited the Second Astronautical Institute to offer
their congratulations.177 In early 2003, Zeng toured several missile
component factories in Jiangxi, his fatherfs old bailiwick, and in
Guizhou province.178

Zeng Haisheng, Sister of the Revolution.

Zeng Qinghongfs sister must certainly be one of Zengfs primary
conduits for inside scuttlebutt within the PLA bureaucracy. She
has come up through the ranks, but her promotion into the PLAfs
general personnel fi les offi ce to the offi ce of the Chief of General Staff
seems to have coincided with her brotherfs increasing prominence
on the national scene.
General Zeng Haisheng is a close aide to General Liang Guanglie,
chief of the PLA General Staff Department. She was also a member
of the PLAfs 268-person delegation to the Tenth National Peoplefs
Congress in March 2003.179 On April 3, 2003, gMajor General Zeng
Haishengh was identifi ed as deputy director of Chief of General Staff
158
offi ce (Zong Can Bangongting fuzhuren) when she saw off General
Kui Fulin at the airport as he departed on a visit to three African
countries, and a few days later she saw off General Xiong Guangkai
on his trip to South Africa.180 Naturally, she was at the airport when
the delegations returned.
A name search of the PLAD website turned up at least 20 news
articles that included General Zeng Haishengfs name, mostly
blurbs about General Zeng greeting or sending-off various PLA
delegations.181 In January 2003, General Zeng gave at least four
military, security, and information related briefi ngs to the tenth
session of the Beijing Municipal Political Consultative Conference.182
From September 29 to October 1, 2002, General Zeng Haisheng led
a team of four from the PLA General Staff Department to inspect
the city of Jinggangshan, which she called the gcradle of the
revolution.h183 No doubt because of her paternity and her brotherfs
senior status in the Politburo, General Zeng was treated with the
greatest of deference in Jiangxi as she traveled with several other
military offi cers from the Jiangxi Military district, touring such
landmarks as Maofs old house in the Ruijin base area.
Clearly, General Zeng is in a position to know just about
everything that is going on in the PLA, and certainly must share that
information freely with the vice president\her brother.

CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR THE TWO CENTERS

The careers of Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice President Zeng
Qinghong are emblematic of the two very different world views of
Chinafs gtwo centers,h the Party/Government and the PLA. Not since
the early 1930s when Mao Zedong leveraged his control of the Red
Army ggunh in the Jiangxi Base area to gain leadership in the Party,
has the Armyfs top leadership been seen as a competing center of
power to the Party Center. The gFutian Incidenth of 1930 established
Mao as the preeminent leader of the Party for nearly three decades,
and in 1959, following his humiliation at the Lushan Plenum and his
retirement from the policy work, Mao was determined to maintain
his control of the Army. Indeed, Mao used the Army as his powerbase
to undermine and then destroy his political rivals during the
159
Cultural Revolution, and the Army remained a separate center of
power until the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress when
both political and military power were again concentrated in the
hands of one person, Deng Xiaoping. Control of the Army was
essential to Dengfs ability to defeat the most serious challenge to the
power of the Party since the Cultural Revolution\the Tiananmen
Demonstrations.
Since 1989, Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong have seen the
PLA as a vital part of their own power base. But it remains to be
seen whether Chinafs army wants to continue in the role as the
Praetorian Guard for an unpopular leadership. Political dynamics
in China are already undergoing profound changes, and the SARS
fi asco may have begun a process in the Army that inclines it toward
a leadership with proven political competence. As the sentiments
against the gtwo centersh expressed by senior PLA generals during
the NPC session in March 2003 indicate, the PLA is somewhat
uncomfortable with the existing situation\a civilian leadership
focused on economic (and perhaps even eventual political reforms)
vying with Jiang Zeminfs gShanghai Gang,h which sees the PLAfs
role as bolstering their personal infl uence. But as long as the PLA
has its own agenda\to transform itself into a fi ghting force befi tting
a global superpower\the PLAfs top military commanders may well
be inclined to go with the political leadership that promotes their
goals.
If, in the long-run, both the economic reformists and Zeng
Qinghongfs Shanghai faction continue to see the PLA as the strategic
center of power in China, there is little likelihood that Chinafs
national priorities will shift away from military modernization and
gincreasing the comprehensive strength of the nation.h On the other
hand, if the Hu Jintao/Wen Jiabao leadership faction can successfully
undermine Jiang Zeminfs prestige in the military\as they tried to do
in the SARS crisis\there is a chance that the PLAfs infl uence over
debates of national policy can be marginalized. At this juncture, the
latter scenario seems unlikely.
160

