CIVIL-MILITARY CHANGE IN CHINA:
ELITES, INSTITUTES, AND IDEAS
AFTER THE 16TH PARTY CONGRESS

CHAPTERS 10 THROUGH 12


PDF ORIGINAL DOCUMENT

Edited by
Andrew Scobell
Larry Wortzel
September 2004
Carlisle Barracks
Pennsylvania
U.S. War College
U.S.A.
September 19- 21, 2003
Sponsored by:
The American Enterprise Institute
The Heritage Foundation
The Army War College
Archives
Research Dept.
La Nueva Cuba
February 4, 2006

CONTENTS

Foreword

Ambassador James R. Lilley ............................................................................ v
1. Introduction
Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzel................................................................. 1
2. Party-Army Relations Since the 16th Party Congress:
The Battle of the gTwo Centersh?
James C. Mulvenon ....................................................................................... 11
3. Hu Jintao as Chinafs Emerging National Security Leader
Murray Scot Tanner ..................................................................................... 49
4. Chinafs Ruling Elite: The Politburo and Central Committee
Joseph Fewsmith ............................................................................................ 77
5. Premier Wen and Vice President Zeng: The gTwo Centersh
of Chinafs gFourth Generationh
John Tkacik .................................................................................................... 95
6. The 16th Party Congress and Leadership Changes in the PLA
Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise, Dean Cheng, and Ken Gause........................... 179
7. PLA Leadership in Chinafs Military Regions
Elizabeth Hague........................................................................................... 219
8. Predicting PLA Leader Promotions
Kenneth W. Allen and John F. Corbett, Jr................................................... 257
9. Agents of Infl uence: Assessing the Role of Chinese Foreign
Policy Research Organizations after the 16th Party Congress
Evan Medeiros ............................................................................................. 279
10