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. I blame former State Department China Hand, Ambassador Harvey
Feldman, with this unforgivable pun.
2. Jia Qinglin suffers from a universally bad reputation. Reports from Agence
France Presse, Reuters, and The Associated Press shortly after his appointment
to Chinafs leadership also included commentary on his wifefs reputed links
with massive corruption and smuggling schemes. My own recollections of his
promotions in Fujian were that they were the result of having impressed Jiang
Zemin with his personal loyalty to Jiang. His loyalty to Jiang is an accepted factor
in Chinese politics. For example, see China News Digest at http://services.cnd.org/
CND-Global/CND-Global.02-10-25.html.
3. Even the normally hagiographic Chinese leadership profi le of Wu
that appeared in the Hong Kong PRC press was unable to list many of Wufs
accomplishments in Shanghai\other than attributing to Wu credit for the success
of the Shanghai stock exchange and the development of the Pudong Zone, both
of which seem to have been the result of Zhu Rongjifs policies, not Wufs. See
Tseng Hua, gWu Bangguo Studies Treaties on Financial Affairs Intensely\brief
biography of the Shanghai CPC Committee secretary,h Hong Kong TA KUNG
PAO in Chinese, June 22, 1994, p. A1, translated by Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS) at FBIS-CHI-94-137.
4. Tamora Vidaillet, geYoungf Guangdong chief joins China powerful,h
Reuters English News Service, November 15, 2002.
5. See Tamora Vidaillet, gChinafs Mr Integrity picked to weed out party
graft,h Reuters English News Service, November 15, 2002. Vidaillet refers to Wufs
gunswerving support for Jiang,h but cites Hamilton College professor Cheng Lifs
opinion that gWu Guanzheng has been a rising star because he is a capable leader.
Hefs also someone the different factions can accept.h For a broader view of Wu, see
Cheng Li, Chinafs Leaders, The New Generation, Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefi eld,
2001.
6. John Pomfret, gNew Guard In China Marks No Clear Path,h Washington
Post, November 16, 2002; p. A01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/
A61554-2002Nov15.html.
7. For a plausible discussion of the Politburo Standing Committee rivalries, see
a collection of articles under the general title of gSi Changwei fan Jiang Lianrenh
(Four Standing Committee members oppose another term for Jiang), Hong Kong
Kaifang magazine, September 2002, pp. 10-23.
8. See, among others, Xu Xiangli, gBeidaihe Huiyi Wei 16 Da Yicheng Dingdiaoh
(Beidaihe Conference sets agenda for 16th Party Congress), Taipei China Times,
161
July 9, 2002, at http://news.chinatimes.com/Chinatimes/newslist/newslist-content/0,354
6,110505+112002070900063,00.html; and Zhu Jianling, gBeidaihe Huiyi 16 Da Feng
Xiang Qiuh (Beidaihe Conference and the 16th Party Congress to have far-reaching
impact), Taipei China Times, July 19, 2002, at http://news.chinatimes.com/Chinatimes/
newslist/newslist-content/0,3546,110505+112002071900088,00.html. In English, see
Charles Hutzler, gChina Party Chief Could Cling To Post Leaving Less for Hu,h
The Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2002,
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1025546134720334600.djm,00.html; John Pomfret,
gChinese Leader Throws a Curve Jiangfs Reluctance to Retire Could Spark Power
Struggle,h Washington Post, July 21, 2002, p. A01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/articles/A38286-2002Jul20.html.
9. See Erik Eckholm, gChinafs New Leader Promises Not to Sever Tether to
Jiang,h The New York Times, November 21, 2002, p. A16. This is wholly plausible.
It mirrors the loyalty oaths sworn to Deng Xiaoping by the Politburo in the
1980fs that gon most important issues, we still need Deng Xiaoping at the helm.h
Clearly, Jiang saw himself as Dengfs successor, and no doubt insisted on similar
deference.
10. gQuan Jun he Wujing Budui Guangda Guan Bing Jianjue yonghu xinde
Dang Zhongyang he Zhongyang Junweih (The Broad Mass of Offi cers and Ranks
of the Entire Army and Armed Police are determined to support the new Party
Center and the New CMC), Peoplefs Liberation Army Daily (hereafter PLAD), p. 1,
at http://www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/pladaily/2002/11/17/20021117001004.html.
11. See Wang Zhuozhong gDang, Jun Ge you zhongyang, Gong Jun Liangtou
Yuchengh (Party and Army each have their own center, PRC Army must be loyal
to two chiefs), Taipei China Times, November 18, 2003, at http://news.chinatimes.com/
Chinatimes/newslist/newslist-content/0,3546,110505+112002111800077,00.html.
12. See gXue eSange Daibiaof Zhen Zhua Shi Ganh (Studying the eThree
Representsf truly is acting according to reality), PLAD, March 4, 2003, at http:
//www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/pladaily/2003/03/11/20030311001061.html and http://
www.pladaily.com.cn/item/lianghui/rdzz/009.htm.
13. See Xu Yufang, gChinese military blasts confusion at the top,h Asia Times,
March 11, 2003, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/EC12Ad01.html.
14. Ching-Ching Ni, gNew Premier in China Has Gone Along to Get Along,h
The Los Angeles Times, March 18, 2003, at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/
world/la-fg-wen18mar18,1,5650141.story?coll=la percent2Dheadlines percent2Dworld.
15. Unless otherwise noted, all other information relating to Wenfs career prior
to his return to Beijing comes from Yang Zhongmei, Pingbu Qingyun, Zhonggong
Xin Zongli Wen Jiabao (Striding Along with Destiny, the PRCfs New Premier Wen
162
Jiabao), Taipei: China Times Cultural Publishers, 2003. This is a comprehensive
and readable (but neither footnoted nor indexed) biography, which includes
details from Wen Jiabaofs early career that appear nowhere else in open sources.
All the events, however, seem plausible, and the narrative is consistent with other
reporting of Wenfs career. The author was raised and educated in the PRC and
apparently takes much of the hagiography of Chinese media leadership profi les at
face value.
16. Yang Zhongmei, p. 28. Yang doesnft say which warring side burned the
town.
17. See gRemarks of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao eTurning Your Eyes to Chinafh
given at Harvard University on December 10, 2003, at http://www.news.harvard.edu/
gazette/2003/12.11/10-wenspeech.html.
18. See Premier Wenfs speech gWorking Together to Write A New Chapter
In China-US Relationsh at the website for the National Committee on US China
Relations, https://www.uschina.org/public/documents/2003/12/09-jiabao_dc.html.
19. See gTianjin Nankai Zhongxue Chule Liangge Zonglih (Tianjinfs Nankai
Middle School produces two Premiers), New York World Journal, March 19, 2003,
p. 6.
20. One source says Wen Pengjiu was the PRC Consul General in Geneva
during the 1960s. Zhang Weiguo, gZhongnanhai Budaoweng Wen Jiabaoh
(Zhongnanhaifs eBounce-back dollf Wen Jiabao), Hong Kong Kaifang (Open
Magazine), July 2002, p. 34.
21. The Geology Institute was very much in the camp of the Cultural
Revolution Group, later infamous as the gGang of Four,h while the gHeaven
Factionh supported Premier Zhou Enlai. See David and Nancy Dall Milton, The
Wind Will Not Subside, Years in Revolutionary China 1964-1969, New York: Pantheon
Books, 1976, pp. 206, 240-1.
22. Wang Haitao, gWen Jiabao he tade Jiatingh (Wen Jiabao and his family),
Hong Kong Kaifang (Open Magazine), April 2003, pp. 29-30.
23. gWen Jiabao Qi Shi Baoshi Jianding Zhuanjiah (Wen Jiabaofs Wife Zhang
Peili is expert gemologist), New York World Journal, March 20, 2003. Yang
Zhongmei says Ms. Zhang was in the 1976 class at the geology institute, but I
assume that is a misprint because Zhang is a year older than Wen.
24. Wang Haitao, gWen,h p. 31.
25. Yang Zhongmei, p. 24; Wang Haitao (Wen, p. 31) says that Yunsong is
a computer prodigy, and tried to get a job in Beijing with a foreign fi rm after
163
graduating from a U.S. school. The fi rm wouldnft hire him, fearing repercussions
of having a leaderfs son, so Yunsong started his own fi rm in Beijing called
UNIHUB. UNIHUB now has major contracts with Dell and Northern Telecom,
and maintains offi ces in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Wuhan. Yunsong also
conducts business under the alias, gChen Song.h The March 20, 2003, issue of
Hong Kongfs Yi Zhoukan (Next magazine) says that in 1999, Wen Yunsong formed
a venture in Hong Kong called gUnihub Global Network,h with tycoon Li Kashing
as his partner. Wenfs daughter, Ruchun, is a graduate student at the Nanjing
International Relations Institute where she gburies her head in books,h and
basically treats everyone with respect\gnot like most children of high cadres.h
26. Cheng Li, pp. 117-118.
27. Yang Zhongmei, p. 55.
28. Ibid., p. 55.
29. This narrative is essentially taken from Ibid., pp 70-72. However, the
Poliburo apparently did not confi rm Jiangfs appointment until May 27. See
footnote 115.
30. Ibid., p.71. The earliest congratulatory letters to the Center came between
June 5 and June 12. Hu Jintaofs letter of support\one of the earliest\apparently
came on June 7. See gTibet Supports Central Policy on Crackdownh broadcast on
Lhasa Tibet Regional Service in Mandarin, 1330 GMT, June 9, 1989, transcribed in
the FBIS Green Book for June 13, 1989, at FBIS, p. 57.
31. Yang Zhongmei, p. 71.
32. The author was deputy consul general at the U.S. Consulate General in
Guangzhou from August 1989 to July 1992.
33. Yang Zhongmei, p. 74.
34. gZeng shi Zhao Zong Shuji Deli Zhushou, Ru Jin Bi Tan Zhao Ziyangh
(Once a powerful Zhao Ziyang Aide, Wen Jiabao now avoids discussing Zhao
Ziyang), New York World Journal, March 19, 2003.
35. Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley, Chinafs New Rulers: The Secret Files,
London: Granta Books, 2002, pp. 96-97. This book is remarkable for how much of
its prognostication about the outcome of the 2002 16th party congress was dead
wrong\and that only serves to bolster the view that it incorporates the tendentious
views of partisans of the Politburofs reformist maverick, Li Ruihuan. Nonetheless,
the raw material used by the pseudonymous gZong Hairenh is fully plausible and
in the end accurate, and includes details unavailable in open sources.
164
36. Yang Zhongmei covers this aspect of Dengfs new ideology succinctly at p. 78.
37. See Guan Juan, gDeng Personally Mediated Disputes Between Qin Jiwei
and Yang Baibing,h Hong Kong Cheng Ming magazine, No. 180, October 1, 1992, pp
19-20, translated in FBIS, pp. 27-28. This article was viewed in the U.S. intelligence
community as the fi rst indication of a major revolt among the old soldiers and
a harbinger of Yangfs demise. Yang Zhongmei says on page 81 that 103 senior
general offi cers wrote the letter to Deng, warning that the gYang Brothersh were
violating the dictum that gthe party should control the gun.h
38. For a full biographic review of Hu Jintaofs career, see John J. Tkacik, Jr.,
Joseph Fewsmith, and Maryanne Kivlehan, gWhofs Hu? Assessing Chinafs Heir
Apparent, Hu Jintao,h Heritage Lecture #739 available at http://www.heritage.org/
Research/AsiaandthePacifi c/HL739.cfm#pgfId=1010175.
39. While gDeng Xiaoping Theoryh was not explicitly named in the Party
Charter, it is clear that the revisions were adopted wholly from Dengfs policies.
The best analysis of this is contained in gRevised Party Constitution Strengthens
Reformersf Cause,h published in FBIS TRENDS of November 12, 1992, pp. 1-6. All
other Congress documents, however, explicitly linked the wording of the CCP
constitution amendments to gDeng Xiaoping Theory.h
40. Jiang Zemin was fi rst identifi ed as the gcoreh of the leadership by Premier
Li Peng in a meeting with gdemocratic and nonparty personagesh on June 28, 1989
(see gLi Peng Admits that Jiang Zemin is the Core of the New Leading Body,h Wen
Wei Po, June 29, 1989, p. 1, transcribed by FBIS, p. 17). The term came from Deng
Xiaopingfs speech to the new Politburo Standing Committee on June 16 when he
declared gIn the leadership of the third generation, there should also be a core . . .
this leadership core is Comrade Jiang Zemin, whom we agreed to select.h The title
stuck, and had been an offi cial part of Jiangfs leadership roles ever since. See geFull
Text of Gistsf of Deng Xiaopingfs Speech to Members of the New Political Bureau
Standing Committeeh given on June 16, 1989, Tung Fang Jih Pao, Hong Kong, July
15, 1989, p. 6, transcribed in FBIS, p. 13.
41. Nathan and Gilley, p. 97.
42. Yang Zhongmei, p. 103.
43. Ching-Ching Ni, gNew Premier in China Has Gone Along to Get Along,h
Los Angeles Times, March 18, 2003.
44. Yang Zhongmei, pp. 108-109.
45. gSpecial dispatch: Wen Jiabao Puts Forward Principles for Rebuilding
Disaster Areas,h Hong Kong Ming Pao in Chinese, October 22, 1998, p. B18.
165
46. gWen Jiabao To Head Central Financial Work Group,h Hong Kong Hsin
Pao (Hong Kong Economic Journal) in Chinese, March 12, 1998, p 1. Zhou is now
Governor of the Peoplefs Bank of China. Zhou was born in 1948 in Jiangsu. Zhou
replaced Dai Xianglong, who was named mayor of Tianjin in an effort to remove
Zhu Rongjifs infl uence from policies after the 10th NPC in March 2003. Zhou is a
protege of Jiang Zemin, Zhoufs father, Zhou Jiannan, was Jiangfs mentor at the
Ministry of Machine-Building in the 1970s. Wang, now mayor of Beijing, is of the
gprincelingh faction, his father-in-law was the late Yao Yilin, a very conservative
Politburo Standing Committee member and State Council vice premier under Li
Peng. In 1998, he was a former governor of China Construction Bank recently
transferred to Guangdong to take over South China operations for the Peoplefs
Bank of China. In November 2002, Wang was appointed CCP Party chief in
Hainan, and in April 2003, Wang was named mayor of Beijing replacing Hu
Jintaofs ally, Meng Xuenong.
47. Lu Ru-lue: gWen Jiabao Is Almost Certain to Be the Next Premier,h Hong
Kong Hsin Pao (Hong Kong Economic Journal) in Chinese, December 04, 2000, p.
24, translated by FBIS.
48. gProcess of Speculation About Wen Jiabao Offering Resignation,h Hong
Kong Ming Pao, May 2, 2002 p. B12, translated by FBIS.
49. (citing Beijing Xinhua) gWen Jiabao ti Jinrong Gongzuo Wu Renwuh (Wen
Jiabao outlines fi ve points for fi nancial reforms), New York World Journal internet
edition, January 28, 2003.
50. Ruan Leyi et al, gWen Jiabao Gao Piao Dang Xuan Zhonggong Zonglih
(Wen Jiabao elected PRC Premier with top vote), China Times Internet Edition,
March 17, 2003. Notes that Hu Jintao got 99.7 percent of the votes for MAC vice
chairman, while Jiang Zeminfs successful bid for a second term as MAC Chairman
received gyesh votes from 92.5 percent of the NPC delegates.
51. Wang Zhuozhong, gWen Jiabao Neige, Caijing Renma duo Jiang Paih (In
Wen Jiabao Cabinet Finance Experts mostly JZM cronies), China Times Internet
Edition, March 9, 2003, http://news.chinatimes.com/Chinatimes/newslist/newslistcontent/
0,3546,110505+112003030900053,00.html
52. gHua Jianmin jiang ren Guowuyuan Mishuzhangh (Hua Jianmin to be
State Council Secretary General), New York World Journal internet edition, March
9, 2003.
53. gSiwei Fu Zongli dou shi Zhengzhi Ju Chengyuanh (Four new Vice
Premiers are all Politburo members), New York World Journal internet edition,
March 20, 2003.
166
54. Among Jiangfs factionalists are State Councillor and Public Security
Minister Zhou Yongkang, Minister of National Defense Cao Gangchuan, Foreign
Minister Tang Jiaxuan, State Councillor Chen Zhili, and Personnel Minister Zhang
Bolin who was Zeng Qinghongfs aide in the Central Organization Department.
See gWen Neige Renshi, Jiang Xi reng ju Yaojinh (In Wenfs cabinet, Jiang people
hold strategic positions), New York World Journal internet edition March 18, 2003.
55. Jeffrey Sparshott, gChina to feel farm trade pressure,h The Washington Times,
February 15, 2003, http://www.washtimes.com/business/20030215-69329136.htm.
56. gJie Zongli hou, Wen Jiabao jiang dajian Nongye shuih (After ascending
to the Premiership, Wen Jiabao will grant huge cuts in agriculture tax), New York
World Journal internet edition, March 11, 2003.
57. gShang ren di ba dao, Wen Jiabao qian xiang chi eHuangliang
Rongguanfh (First to get the knife after his appointment, Wen Jiabao takes aim
at esupernumerary offi cials who eat imperial grainf), Taipei China Times internet
edition, March 10, 2003, http://news.chinatimes.com/Chinatimes/newslist/newslistcontent/
0,3546,110505+112003031000076,00.html.
58. gWen Jiabao: Dangqian Jingji Renwu, Shouzhong Fang Tongsuoh (Wen
Jiabao: Defl ation Fight is Biggest Economic Mission at Present), New York World
Journal internet edition, July 18, 2003.
59. gWen Jiabao Gua shuai, Zhiding Keji Fazhan Zhan lueh (Wen Jiabao Takes
Command, Sets Strategy for Science and Technology Development), New York
World Journal internet edition, June 19, 2003.
60. gWen Jiabao Qianchang Xinxihua Lingdao Xiaozuh (Wen Jiabao takes over
E Commerce Leading Small Group), New York World Journal internet edition, July
6, 2003. See also gWen Jiabao zu Kaichuang Xinxihua Xin Juh (Wen Jiabao urges
informationalization of new bureaus), New York World Journal internet edition,
July 24, 2003.
61. John Pomfret, gChinafs Slow Reaction to Fast-Moving Illness, Fearing Loss
of Control, Beijing Stonewalled,h Washington Post, April 3, 2003, p. A18, at http:
//www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A14967-2003Apr2.html.
62. John Pomfret, gSARS Coverup Spurs A Shake-Up in Beijing,h Washington
Post, April 21, 2003, p. A01, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/
A64440-2003Apr20.html.
63. Yang Zhongmei, p. 187.
64.Ibid., p. 196.
167
65. John Pomfret, gPresident Responded to Pressure Inside and
Outside Country on SARS,h Washington Post, May 13, 2003, p. A01, at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A47408-2003May12.html.
66. Boxun.com (at http://www.peacehall.com/hot/feiyan.shtml) has provided a
running tab of SARS reporting from Guangdong since February 10. See http:
//www.peacehall.com/news/gb/china/2003/02/200302102341.shtml. As late as April 2,
the Guangdong provincial government was reporting the alarming fi gures it had,
but maintained political correctness by couching them in soothing terms. See Shen
Gan, gWo Sheng Feidianxing Feiyan 3 Yuefen Bingli Mingxian Xiajiangh (The
Number of New SARS Cases in Guangdong Province Show Clear Decline During
March), Nanfang Daily, Guangzhou, China, April 2, 2003. Text available at http:
//www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/nf/20030402/jywz/200304020033.asp.
67. Yang Zhongmei, p. 191.
68. Zeng Liming, gState Council Information Offi ce Holds Press Conference
on Prevention and Control of Atypical Pneumonia,h Zhongguo Xinwen She, April
3, 2003, translated by FBIS.
69. John Pomfret, gPresident Responded,h May 13, 2003.
70. Rob Gifford, gChina and SARS,h audio broadcast report for National Public
Radio, April 9, 2003. Audio portion available at http://discover.npr.org/features/featur
e.jhtml?wfId=1225737. Jiang sought out several foreign reporters on April 9 and 10,
giving each separate interviews.
71. According to John Pomfretfs May 13 report, the wake-up call came earlier.
gHu and Wenfs push for change began gathering momentum. On April 9 and 10
they arranged for experts and respected nonmembers of the party to meet with
senior government and party offi cials to discuss the crisis. The consensus from
those meetings, according to participants, was that China should stop covering up
its epidemic and begin working closely with WHO and other agencies to deal with
the virus.h
72. gJiang Zemin dao Shanghai bi SARS? Bei Da Xuesheng Bu Manh (Did JZM
go to Shanghai to escape SARS? Beijing University Students Unhappy), New York
World Journal internet edition, April 27, 2003.
73. gBaozhang Lingdao Ceng, Zhanshi Lingdao Tizhi Qidongh (To ensure the
leadership levels, the wartime leadership structure is mobilized), New York World
Journal internet edition, April 27, 2003.
74. See Chang Fan, Chung Hsueh-ping, gMeng Xuenong: Capitalfs Epidemic
Situation Under Control,h Hong Kong Wen Wei Po internet edition, April 14, 2003,
translated by FBIS.
168
75. Charles Hutzler, Karen Richardson, and Todd Zaun, gBeijing Authorities
Grant Slow Access to WHO Team, Chinafs Limited Response Could Hinder
Global Effort To Control SARS Outbreak,h The Wall Street Journal, April 14, 2003,
p. A-17.
76. Erik Eckholm, gChina Said to Take 2 Weeks to Disclose Sub Disaster,h The
New York Times, May 5, 2003 at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/05/international/
asia/05CHIN.html.
77. John Pomfret, gPresident Responded,h May 13, 2003.
78. Yang Zhongmei, p. 199.
79. Ibid., p. 202.
80. See http://www.pku.edu.cn/news/xiao_kan/pkunews03/news4.html.
81. See Tang Qing, gJiang Zemin efl ees to Shanghaif Internet-ers bombard
Jiang and his cast for being eignominiousf,h Association for Asian Research
(AFAR), May 04, 2003, at http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/1337.html. I have not
been able to locate these postings on the Beijing University site.
82. See http://www.pku.edu.cn/news/xiao_kan/news/304/04-123.htm.
83. gJiang Zemin Qin Pijun Ji Diao Junyi Yuan Jingh (Jiang Zemin Personally
OKs Emergency Detail of Military Doctors to aid Beijing), New York World Journal
internet edition, April 29, 2003. Also see Yang Zhongmei, P. 202.
84. John Pomfret, gReport Offers Few Clues to What Caused Overcrowded
Vessel to eMalfunctionf,h Washington Post, Saturday, May 3, 2003, p. A19, at http:
//www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5037-2003May2.html.
85. See image fi les of the PLAD front pages at http://www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/
pladaily/2003/05/23/1.html through http://www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/pladaily/2003/06/
08/1.html. For 2 full weeks, Hu Jintao dominated the LAD to the exclusion of
Jiang Zemin. Jiang returned on June 7, and Hu was little seen until June 19. From
June 19 through June 28, Jiang and Hu share the front pages of the LAD more or
less equally. Random checks for July and August seem to bear this out. I strongly
recommend anyone with access to hard copies of the LAD to riffl e through them
for a better idea of LAD coverage of Hu in recent days.
86. Liu Tong, gWei Jiang Zemin Shinian Ding Qiankanh (A Decade of Deciding
Heaven and Earth for Jiang Zemin), Hong Kong Kaifang (Open magazine), July,
2002, p. 30.
169
87. Wang Haitao, gDa Nei Quan Mo Gaoshou Zeng Qinghongh (The Great
Internal Puppetmaster Zeng Qinghong), Hong Kong Kaifang (Open Magazine),
July, 2002, p. 31.
88. Ibid.
89. Lu Fei-lang, gZeng Qinghong: ethe Kingfs Man, Zeng Qinghongf,h Chiushih
Nien-tai magazine, January 1, 1998, No 1, pp 53-55, translated by FBIS. See also
Zong Hairen, Di Si Dai (The Fourth Generation), Hong Kong Mirror Books, 2002,
p. 332. Zong doesnft mention Zeng Shanfs fatherfs pre-revolutionary career.
90. John E. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition: 1927-1935, Palo Alto: Stanford
University Press, 1966, pp. 231-240.
91. Ibid. Zeng Shan is also cited as a key Mao aide in at least two accounts of
the Futian Incident. Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao,
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1951, pp. 174-177. See also Otto Braun, A
Comintern Agent in China 1932-1939, London, C. Hurst & Company, 1982. p. 57.
92. Cheng Li, p. 160. Li cites Klein and Clark, Biographic Dictionary of Chinese
Communism, and private correspondence with Dai Qing.
93. Ting Wang: geSunset Groupf Strong Man Zeng Qinghong Has Great
Potential,h Hong Kong Hsin Pao (Hong Kong Economic Journal) in Chinese, May
31, 2000, p. 30, FBIS.
94. Wang Zhuozhong, gChangzheng Nyu Hongjun Zeng Qinghongzhi Mu
Deng Liujin Bingshi Beijingh (Female Red Army Veteran of the Long March, and
Zeng Qinghongfs Mother, Deng Liujin dies in Beijing), Taipei, China Times internet
edition, July 24, 2003.
95. Zong Hairen, p. 263.
96. Wang Haitao. p. 32.
97. Zong Hairen, p. 263.
98. Ting Wang. It is interesting to note that Chen Yi was Maofs chief military
lieutenant at the Futian Incident. See Howard L. Boorman, ed., Biographical
Dictionary of Republican China, New York: Columbia University Press, 1967, p. 256.
It is also interesting to note that Hu Jintao apparently alienated Chen Haosu when
Hu served as Party Secretary of the Communist Youth League. See Yi Ming, gThe
Logical General Secretary Designate, Among the Seven CPC Politburo Standing
Committee Members, Hu Jintao Ranks Fifth and Is the Youngest, At 54,h Chiu-shih
Nien-tai (The Nineties), Hong Kong in Chinese, No. 1, January 1, 1998, pp. 50-52.
170
99. Wang Zhuozhong.
100. gYi Ren Zhixia, Wan Ren Zhishangde eJiuqian Suif Zeng Qinghongh
(Second to One, Lord of the multitudes, May Zeng Qinghong have a epretty long
lifef), Secret China, July 16, 2002, at http://www.secretchina.com/news/articles/2/7/16/
21099b.html. See also Liu Fei-lang.
101. Zeng was said to have helped his former 101 Middle School classmate, Bai
Keming, get appointed as CCP party secretary in Hainan in August 2001. Bai was
general manager of Renmin Ribao, and was considered wholly incompetent. His
father was Bai Jian, the former No. 1 Machine Building deputy minister, who was
once Jiang Zeminfs superior. See Zong Hairen, gDeclining Hainan: Part 2,h Hong
Kong Hsin Pao (Hong Kong Economic Journal) January 22, 2003, p. 22, translated by
FBIS.
102. Zong, p. 264.
103. See Secret China.
104. Mark A. Stokes, gThe Peoplefs Liberation Army and Chinafs Space and
Missile Development,h Chapter 6 of Burkitt, et al., eds, The Lessons of History: The
Chinese Peoplefs Liberation Army at 75, Carlisle: U.S. Army War College Strategic
Studies Institute, 2003, pp. 197-198.
105. Zong, pp. 264-265.
106. See Secret China, July 16, 2002.
107. Zong, p. 266. Liu Fei-lang says Zeng gpolitely demurredh when invited to
gput on the uniform again.h Cheng Li says that Zeng did not rejoin the PLA at this
point, p. 162.
108. Zong, p. 269-270. See also Nathan and Gilley, p. 85.
109. David and Nancy Milton, pp. 114-115, 183, 196, 240, 244, 311-312. For the
conviction, see Zong, p. 334.
110. Zong, p. 268; Nathan, p. 85.
111. Zong, p. 270.
112. Liu Tong, p. 28.
113. For an account of the offi cial reaction to the World Economic Heraldfs
excesses, see Zhang Liang, Andrew Nathan, and Perry Link, The Tiananmen Papers,
New York: Public Affairs, 2001, pp. 91-94.
171
114. Liu Tong, p. 28.
115. Eight of the Communist Partyfs top old revolutionaries were commonly
referred to as the gEight Immortalsh (Bage Yuanlao), but no two lists of the eight is
the same. My sense is that they included Zhou Enlaifs widow, Deng Yingchao, Bo
Yibo, Peng Zhen, Wang Zhen, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian and Yang
Zhangkun. They all had their own offi ces and staff and corresponded on offi cial
stationery that bore the logo gThe Offi ce of . . .h
116. Liu Tong, p. 29. The PRC-owned press in Hong Kong reported in June
1989 that gJiang Zemin had left Shanghai and worked in Beijing for several weeks.h
See gStanding Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee to
Undergo a Major Reshuffl e,h Wen Wei Po, June 23, 1989, p. 1, transcribed by FBIS,
p. 7.
117. Nathan and Gilley, pp. 96-97.
118. Zong, p. 273.
119. Liu Tong p. 29.
120. Zong, p. 275.
121. gNanxun,h literally, gSouthern Progress,h refers to the ancient imperial
tradition of an emperorfs royal tour through his domain (gprogressh). Dengfs visit
also was dubbed the gSouthern Whirlwindh (Nanxuan) because of its profound
political impact.
122. Zong, p. 276. At the time, the offi cial PRC press was coy about reporting
the meeting. Qiao Shifs presence in Zhuhai as the chair of a public security and
legal affairs conference was reported in gQiao Shi Zai Zhuhai Zhichu Zhengzhi
Tizhi Gaige - Zai Jingji Tequ ye xuyao xian xing yi buh (Qiao Shi points out:
Reform of Political Structure requires the Special Economic Zones to be one step
ahead), Shenzhen Tequ Bao, January 29, 1992. See also gQiao Shi dui Jingji tequ
Zhengfa Gongzuo tichu Yaoqiu, Wei Quanguo Shuli Bangyang Tigong jingyanh
(Qiao Shi demands that the Special Economic Zonesf Politics and Law work set a
model that will avail the entire nation of its experience), Nanfang Ribao, January
29, 1992. On the same page, the Nanfang Ribao also reported gLiu Huaqing kaocha
Guangzhou Junqu shi qiangdiao Liyong Gaige Kaifang Youli tiaojian quanmian
jiaqiang budui zhiliang jiansheh (During an inspection tour of the Guangzhou
military region, Liu Huaqing stresses the need to utilize the benefi cial conditions
of Reform and Opening to establish a strenthened quality among the troops).
President Yang Shangkunfs inspection of Zhuhai was reported by Xinhua. See
gYang Shangkun Kaocha Zhuhai Zhongshanh (Yang Shangkun Inspects Zhuhai
and Zhongshan), Nanfang Ribao, February 2, 1992. The Hong Kong press noted
172
Qiaofs\though not Dengfs\meeting in Zhuhai with top CMC and PLA fi gures at
the time; see Chu Chan-kang, gMajor Military Offi cials Visit Zhuhai,h Hong Kong
Ming Pao, transcribed by FBIS, February 10, 1992. My recollection was that at
least one Guangdong newspaper published a photograph of the meeting. Dengfs
January 25 meeting with Qiao and the CMC leadership (sans Jiang) was reported
in Lin Wu, gInside Story of Central Military Commissionfs Meeting in Zhuhaifs
Yuanlin Guest House,h Hong Kong Cheng Ming, No. 183, March 1, 1992, pp. 15-
16, 89, transcribed by FBIS on March 6, 1992. Cheng Ming said that President Yang
Shangkun proposed to Deng that Qiao Shi gtake part in the work of the Central
Military Commissionfs leading body in his capacity as a member of the Political
Bureaufs Standing Committee, and for him to be in charge of the armed police
force and the PLAfs secret service troops.h
123. Ibid., p. 277.
124. Including General Xiong Guangkai\who was the only general on the list
who was fi nally promoted.
125. Zong, p. 280.
126. Ibid. Yu was mayor of Qingdao (and is now a Politburo member and CCP
Party Secretary for Hebei), and Liu was mayor of Kunming and was later vice
governor of Yunnan.
127. Ibid., p. 281.
128. Ibid.
129. Ibid.
130. Ibid., p. 282.
131. Ibid. (Shi Beijing Shi chengwei Jiang Zemin Shui Pobujin.)
132. Bruce Gilly, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and Chinafs New Elite, Berkeley,
University of California Press, 1998, p. 243. Gilley cites a Reuters wire service
report of April 30, 1995.
133. Unless otherwise noted, all information on the Chen Xitong affair is from
Zong, pp. 285-288; and Nathan and Gilley pp. 154-157.
134. Marcus W. Brauchli, gBeijing and McDonaldfs Settle Location Dispute,h
The Asian Wall Street Journal, December 14, 1994, p. J.1; Peggy Sito, gWork stopped
on troubled McDonaldfs site Li Peng steps into plaza row,h South China Morning
Post, December 22, 1994, p. 1. See also the description of the threat in Gilleyfs Tiger,
pp. 242-245.
173
135. Gilley, Tiger, p. 245.
136. Zong, p. 286.
137. Ibid., pp. 287-289.
138. A long account of the gsecret envoyh talks from 1988 to 1995 held under
the auspices of a Hong Kong-based, Rasputin-style gQigong Masterh and Zen
philosopher named Nan Huaijin, is related in Lee Teng-huifs authoritative (if not
wholly gauthorizedh) biography. See Zou Jingwen, Li Denghui Zhizheng Gaobai
Shilyu (A True Account of Lee Teng-huifs Tenure), Chengyang Chuban She, Taipei
2001, pp. 192-214.
139. Zou Jingwen, p. 201. All other information about the gsecret envoysh is
from Zoufs book unless otherwise noted.
140. See gLi Teng-hui News Conference on Mideast Trip,h Taipei China Times,
April 5, 1995, pp. 1-2, transcribed by FBIS.
141. Zou Jingwen, p. 204
142. Qu Tao, gJiang Zemin Promotes Hong Hu,h Hong Kong Chengming
magazine, November 1, 1997, No. 142, pp. 41-43, translated by FBIS.
143. Ling Chen, gWhen Has Zeng Qinghong, Jiang Zeminfs Ambitious Top
Advisor, Emerged From Behind the Scenes?h Hong Kong Kai Fang magazine, No.
145, January 3, 1999, pp. 35-38.
144. Hao Xinyi, gCPC Comprehensively Readjusts Its Policy Toward Taiwan,h
Hong Kong Ming Pao, September 10, 1996, p. A12, transcribed by FBIS.
145. Xiao Peng, gZeng Qinghong Joins Central Leading Group for Taiwan
Affairs,h Hong Kong Sing Tao Jih Pao, September 7, 1998, p. A7, translated by
FBIS.
146. Wang Zhuozhong, gZeng Qinghong, Chen Yunlin jiang zhang dui Tai
Gong zuoh (Zeng Qinghong, Chen Yunlin to run Taiwan Work portfolio), Taipei
China Times, November 15, 2002.
147. See Wang Zhuozhong, gZhonggong dui Tai Juece Xin Ban di, Yi zhiwu
Gongneng Kaoliangh (The CCPfs new cadre of Taiwan Policymakers, Professional
Capacities is main consideration), Taipei China Times, December 26, 2003. Author
cites Hong Kongfs Wen Wei Po as reporting that the CCP Central Taiwan Task
Force (Zhong Yang Dui Tai Gong Zuo Xiao Zu) had been reshuffl ed and formally
announced on December 25. The new nine-man Task Force includes one more
174
member than the previous group. They are Hu Jintao (replacing Jiang Zemin,
as chief), Jia Qinglin (replacing Qian Qichen as deputy), Tang Jiaxuan (state
councilor, replacing Zeng Qinghong, as secretary general), Wang Gang (director
of General Offi ce of the CPC Central Committee, new), Liu Yantong (Head of the
United Front Work Department of the CPC Central Committee, replacing Wang
Zhaoguo), Wang Daohan (president of the Association for Relations Across the
Taiwan Strait, remains), Chen Yunlin (Director of Taiwan Affairs Offi ce of Chinafs
State Council, remains), Xu Yungyao (National Security Minister, remains), Xiong
Guangkai (Deputy Chief of General Staff of PLA, remains). Aside from Hu Jintao
himself, only Minister of State Security Xu Yunyao is clearly not a Jiang Zemin
protege, and consequently may not be inclined to seek Zeng Qinghongfs guidance.
Zeng kept Tang Jiaxuan on the job even after the fi asco of Jiang Zeminfs Tokyo visit
of 1998 (see below), Wang Gang is also considered a gbrother and faction member
of Zeng Qinghongh (Wang was in the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building with
Zeng for 10 years).
148. At the end of December 2003, the removal of a key Shanghai man from
the Taiwan Affairs Offi ce indicated that Zeng Qinghong may be losing his grip
on Taiwan policy. See gZhuan Zhou Mingwei bei diaoli Guotaiban eShanghai
Bangf Zaici Shoushangh (Zhou Mingwei transfer from the State Council Taiwan
Offi ce said to be another blow to the eShanghai Factionfh), Singapore Asia Times (in
Chinese), December 29, 2003, at http://www4.chinesenewsnet.com/MainNews/Forums/
BackStage/2003_12_29_8_43_39_511.html.
149. Chen Weiming, gDeng Xiaoping Requires the Preliminary Work
Committee to Do Down-to-Earth Work,h in the Pro-PRC Hong Kong magazine,
Ching Pao, No. 1, January 5, 1994, pp. 18-19, translated by FBIS.
150. gJiang Zeminfs Assistant Zeng Qinghong Arrives in Hong Kong to
Make Arrangements for Reversion,h Hong Kong Ming Pao, June 23, 1997, p. A2,
translated by FBIS. Liu Fei-lang (cited earlier) also says that before the 15th party
congress (1997) Zeng was ggiven another title, that of fi rst political commissar
of the Central Guards Regimenth the unit that is responsible for the protective
security of the central leadership.
151. Zheng Hanliang, g23 tiao zenma xiu? Zhongyang liang tiao luxian?h
(How to revise Article 23? Are there Two Lines at the Center?), Taipei China Times,
July 7, 2003.
152. The China Daily headline read gConspiracy to Subvert,h and the editorial
accused the democratic camp of trying to transplant gWestern political systems
to Hong Kong.h gHong Kong Democrats Attacked in Editorial in China-Owned
Paper,h Bloomberg wire service, July 14, 2003, at http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=10000080&sid=ajFWimtYe80M&refer=asia#.
175
153. Even the English language press was sensitive to Liufs patrimony\see
Joseph Kahn, gAnalysts See Tension Among Chinas Leaders,h New York Times,
July 1, 2003. Liu Yunshan is a rigid party ideologue on propaganda matters
according to Charles Hutzler, gBeijing Strives to Match Changing Nationfs Pace,h
The Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2003, at http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1066584
95545149000,00.html.
154. Wong Kwok Wah, gANALYSIS: HK leader loses the mandate of
heaven,h Singapore, Asia Times, July 9, 2003, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/
EG09Ad03.html.
155. Hamish McDonald, gHong Kong protesters to keep up the pressure,h
Melbourne, The Age, July 7 2003, at http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/07/06/
1057430073927.html.
156. Chen Jingxin, gBeijing Si Jutou, Gao Zitai Yan Dongh (Four Beijing
Heavyweights give high profi le support to Tung), New York World Journal, July
20, 2003.
157. gWen Jiabao Hui Dong, Xian Paiding Xinwan,h (Wen Jiabao sees C. H.
Tung, fi rst prescribes a dose of digitalis), New York World Journal, July 21, 2003
(citing Taipei Central News Agency).
158. Philip P. Pan, gChinafs Leaders Show Support for Hong Kongfs
Chief Executive,h The Washington Post, Sunday, July 20, 2003, p. A28, at http:
//www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A17238-2003Jul19.html.
159. See gZeng Qinghong fenguan Xianggang shiwuh (Zeng Qinghong
assigned to handle Hong Kong Affairs,h New York, World Journal, July 23, 2003.
See also Ching Cheong, gBeijing may shelve new HK law,h Singapore, The Straits
Times, August 15, 2003.
160. Ching Cheong, gBeijing may shelve new HK law,h Singapore, The Straits
Times, August 15, 2003, p. 1.
161. gZeng Qinghong fan Yue shicha, Zhaojian Dong Jianhua, liaojie Gangfu
chehui guoan tiaoli hou zhuangkuang, qiangdiao wending dui Xianggangde
zhongyaoxing,h (Zeng Qinghong returns from inspection of Guangdong,
Summons C. H. Tung for an appreciation of the situation in the wake of the recall
of National Security legislation, Stresses the importance of stability to Hong
Kong), New York, World Journal, September 17, 2003, p. 2.
162. Ling Chen.
163. Ibid.
176
164. Ibid. The most scathing commentary came from the Hong Kong press.
See Wang Ziyan, gJiang Zeminfs Visit to Japan Premature, Ill-Timed,h Hong Kong
Hsin Pao, November 30, 1998, p. 20, which said all the visit did gwas to expose
the weakness of the Japan policy of the Chinese governmenth and called it gJiang
Zeminfs worst diplomatic failure since he assumed offi ce.h
165. Wang Ziyan (above), see also gTwelve Senior Diplomats Who Were
Promoted Through Open Selection Have Recently Gone To Their Posts\Zeng
Qinghong Demands Stepping Up The Reform of The Personnel System Of Cadres
Dealing With Foreign Affairs,h Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, in Chinese, 1348
GMT, March 19, 2003, translated by FBIS.
166. The reporting of Zengfs gsecreth visit was quite public, and references
to gfree assistanceh were replete in the Chinese press. See Kwon Kyong-pok,
gBackground Behind CPC Organization Department Directorfs Visit to DPRK,h
Seoul Yonhap, 0108 GMT, March 20, 2001, FBIS translated text. Zhang Jinfang
and Li Zhengyu, gKim Chong-il, General Secretary of the Workersf Party of
Korea and Chairman of the DPRK National Defense Commission, Meets With
Zeng Qinghong,h Beijing, Xinhua 1513 GMT, March 22, 2001, FBIS translated text.
Kim Jong Il Meets CPC Leader,h Beijing Xinhua 1555 GMT, March 22, 2001, FBIS
transcribed text.
167. Kwon Kyong-pok: gDirector Zeng Qinghongfs Visit to North Korea,
What Did it Accomplish?,h Seoul Yonhap (Internet Version-WWW), 1517 GMT,
March 25, 2001, FBIS translated text.
168. See Wen Yu, gZeng Qinghong: A Potential Challenger To Chinafs Heir
Apparent,h The Jamestown Foundationfs China Brief Vol. 1, No. 10, November
21, 2001. Jiang had been making a habit of lavishing particular attention on Zeng
in the presence of foreign leaders. In a meeting with Russian President Putin at
the October 2001 APEC summit in Shanghai, Jiang introduced Zeng to Russian
president Putin as gQinghong, our director of the Organization Department
and a member of the Secretariat.h Most analysts saw Jiangfs reference to Zeng
simply as gQinghongh as implying an extremely close relationship, at http:
//www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=17&issue_id=638&article_
id=4589.
169. See Foreign Ministry Spokespersonfs Press Conference on July 15, 2003, at http:
//www.china-un.ch/eng/52865.html.
170. gChuli Yang Bin An, Chuan you Zeng Qinghong Fuzeh (Zeng Qinghong
said to handle Yang Bin Case), Taipei China Times, October 8, 2002 (cites Hong
Kongfs Jingji Ribao).
171. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, gChina looks ahead to Korea crisis,h CNN International
(internet report), March 18, 2003, at http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/
177
03/18/willy.column/n policies. See also Joseph Kahn, gSix Party Talks U.S. Set to Take
a Hard Line in Talks on Korean Arms,h the New York Times, August 27, 2003, at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/27/international/asia/27KORE.html.
172. Wu Su-li, geShenzhouf Space Strategy,h Hong Kong Kai Fang magazine,
No 156, December 5, 1999, pp. 15-16, FBIS.
173. gKaifang Zazhi: Jiang Zemin Kao Juntou ji zhang Jun quanh (Kaifang
Magazine says Jiang Zemin relies on Military chiefs for hold on Military power),
New York World Journal, December 6, 2002.
174. gZeng Qinghong mingnian keneng ren Junwei Fuzhuxih (Zeng Qinghong
could be named CMC Vice Chairman next year), New York World Journal, April
3, 2003 (citing Hong Kong Kaifang [Open] magazine). See also Wang Zhuozhong,
gJiang Zemin Ji Zhang eGuofang Waijiao Lianganf San Daquanh (Jiang Zemin
maintains grip on authority in three priority areas, eDefense, Foreign Affairs,
Cross-Straitf), Taipei China Times, February 17, 2003.
175. Ruan Leyi, gZeng Qinghong Shiqi Da ren Junwei fuzhuxi?h (Will Zeng
Qinghong wait for 17th CPP Congress before being CMC Vice Chairman?), Taipei
China Times, December 15, 2003, at http://news.chinatimes.com/Chinatimes/newslist/
newslist-content/0,3546,110505+112003121500066,00.html.
176. See gChinafs Zeng spreads wings, gains power with military post,h
based on Reuters dispatches, Taipei China Post, November 4, 2003, at http://
www.chinapost.com.tw/p_detail.asp?id=42807&GRP=A&onNews=.
177. gHangtian Er Yuan Jianyuan 45 zhou nian, Li Lanqing, Wu Bangguo, Zeng
Qinghong, deng biaoshi zhuheh (Li Lanqing, Wu Bangguo, Zeng Qinghong and
others offer congratulations on the 45th anniversary of the Second Astronautical
Institute), Press Release, China National Space Administration, November 28,
2002, at http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/brow.asp?id=1154.
178. News release, gJiang Zemin Xianchang Guankan eShenzhouhSanhao
Feichuan Fashe Chenggongh (Jiang Zemin observes the successful launch of the
eShenzhou-3f Spacecraft at the launch site), China National Space Administration,
March 25, 2002, at http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/brow.asp?id=725.
179. gZhonghua Remnin Gonghe Guo Di Shijie Quanguo Renmin Daibiao
Dahui daibiao Mingdan (2982 ming)h (Namelist of delegates to the Tenth Session
of the Peoplefs Republic of China National Peoplefs Congress [2982 names]),
Peoplefs Daily Information Database, at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/
9667/9685/20030315/944408.html.
180. gKui Fulin shuai Junshi Daibiaotuan Chufang Feizhou san guoh (Kui
Fulin leads a military delegation to three African nations), Beijing Peoplefs
178
Liberation Army Daily, April 3, 2003, at http://www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/pladaily/
2002/04/03/20020403001090_army.html. Fu Zong Canmozhang Xiong Guangkai
Shangjiang Qicheng fan Nanfei Chuxi Huiyi, (Vice Chief of General Staff General
Xiong Guangkai Embarks on trip to South Africa to attend conference), April 6,
2003, at http://jczs.sina.com.cn/2003-04-06/119324.html.
181. Among them were: www.english.peopledaily.com.cn/200304/06/
eng20030406_114633.shtml, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/9667/9685/
20030315/944408.html, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/junshi/60/20021028/852180.html,
www.jiaodong.net/2003/2/68203.htm, http://www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/pladaily/2002/10/
27/20021027001043_world.html, http://www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/pladaily/2001/12/12/
20011212001112_army.html, http://mil.21dnn.com/5051/2002-10-27/186@486760.htm,
http://www.pladaily.com.cn/big5/pladaily/2002/04/20/20020420001067_army.html, http:
//jczs.sina.com.cn/2003-04-06/119324.html, http://www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/pladaily/
2002/04/03/20020403001090_army.html.
182. See the Beijing PCC web site at http://www.beinet.net.cn/bjzx2003/overture/
index.jsp. In 1998, Zeng Haisheng was awarded a Science and Technology
Progress Prize, Third Class, possibly for her work in computerizing the General
Staff Records Offi ce, see http://www.chinatech.com.cn/aspx/kejiziliao/kejijiangxiang/
jinbujiang/jinbujiang202.htm.
183. See the Jiangxi Agricultural and Economic Net at http://www.jxagriec.gov.cn.
179

CHAPTER 6

THE 16TH PARTY CONGRESS AND LEADERSHIP
CHANGES IN THE PLA

Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise
Dean Cheng
Ken Gause

INTRODUCTION

The 16th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
of the Peoplefs Republic of China (PRC), held November 8-15, 2002,
set into motion signifi cant changes in the Chinese Peoplefs Liberation
Army (PLA) high command. In a single re-shuffl e, the directorship
of each of the four general departments of the PLA was replaced,
ushering into power a group who, most concur, are younger,
better educated, and more professionalized than any previous PLA
leadership. At the same time, Jiang Zemin retained the position of
Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman although giving up
all his other Party (and later State) positions.
This transition takes place at a critical moment in Chinafs
history. Chinafs new military (and political) leadership is faced with
a rapidly changing international security environment, radically
different from those facing its predecessors. The current leadership
must adjust to the new demands brought about by the U.S.-led
Global War on Terrorism, even as it is responding to transnational
issues that had previously been given less attention (everything
from issues of emerging diseases to emerging terrorism threats).
Moreover, it must do so in the context of latent domestic upheaval.
Chinafs internal situation is undergoing tremendous change as
well, partly as a consequence of two decades of economic reform,
and there are a host of burgeoning social, economic, and political
problems.
Finally, these new leaders have come into power at an important
phase in PLA reform and modernization. They will be charged with
implementing many of the reforms fi rst developed before or during
Jiangfs tenure as paramount leader of the PRC. These challenges go
180
beyond simply the acquisition of weapons and technology and span
the spectrum of institutional and systemic reforms that will enable
the PLA to professionalize, modernize, and realize the aspirations
Jiang laid out in his gTwo Transformationsh program of reform and
modernization.
Who are these military leaders? Who are the key staff members
that will support them in this effort? What experiences in their
careers have prepared them to meet the challenges that lie ahead?
The following paper will attempt to answer these questions.

CAREER PATHS IN CONTEXT OF PLA DEVELOPMENT
AND REFORM

Before looking at the biographies of these new military leaders,
it is useful to review some of the key events that have shaped the
recent history of the PLA in order to better understand their impact
on this new CMC. For example, one would want to know where,
institutionally, these new leaders sat during previous periods of
crisis or tension. This would include understanding what positions
these leaders held during the summer of 1989 or as the crisis evolved
during the Taiwan Straits missile tests in 1995-96.
Other events deal more directly with the reform and
modernization of the PLA. The new members of the Central Military
Commission were not mere spectators to the dramatic changes
that have taken place within the PLA over the past two decades.
In many cases they were active participants, implementing military
policies and responding to national crises. And, their involvement
in these changes was deemed to be successful. These events shaped
their careers, defi ned what were seen to be their professional
accomplishments, and make up the experiences that they will draw
upon when leading the Peoplefs Liberation Army in the coming
years.
Some key events include:
Development of the New Strategic Assessment of gPeace and
Development.h
In 1985 Deng Xiaoping provided an assessment of the
international security environment that has since provided a
181
rationale for the basic direction of Chinafs domestic policies, foreign
policies, and defense policies. Key to this was the belief that gpeace
and developmenth was the keynote of the times.that China would
enjoy a relatively long lasting peaceful environment in which it
could concentrate on economic development. With this assessment,
Deng determined that what had previously been considered the
most likely PLA contingency.fi ghting an imminent war, total
war, and nuclear war.was no longer applicable and that the PLA
should instead train and prepare for a more limited, locally-oriented
war. This fundamental shift in assumptions made PLA reform and
modernization possible.
Quite simply, when the PRC was working under the assumption
that total war was imminent, the PLA could only rely on the weapons
and techniques it had on hand to defend China. With war no longer
considered to be imminent, and with two decades of predicted
peace in which to reform, modernize, innovate, and experiment, the
door was now open for doctrinal adjustment based on new military
developments. It was possible for the PLA to plan for the future as
well as deal with the present.1 As a result the PRC leadership made
a decision to modernize the PLA while at the same time carrying out
a program of economic development.
The defi nition of this most likely type of confl ict for which the PLA
was preparing to fi ght has changed several times since this fi rst
groundbreaking change: from Local Wars to Local Wars Under
Modern Conditions, to Local Wars Under Modern High Tech
Conditions. Each change has brought with it some adjustment
to PLA military doctrine. These changes in turn have had to be
internalized by PLA leaders, passed down through the ranks, and
utilized in training. Rising offi cers in the PLA were called upon to
master these changes and further implement them over the course
of their careers.

Downsizing and Force Restructuring.

Concomitant with the decision to reform and modernize the PLA
while focusing on economic development was the conclusion that
PLA restructuring was necessary, as well. This involved downsizing
182
the PLA, both in terms of manpower and organizational structure.
Thus, in 1985 the PLA was reduced by a million in personnel, and
the number of Military Regions (MR) went from eleven to seven.
This was followed by later force reductions of 500,000 (announced in
1997) and 200,000 (announced in 2003).
Although a critical move necessary in order to promote
modernization and professionalization in the PLA offi cer corps,
implementing this decision presented a host of challenges for
offi cers in the PLA. This was particularly true for those working
in the headquarters of military regions and in the General Staff
Department (GSD) and those working on personnel related issues.
As provincial and local governments worked with appropriate
military counterparts to provide newly demobilized soldiers with
appropriate jobs and housing, PLA offi cers developed a more
nuanced appreciation for the evolving relationship between the
PLA and society. Offi cers assigned to various military regions were
able to see how this restructuring was affecting the PLA and were
given an opportunity to gain a deeper appreciation for the limits
and challenges downsizing presented. They also were afforded an
opportunity to see the potential for professionalization and reform
such polices provided.

Operation Desert Storm.

U.S. operations during the 1991 Gulf War left a deeper
impression on the leadership of the Chinese military than virtually
any previous military action. Most were shocked and stunned by the
highly televised U.S. victory; more to the point, they were surprised
by what this victory indicated about the state of modern warfare,
including the role of joint operations in modern warfare.
The Gulf War resulted in a PLA gstudy campaignh to understand
the operational signifi cance of the event. Upon assessing the rapidly
changing nature of modern warfare, Chinafs leadership apparently
drew two important conclusions. First, it revised its conception of
the most likely types of wars and campaigns its military would be
called upon to prosecute. Second, it concluded that the armed forces
of China were ill equipped to fi ght and win these new, most likely
campaigns, which they termed gLocal Wars Under Modern High
Tech Conditions.h
183

Two Transformations Program of Reform and Modernization.

Based upon the conclusions the PLA leadership drew from
the 1991 Gulf War, the PLA set upon a course of thorough and
comprehensive reform.cutting across virtually every conceivable
facet of activity within the PLA and seeking measured leaps in the
intellectual, professional, and conceptual outlooks of its defense
establishment and virtually every member of its military.2
In December 1995, at an enlarged meeting of the CMC chaired
by Jiang Zemin, Chinafs military leaders put forth a new policy for
garmy buildingh or defense modernization to guide all aspects of
PLA reform.3 Known as the gTwo Transformations,h it calls for the
Chinese armed forces to undergo a metamorphosis, transforming:
. From an army preparing to fi ght local wars under ordinary
conditions to an army preparing to fi ght and win Local Wars
Under Modern High Tech Conditions.
. From an army based on quantity to an army based on quality.
Although a holistic endeavor, the true scope and breadth of these
reforms is best understood by considering them as three separate
vectors aimed at the same objective. 4 (See Figure 1.)
Material Vector
Doctrinal Vector
Institutional Vector
Capability to fi ght and win
future Local Wars Under
Modern High Tech Conditions
Figure 1. Three Vectors of PLA Reform and Modernization.
184
. Material vector.weapons, equipment, and new age systems.
Reforms in this area are aimed at improving the weapons
and equipment that the PLA will use to wage a campaign.
They involve the development, procurement, acquisition, and
fi elding of new weapons systems, technologies, command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (C4ISR) assets and architectures, and both
combat and combat support technologies.
. Doctrinal vector.operational concepts and warfi ghting
techniques. Reforms in this area are aimed at improving how
the PLA will fi ght. It consists of the new operational concepts:
strategic guidelines, campaign methods, and tactics.
. Institutional vector.systemic underpinning, organizations,
and processes. Reforms in this area are aimed at improving the
institutions that enable the PLA to fulfi ll its national security
objectives. It includes reforms to the systemic underpinnings,
organizations, and processes that support and enable the fi rst
two vectors of reform. Examples include the personnel system,
military education system, training regimens, force structure,
command and control relationships, logistics structure, defense
research and development complex, standardization processes
(the codifi cation of regulations and standard operating
procedures), and military legal system.
It would be diffi cult to overstate the degree to which the PLA
has focused on this program of reform and modernization in recent
years. Reforms occurring along each of these vectors have been
repeatedly emphasized in PLA discussions during the bulk of the
past 10 years.
Progress along the material vector is comparatively easy to
measure. Leaders engaged in these sorts of reforms include those
engaged in weapons procurement and those participating in or
guiding the development of new types of weapons and equipment.
Military leaders engaged in work along the doctrinal vector
would include those involved in the formulation, vetting, and
implementation of new operational concepts and techniques. At
various phases in the process, this would include researchers
at military science research and teaching institutions such as
185
the Academy of Military Science and Chinafs National Defense
University. It would also include operators, such as leaders in
experimental units that are charged to test and evaluate new tactics
and operational concepts and those working in the headquarters
departments of Military Regions who might be charged to
incorporate these concepts in large-scale military exercises.
Military leaders engaged in work along the institutional vector
focus on improving the systemic underpinnings supporting PLA
reform and modernization. Often this work supports activities
occurring along the other two vectors of reform. Offi cers engaged
in this work can be found both gat the centerh working within the
four general departments, and at the headquarters departments of
military regions throughout China.
In light of all these changes, the PLA is therefore in fl ux. That
is, it is operating in the midst of both internal evolution (covering
institutions and doctrine, as well as equipment), as well as nationallevel
changes (in terms of the ongoing process of economic reform
and the building of a gsocialist market economyh) and a global
security environment that has seen, since at least 2001, enormous
shifts.

LEADERSHIP CHANGE IN THE CENTRAL MILITARY
COMMISSION

It is in this context that the 16th Party Congress met in 2003. In
the course of that Party Congress, there was an almost complete
personnel overhaul in the composition of the CMC, the highest
military body (see Table 1). The overall number of CMC members
was reduced from eleven to eight and the heads of each of the
four PLA General Departments changed. [Note: In April 2004, the
Hong Kong newspaper Wen Wei Po reported that the membership
of the CMC would soon expand from eight to eleven. The three
new members would be Vice Admiral Zhang Dingfa, commander
of the PLA Navy, General Qiao Qingchen, commander of the PLA
Air Force, and Lieutenant General Jing Zhiyuan, commander of
PLA Second Artillery. If true, this change would establish a Central
Military Commission that is remarkably gjointh in its composition.
At the time of this writing, however, such a change has not been
formally announced.]
186
Position Previously held by Currently held by
Chairman Jiang Zemin Jiang Zemin, no change
Vice Chairman Hu Jintao Hu Jintao, no change
Vice Chairmen Zhang Wannian
Chi Haotian
Chi Haotian
Guo Boxiong
Cao Gangchuan
Cao Gangchuan
Director of the General Staff
Department (GSD)
Fu Quanyou Liang Guanglie
Director of the General Political
Department (GPD)
Yu Yongbo General Xu Caihou
Director of the General Logistics
Department (GLD)
Department (GLD)
Wang Ke Liao Xilong
Director of General Armament
Department (GAD)
Cao Gangchuan Li Jinai
Table 1. Changes in Make-up of the CMC
Resulting from 16th Party Congress.
Six individuals retired. These were:
. Zhang Wannian, vice chairman of the Central Military
Commission
. Chi Haotian, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission
and concurrent Minister of Defense
. Fu Quanyou, chief of General Staff Department (GSD)5
. Yu Yongbo, director of the General Political Department (GPD)
. Wang Ke, director of the General Logistics Department (GLD)
. Wang Ruilin, deputy director of the General Political Department
(GPD).
Five individuals retained their membership. Chairman Jiang
Zemin and Vice Chairman Hu Jintao each retained their original
CMC positions. In addition to their non-CMC posts, Cao Gangchuan,
former director of the General Armament Department (GAD) and
Guo Boxiong, former executive deputy chief of the GSD were both
promoted to vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission.6
Xu Caihou, former CMC member and executive deputy director
187
of the General Political Department retained his membership and
was appointed director of the GPD. Although this was not a change
in military grade (CMC members that are not vice chairmen are
all grade three), Xu Caihou was also made a member of the CCP
Secretariat. As he was the only member of the PLA to hold such a
position, the 16th Party Congress personnel shuffl e established Xu
as a critical link between the Party and its military for issues of dayto-
day Party affairs.
Three new individuals were added: Liang Guanglie, Liao Xilong,
and Li Jinai. In addition to being made members of the CMC, Liang
Guanglie, former commander of the Nanjing Military Region was
made the head of the General Staff Department; Liao Xilong, former
commander of the Chengdu Military Region, was made director
of the General Logistics Department; and Li Jinai, former Political
Commissar of the General Armaments Department was made
Director of the GAD.

MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL MILITARY
COMMISSION

The civilian leaders on the CMC have been the subject of much
research and discussion already. This paper will focus instead on
the new military members of the CMC and the background and
experiences they bring to bear on the challenges the PLA will face in
the coming decade.7 Key aspects of their background are outlined in
table two.
CMC Vice Chairman Guo Boxiong.
During the 16th Party Congress, Guo Boxiong was made vice
chairman of the CMC and a member of the Politburo of the Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Prior to this, he
held the positions of CMC member and executive deputy director of
the General Staff Department.
Guo Boxiong was born in 1942. He joined the PLA in 1961 at
age 19 and joined the CCP in 1963 at age 21.8 He received military
training at the Xian Army Academy, at the PLA Military Academy,
and at Chinafs National Defense University.9
188
Guo has been a member of the PLA for over 43 years. He spent
the fi rst two decades of his career (from 1961 to 1982) with the 55th
Division of the 19th Army, rising from enlisted soldier to chief of
staff of the division.10 He also served as both a staff member of
the Propaganda Group of the Political Section in one of the 55th
Divisionfs regiments, as well as in the Combat Training Group of the
headquarters of the same regiment (the 164th Regiment).
Guo has spent the bulk of the second half of his career in
military region headquarters positions gaining expertise in military
operations and command issues. From 1983-1985, Guo was the
chief of staff of the PLAfs 19th Army. In 1985, as the PLA began
its dramatic shift from a wartime to a peacetime footing, Guo was
deputy chief of staff of the Lanzhou MR. This was followed by a
three year stint as commander of the 47th Group Army. In 1993, Guo
was made deputy commander of the Beijing MR.a position he held
during the Taiwan Straits missile tests of 1995-96. This was followed
in 1997 by an appointment to be commander of the Lanzhou MR.
Guo is also experienced in issues related to military training.
During the 1979 Sino-Vietnam border war, for example, he served as
the deputy head of the Combat Training Section of the 19th Group
Army. He also has a reputation in the PLA for developing innovative
tactics. During the Western e93 and e94 war games, he is said to have
earned the esteem of the CMC by orchestrating exercises featuring
live mobile rapid response operations, frontier defense bolstering,
and border counterattack. He also is credited with introducing
new tactics for mobilizing elite forces for air/land attacks and
integrated mobile strikes against key targets.11 While serving as
deputy commander of Beijing Military Region and commander
of Lanzhou Military Region, he was credited with introducing
gquality management initiativesh in an effort to improve combat
effectiveness.12
After serving as commander of the Lanzhou MR for two years,
Guo was made a member of the CMC, GSD executive deputy chief,
and deputy secretary of the Party Committee of the PLA General
Staff Department. In 2002, Guo was made a member of the Politburo
as well as CMC vice chairman.
189
CMC Vice Chairman and Minister of Defense Cao Gangchuan.
Like Guo Boxiong, as a result of the 16th Party Congress, Cao
Gangchuan was made vice chairman of the CMC and a member of
the Politburo. During the subsequent National Peoplefs Congress
(NPC) in March of the following year, he was made Minister of
Defense.
At age 68, Cao Gangchuan is the oldest military member of the
new CMC. General Caofs career in the PLA spans fi ve decades. He
joined the PLA in 1954 and joined the CCP in 1956.
Seemingly marked early on for advancement, Cao spent virtually
the fi rst decade of his military career in training. First, he attended
the Nanjing No. 3 Artillery Ordnance Technical School and the No.1
Ordnance Technical School (1954-56). He next went to Dalian for
Russian language training, and then went to the Soviet Union to train
at the Leningrad Advanced Artillery Military Engineering School
(a.k.a. the Soviet Army Artillery Academy), where he majored in
missile design. He returned to the PRC in 1963.
During his lengthy career, Cao has gained a substantial level of
experience on issues related to equipment. Cao spent over two and a
half decades focused on issues of ordnance and military equipment.
He served in a variety of positions fi rst within the General Logistics
Department and then in the Military Equipment Department of the
GSD.13 These positions ranged from working in the Ammunition
Division of the GLD Ordnance Department (1963) to serving as
deputy director of the GSD Military Equipment Department (1989).
Thirty-fi ve years into his military career, Cao Gangchuan was
made, fi rst, director of the Military Affairs offi ce in the GSD, and
later director of the CMC Offi ce of Military Trade. In 1992, as the
PLA began to digest the lessons it had learned from its observations
of U.S. operations during Operation DESERT STORM, Cao was
appointed to the position of GSD deputy chief. He was reportedly the
fi rst person without any combat experience to hold this position.14
In many ways, General Cao has been one of the critical leaders
in the PLAfs efforts to advance the modernization of its weapons
and equipment. In 1996, Cao left his position in the GSD and was
appointed minister of the Commission of Science, Technology,
190
and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND). This transfer from
a GSD position to a position that was under the dual jurisdiction
of the PLA and the State Council was considered unusual. Many
concluded that this was an indication of Jiangfs renewed interest in
reforming the national Chinese military industrial complex as part
of his ongoing program of reform and modernization known as the
gTwo Transformations.h15
During his tenure in this position, Cao repeatedly pressed for
modernization in the face of resource constraints. He is reported
to have publicly argued for increases in the PLA military budget,
particularly in the area of research and development. For example,
in 1997, after learning that the projected budget increase was 12.7 per
cent (6.6 per cent above infl ation) he is reported to have complained
that the PLA had no choice but to postpone many research and
development projects, stating, gWe have to feed and clothe three
million-odd soldiers. Whatfs left after that?h16
In 1998, General Cao became the fi rst director of the newly
formed General Armament Department.a position he held until
his promotion to vice chairman at the 16th Party Congress. As
director of the GAD he continued his work of promoting scientifi c
and technological innovation as a means of improving the PLAfs
military capabilities, i.e., advancements on the material vector of
PLA reform.
Cao is reportedly trying to foster innovation in the PLA weapons
development process through the introduction of such measures as
competition.17 One can expect Cao to continue to advocate innovation
and reform during his tenure as vice chairman, as he helps to guide
the PLA in its ongoing program of reform and modernization.
CMC and CCP Secretariat Member Xu Caihou.
Prior to the 16th Party Congress, Xu was a CMC member and
held the post of executive deputy director of the General Political
Department. In addition, he held the position of secretary of the
PLA Discipline Inspection Committee.a post that gave him a
great deal of infl uence over promotions and other PLA personnel
moves. At the 16th Party Congress, Xu maintained his membership
191
in the CMC as well as his position as secretary of the PLA Discipline
Inspection Committee, and was further promoted to director of the
General Political Department. At the same time, Xu was also given
membership in the CCP Secretariat.18 As the only PLA offi cer serving
in this body, he is a critical fi gure in Chinese civil-military (or at least
Party-Army) relations.
Xu Caihou was born in Liaoning in June 1943. He joined the
PLA in 1963, and spent the bulk of his career in the Shenyang MR
working on personnel and political issues. Soon after enlisting, Xu
became a student in the Electronics Engineering Department of the
prestigious Harbin Institute of Military Engineering. He graduated
in 1968.just as the Cultural Revolution was reaching its height.
Immediately thereafter, he was sent to a farm controlled by
the 39th Army. Subsequently, he was sent, as a soldier, to the Jilin
Provincial Military District. There, he began as a deputy company
political instructor, then became a deputy political instructor in an
artillery regiment in the Shenyang MR.
Xu has spent the bulk of his career in the Shenyang MR working
on personnel and political issues. From 1972 to 1982, he was
secretary and deputy chief in the Personnel Division of the Political
Department of the Jilin Provincial Military District. During this time,
he also studied at the PLA Institute of Political Sciences (October
1980-August 1982). He rose to become chief of the Personnel Division
of the same Political Department, then became deputy director of
that Political Department in 1983-1984.
For the next decade, Xu held a series of positions of increasing
responsibility in military region and group army commands. He
served as director of the Mass Work Section of the Shenyang MRfs
Political Department (1984-85), director of the Political Department
of the 16th Group Army (1985-1990), and then was promoted to
political commissar of the 16th Group Army.
Xu digested the PLAfs lessons learned from the 1991 Gulf War
while serving in the position of assistant to the director, and then
deputy director, of the GPD. He remained in the GPD throughout a
series of dramatic events for the PLA, including the purge of the Yang
brothers and Jiangfs announcement of the gTwo Transformationsh
program of reform and modernization.19 For a portion of this time he
192
also served as director of the Liberation Army Publishing House and
served as co-editor of Liberation Army Daily. 20 Xu remained deputy
director of the GPD until 1996, when he became political commissar
for the Jinan MR.
In 1999, Xu became a member of the CMC and executive deputy
director of the PLA GPD. In 2000, he also gained the position of
secretary of the Discipline Inspection Committee of the CMC, as
well as deputy secretary of the Party Committee of the PLA GPD.
He continued to hold all these positions in 2002 when he succeeded
his old boss, Yu Yongbo, as CMC member and director of the GPD
and became a member of the CCP Secretariat.
CMC Member and Director of the General Staff Department
Liang Guanglie.
At the 16th Party Congress, Liang Guanglie was promoted from
commander of the Nanjing Military Region to member of the Central
Military Committee and director of the General Staff Department.
Liang Guanglie was born in December 1940. He joined the PLA
in 1958 and the CCP in 1959. He attended the Xinyang PLA Infantry
School, the Military Academy in Nanjing, and the Chinese National
Defense University and has a degree from Henan University, where
he completed a political theory correspondence education program.
Liang worked his way up from the lowest ranks in the PLA. From
1958-1963, Liang was in the First Army, fi rst as an enlisted soldier
and squad leader and subsequently as commander of an engineer
company and staff offi cer of the operations and training branch,
Headquarters (HQ), 2nd Regiment, 1st Division of the First Army. In
1966, he became a staff offi cer of the engineering branch. In 1970 he
held that same position in the operations and training branch of that
same headquarters. It was in this fi eld, operations, that he then spent
the bulk of his military career.
From 1970 to 1979, he was in various positions in the Wuhan
Military Command HQ, including as a staff offi cer in the Operations
Department, deputy chief of the fi rst section of the Operations
Department, then deputy head of the Operations Department.
Liang gained combat experience during the Sino-Vietnam War
of 1979. From 1979 to 1981, Liang was the deputy commander of
193
the 58th Division of the 20th Army, before rising to command of
the same division from 1981 to 1983. Liang was promoted to deputy
commander of the entire 20th Army in 1983 and rose to command
that Army in 1985, a position he held for the next fi ve years. It is
reported that at the time Liang was serving in these positions,
the 20th Army was a test unit for new concepts in organization.
He is rumored to have played a hand in the formation of the fi rst
mechanized brigades in the Chinese military and the formation of
the PLAfs fi rst emergency response unit.21
Next, Liang became the commander of the 54th Group Army.
According to his offi cial biography, this event occurred in 1990.
However, as David Shambaugh has pointed out in previous work,
one should note the existence of unverifi ed news reports in the Hong
Kong press asserting (1) that Liang actually took up the position in
1988 and (2) that the 54th Group Army played an unspecifi ed role in
enforcing martial law in Beijing in 1989. 22
In 1993, he was promoted to chief of staff of the Beijing MR.
crossing career paths with Guo Boxing.23 He then became the Beijing
MR deputy commander in 1995 and held this position during the
PRCfs Taiwan Straits missile tests of 1995-96. In 1997, Liang rose to
command of the Shenyang MR.
In 1999, Liang was made both commander and deputy Party
committee secretary of the Nanjing MR. During his tenure as
commander of the Nanjing MR, he spent a great deal of time focusing
on sea-crossing and landing operations of both Chinese and foreign
armies (with a clear eye on a possible Taiwan contingency). While
commanding the Nanjing MR, he oversaw a series of increasingly
elaborate exercises directed at Taiwan. He has since published a
book on the subject of landing operations. 24
His expertise in these areas mark him as the CMCfs point man
on Taiwan. His selection as director of the General Staff Department
clearly signals the continued importance of Taiwan to the PLA.
However, one should note that Taiwan expertise is not Liang
Guangliefs only attribute, but was instead probably only one of
several factors that played a role in his selection to this position. For
example, although in some ways he has spent comparatively little
time gat the center,h one should note that he has been involved with
194
the CCP Central Committee longer than any of the current members
of the CMC. Liang was an alternate member of both the 13th and
14th Central Committees.25
Furthermore, Liang comes to the General Staff Department
with signifi cant command experience drawn from a number of
different regions. His early experiences in Wuhan, combined
with his headquarters-level command experiences in the Beijing,
Shenyang, and Nanjing MRs have likely exposed him to a range of
PLA conditions, and given him a deep understanding of the on-theground
realities throughout the PLA. This breadth of expertise will
likely prove valuable as he continues to lead the PLA down its path
of reform and modernization.
CMC Member and Director of the General Logistics Department
Liao Xilong.
During the 16th Party Congress, General Liao Xilong was
promoted from commander of the Chengdu MR to CMC member
and director of the General Logistics Department.
Rising quickly through the ranks, Liao is said to have had the
quickest path to general of all of the current members of the CMC.26
He has attended the PLA Military Academy, Chinafs National
Defense University, and has done some part-time post-graduate
studies with the Sociology Department of Beijing University.
Liao was born in 1940. He joined the PLA in 1959 and the CCP in
1963. He spent a little over the fi rst decade of his career in rising from
enlisted soldier to company commander in the 49th Division of the
Guizhou Provincial Military Command.
In 1971, he became deputy head of the operations and training
branch in the HQ of the 91st Regiment, 31st Division of the 11th
Army, and then became the deputy head of the Military Affairs
section and Operations and Training Section in the HQ of the 31st
Division. By 1978, he had risen to be deputy commander of the same
regiment, and in 1981, he was further promoted to commander of
the regiment.
Liao is a combat veteran who gained fame in the Sino-Vietnam
War of 1979. According to Hong Kong news reports, he gained a
reputation for command during his efforts in the Basha mountain
195
pass and in the capture and occupation of Fengtu. He was
commended by the CMC for his gcombat effectivenessh and his
ability to win military victories with minimal casualties and using
few resources27
In these experiences, he had an opportunity to gain appreciation
for the critical role logistics and support play in planning successful
military campaigns. As important, he experienced, fi rst-hand, PLA
weakness in this important aspect of modern warfare.
In 1984, Liao was once again involved in combat with Vietnam,
where he commanded the 31st Division when it captured Zheyinshan
on April 30, 1984. In the course of this campaign, Liao again was
praised for his effective use of forces and low casualties. As a result,
he was reportedly handpicked for promotion by then-chairman
of the CMC Deng Xiaoping from division commander to deputy
army commander of the 11th Army. Six months later, Liao Xilong
was promoted to commander of the 11th Army. At that time, Liao
Xilong was 44 years old, the youngest army commander in the entire
PLA.28
In 1985, he rose to become deputy commander of the Chengdu
MR, a post he held for the next ten years.after which he was
promoted to the post of commander of the same MR. 29 He held this
post until the 16th Party Congress.
In his 17 years in the headquarters of the Chengdu MR, Liao saw
the PLA face challenges and adapt to change. From this vantage
point, he heard Deng announce that gPeace and Developmenth was
the new keynote of the times, witnessed dramatic downsizing and
force restructuring in 1985 with a 1 million-man force reduction
(followed by a later reduction of 500,000) and a consolidation of
Military Regions from eleven to seven. In 1989, it was troops from
his MR that enforced marital law in Tibet. Liao saw the PLA digest
its lessons from the 1991 Gulf War and worked to implement
Jiang Zeminfs Two Transformationfs program of reform and
modernization
Little is known about his opinions of the United States. However,
it should be noted that during the period of tension that eventually
led to the Chinese missile tests in the Taiwan Straits in 1996, Liao
was a voice of hawkish sentiments. According to one Hong Kong
report:
196
When asked: gIf the United States gets involved when the cross-strait
situation becomes precarious, what changes will take place?h Liao
responded without hesitation: gWhy should we be afraid of the United
States?h Liao said: gIn the past the Japanese troops could be considered
powerful, but they were defeated. The Kuomintang troops could also be
considered strong, but they were no match for the Communist troops.
The relative strength of the opposing sides cannot be judged solely
by several planes or a specifi c weapon; the peoplefs will plays a more
important role. Sensible people should understand this.h30
CMC Member and Director of the General Armament
Department Li Jinai.
At the 16th Party Congress, General Li Jinai was made CMC
member and director of the General Armament Department.
Li Jinai is the nephew of the PLAfs former GSD chief Li Jing.31
Li Jinai was born in 1942. Unlike the other members of the CMC, Li
actually joined the CCP before joining the PLA. He joined the CCP in
1965 and the PLA in 1967. Prior to joining the PLA, he was a student
of missile design at the Engineering Mechanics Department of the
Harbin Institute of Technology.
Li spent much of the early part of his career doing political work
in Second Artillery Corps (Chinafs missile forces). After serving for
a brief period as an enlisted soldier in a construction regiment, Li,
in 1969, became a clerk and deputy platoon leader in the Second
Artillery. From 1970 to 1977, he rose steadily, becoming a deputy
head and deputy political commissar of the Propaganda Branch
within his regiment.
By 1977, Li had become head of the Youth Section and head of the
Organization Section, in the Organization Division of the Political
Department of the Second Artillery. After serving there for six years,
he went on to become the deputy political commissar of the 54th
Base, Second Artillery. For much of that time, he was also working
at the Party Consolidation Offi ce of the PLA. In 1985, Li became head
of the Cadresf Department within the PLA GPD. From there, he was
promoted to be deputy director of the GPD, a post he held for two
years.
During the PLAfs reforms of the 8th and 9th Five Year Plans (1991-
2000), Li served as the deputy political commissar, then political
197
commissar of the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry
for National Defense (COSTIND). In this position, he played a role
in guiding the PLA in its efforts to move from a personnel intensive
force to a military that relied more on technology and professional
expertise. It was also in this position that, in 1996, he fi rst began to
work side by side with the then new minister of COSTIND.current
CMC vice chairman Cao Gangchuan.
When COSTIND was reorganized in 1998, Li became the political
commissar and deputy secretary of the Party committee of the newly
formed General Armaments Department. There he continued to
work with Cao.who was serving as GAD director.
An engineer by training and a political offi cer by practice, during
his tenure at COSTIND and at the GAD, Li took a keen interest in
various major research projects. It has been reported that at major
tests, both he and Cao Gangchuan would be personally involved in
the oversight and direction of major tests.32 This has remained true
for Chinafs space program. A December 2002 report from Chinafs
offi cial Xinhua news service identifi es him as the commander and
chief of Chinafs space program.a position he likely inherited when
assuming the duties of director of the GAD.
Li has also gone on record calling for qualitative improvements
in the capabilities of the PLA, including incorporating greater
informationization and mechanization into the PLAfs equipment.
And, according to the Hong Kong press, like his colleague Cao
Gangchuan, he has actively petitioned the CCP to increase PLA
budgets in an effort to enhance and implement its modernization
program.33
In 2002, in addition to taking over directorship of the GAD,
Li joined Cao as a second member of the CMC with an S&T
background. This personnel move highlights the fact that technical
innovation and reform are seen as issues of critical interest to the
PLA. Given their shared professional history, one can expect to see
more continuity than change in the pace or direction of the PLAfs
approach to material vector modernization in coming years.
198
Table 2. Military CMC Members Career Paths
at Key Moments in Time.
199

DEPUTY DIRECTORS OF THE GENERAL DEPARTMENTS

In addition to the individuals who hold the positions of directors,
each of the four general departments (GSD, GPD, GLD, GAD) has a
group of deputy directors that comprise a second tier of leadership
over these organizations. Those who hold these positions are of
interest for two reasons. First, in many ways, these are the individuals
who manage the more day-to-day implementation of Chinese defense
policy. Second, deputy directorship can be indicative of future CMC
membership. At some point in their careers, for example, four of the
six current military members of the CMC have served as deputy
directors of a general department. 34
The following section identifi es the deputy directors of the
four general departments and, where possible, lists some of their
concurrent positions, areas of expertise, and previous posts.
Biographical information on these individuals is not generally as
detailed as that available for the full members of the CMC. In some
cases, even identifying the individuals who hold these positions
can be a challenge. Furthermore, at the time of this writing, reports
of a December 2003 personnel reshuffl ing are still being evaluated.
Therefore, this listing should be viewed as preliminary, possibly
incomplete, and not necessarily refl ecting the fi nal outcomes.
General Staff Department.
Ge Zhenfeng. Ge Zhenfeng currently serves as executive deputy
chief in the PLA General Staff Department, a position previously
held by current CMC vice chairman Guo Boxiong. He is also a full
member of the CCP Central Committee and is rumored to be deputy
secretary of the General Staff Departmentfs Party Committee.35
Prior to assuming the position of GSD executive deputy chief, Ge
served as commandant of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences, an
institution intimately involved with the PLA process of formulating
and testing new doctrinal concepts. He has authored articles on the
role of education in military reform.
Ge currently serves under GSD Director Liang Guanglie. This
is not the fi rst time their career paths have crossed. When Liang
Guanglie held the position of commander of the Shenyang Military
200
Region from 1997-1999, Ge served as the military regionfs chief of
staff. There, among his other duties, he was actively involved in
managing the Shenyang MRfs response to the 1998 fl oods.36
Wu Quanxu. Wu Quanxu currently holds the position of deputy
chief of the General Staff Department. He is an alternate member of
the Central Committee. Wu was promoted to GSD deputy chief in
1995 after serving as an assistant in the same general department. He
was promoted to the rank of general in June 2000, a date common to
several individuals currently serving at the deputy director level in
the four general departments.
Wu is well traveled. During his tenure in the GSD, he has visited
numerous countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe.
He has also helped receive delegations visiting from the U.S. and
Canada.
According to some Hong Kong reports, Wu has served as both
the commander and commissar of the First Group Army.a unit
that is known in China for its achievements in the 1984 border battle
to recover strategic Zheyin Mountain from Vietnamese forces.37
General Wu has had a series of positions and career experiences
of interest:
. He is currently the deputy director of the Military Encyclopedia
Compilation Committee.
. He served as chairman of the State Councilfs fi rst ever committee
on the accreditation of military science academic degrees.
. He served as a member of the g21 Februaryh security group
responsible for overseeing security in Beijing during President
George Bushfs 2002 visit to Beijing.
. In April 2001, he oversaw the PLAfs fi rst ever disaster response
drill dealing with potential accidents in nuclear power stations.
Qian Shugen. Qian Shugen is currently a deputy chief of the
General Staff Department. He is a full member of the CCP Central
Committee. He also serves as a member of the NPC Committee for
Overseas Chinese Affairs and the NPC Peoplefs Liberation Army
Election Committee.
201
Signifi cantly, much of Qianfs previous work on the GSD appears
to revolve around mobilization issues, including PLA reserve units,
conscription issues, and inspection tours. Qian now holds the
position of secretary general of the National Defense Mobilization
Committee (NDMC). This is a position of growing importance, as
mobilization planning assumes a larger role in PLA concepts of
future warfare. In that context, the NDMC is a critical nexus, linking
the State, the Party, and the Army. The NDMC, which includes
the head of the State Council, as well as the leadership of the CCP
and the CMC, is responsible for planning (and, in event of war,
executing) mobilization plans. It therefore has enormous purview;
included in its brief are economic, social, and political missions, as
well as military ones.
Qian is also fairly well traveled. In addition to trips around Asia,
to Europe, and Africa, he has also visited the U.S. Pacifi c Command,
Russia, Cuba, and Iran.
Zhang Li. Zhang Li currently serves as deputy chief of the
GSD and as deputy secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection
Committee. He is an alternate member of the Central Committee
and a member of the NPC Army Election Commission.
Zhang is fairly new to his position and served as assistant to the
GSD chief until late 2000 or early 2001. He has traveled to India,
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Sierra Leone, Finland, and Greece.
Xiong Guangkai. Xiong Guangkai currently serves as deputy chief
of the General Staff Department. He is also an alternate member of
the Central Committee. Xiong is involved with many PLA foreign
exchanges, as well as Chinese intelligence.
Prior to the 16th Party Congress, there were rumors that Xiong
would rise though the ranks and could possibly become the next
PRC Minister of Defense. This did not happen. Xiong, and his post
16th Party Congress fate, have been discussed at length in Hong
Kong news reporting and by other U.S. scholars. 38
General Political Department.
Tang Tianbiao. Tang Tianbao currently serves as deputy director
of the General Political Department. He has held this position
since 1995. Prior to this time he held the position of assistant to the
202
director. He has held full membership in both the 15th and 16th
Central Committees. He is also an NPC delegate and member of the
NPC Credentials Committee. Like Wu Quanxu, he was promoted to
the rank of general in June of 2000.
Tang is also fairly well traveled. He has been on military
delegations to Africa, South Asia, North Korea, and Latin America.
During the 2001 EP-3 crisis, he traveled with Zhang Wannian to
Australia and New Zealand.
Over the course of his career, Tang has worked on many of the
institutional and systemic challenges facing the PLA as it carries out
its process of reform.
. He has experience with the PLAfs ongoing work in
gregularizationh and the development of military laws and
regulations. For example, he worked under Luo Gan as a member
of a CCP commission on political science and law.
. He has experience with ongoing PLA efforts to streamline and
downsize its personnel. In 1999 he served on a State Council
working group focusing on the placement of demobilized
military offi cers.
. He has experience with ongoing PLA efforts to reform its
approach to professional military education. He served under
GSD Deputy Chief Wu Quanxu as deputy chairman of the State
Councilfs fi rst ever committee on the accreditation of military
science academic degrees.
Yuan Shoufang. Yuan Shoufang currently serves as deputy
director of the GPD. He has been listed as an alternate member of
both the 15th and 16th Central Committees. Born in Jilin in 1958, he
was promoted to the rank of major general in 1988 and was made
a full general in June 2000. Like several other General Department
deputy directors, he fi rst served as assistant to the director of the
GPD and was promoted to deputy director in 1996.
Among the GPD deputy directors, Yuan appears to hold the
propaganda portfolio. He often attends and speaks at meetings for
military newspapers and publishing houses. He also holds the post
of Director of the Military Sports Committee and served as the head
203
of a leading group in charge of the PLAfs participation in the PRCfs
Ninth National Games.
Yuan Shoufang has paid special attention to developing methods
to use technology to improve the GPDfs approach to propaganda
work. Since 1999, he has worked with relevant departments in the
GSD to develop an gall army g propaganda and cultural information
network. The purpose of this project was to make available a
special network where offi cers could obtain detailed and current
information directly from the General Political Department. This
network is reported to have been in operation since 2000, and Yuan
has been reported as being an important voice in promoting its
use.39
Yuan has traveled within Asia, but does not appear to have had
as many opportunities to interact with foreigners as other deputy
directors of the GPD.
Zhang Shutian. Zhang Shutian serves as deputy director of
the GPD. He was promoted to general in June of 2000. He has
comparatively limited experiences abroad, although it should be
noted that he did travel with Chi Haotian to the DPRK in October of
2000.
Zhang Shutian currently serves as secretary of the CMC
Discipline and Inspection Committee and as deputy secretary of the
CCPfs Central Discipline and Inspection Committee. He is the only
current member of the PLA appointed to this position on the Central
Discipline and Inspection Committee. He is also currently serving as
an NPC deputy.
General Logistics Department.
Leadership in the General Logistics Department has undergone
some turnover in recent months. At the time of this writing, reports
on these changes are still surfacing. This has made identifying the
current deputy directors of this department diffi cult. The following
list should be considered preliminary.
Wen Guangchun. Wen Guangchun is currently serving as deputy
director of the GLD. He has held this position since 1996 when he
was promoted from gassistant to the directorh to deputy director.
He is currently a vice chairman of the State Councilfs committee
204
regarding accreditation of military science academic degrees. He is a
deputy of the 10th National Peoplefs Congress.
Wen has chaired and attended several meetings focusing on
gsocializingh logistics (i.e., relying more on civil and commercial
providers to meet military needs in such areas as housing and fuel)
and appears to have some interest in mobilization issues. He has
accompanied Zhang Wannnian on several inspection tours and has
traveled to Macau and Morocco.
Sun Zhiqiang. As of December 2003, Sun Zhiqiang was serving
as deputy director of the GLD. He is a member of the 16th Central
Committee and a deputy to the National Peoplefs Congress.
Sun Zhiqiang appears to be an understudied, but important,
player in the PLA bureaucracy. Within the GLD, he appears to play
a key role in managing the PRC defense budget. He is frequently
quoted in news stories explaining military budgets and especially
their increases, and appears have been occasionally tasked to explain
military budgetary matters to the NPC. Xinhua lists him as holding
the position of director of the GLD fi nance department in 1999.
Sun is also frequently quoted in articles discussing budgetary
implications of PLA personnel reforms such as pay and housing
reform. He appears to have experience in this area as well. For
example, in 1998, he was listed as the head of the new PLA Military
Insurance Offi ce, which was set up to provide, for the fi rst time ever,
a mechanism to insure all members of the PLA against injury or loss
of life. This program was approved by the State Council in 1998.
Wang Qian. As of October 2003, Wang Qian was serving as
deputy director of the GLD. He is also an alternate member of the
Central Committee. He has served as deputy director of the General
Logistics Department since April 2001
Wang has experience with health and sanitation issues. Prior to
moving to the GLD, Wang was the commandant of the No 3 Military
Medical University in Chongqing. Recently, he has been active in the
PLAfs efforts to combat SARS (atypical pneumonia). In the spring of
2003, he was appointed Deputy Head of the Beijing Joint Working
Group for Atypical Pneumonia Prevention and Treatment.
Zhou Youliang. As of July 2003, Zhou Youliang was deputy
director of the GLD. He also held the concurrent post of director of
the Capital Construction Department and was vice chairman of the
205
Beijing Commission on Urban Planning.
Some Hong Kong news reports, as of November 2003, indicated
that Zhou Youliang had left these positions and had taken on a
new post as a full-time member of the NPC Standing Committee.40
Su Shuyan is said to have assumed at least a portion of Zhoufs
responsibilities.
Su Shuyan. Su Shuyan currently holds the position of deputy
director of the GLD.41 He is a member of the 10th National Peoplefs
Congress and currently holds the position of deputy director of the
Beijing Municipal Commission of Urban Planning.
His previous positions include: director of the GLD Vehicles and
Vessels Department and director of the GLD Materials and POL
Department.
Tan Xuexin. As of late December 2003, Tan Xuexin was serving
as deputy director of the GLD. Prior to taking up this position, Tan
served as the long time director of the CMC General Offi ce. He is
seen to be close to CMC chairman Jiang Zemin.
At the time of this writing, little data is available regarding Tanfs
duties in his new position.
Wang Tailan. As of March 2003, Wang Tailan has been listed in
Hong Kong and Taiwan news reports as a former deputy director
of the GLD. He was last identifi ed in the Chinese press as a deputy
director of the GLD at around this same time.
His is currently serving as an NPC deputy and a member on the
NPC Committee for Agriculture and Rural Affairs.
General Armament Department.
As with the General Logistics Department, identifying deputy
directors of the General Armament Department was challenging.
The following list should be considered preliminary. Individuals are
not listed in protocol order.
Li Andong. Li Andong currently serves as deputy director of the
General Armament Department. He is also a member of the 16th
CCP Central committee and is a military delegate to the 10th NPC.
Li accompanied Cao Gangchuan on his trip to the United States
in 2003.
206
Like GSD Deputy Chief Wu Quanxu, Li is a member of the
current PLA Military Encyclopedia Compilation Committee.
Chu Hongyan. Chu Hongyan is currently serving as deputy
director of the General Armament Department. He is a deputy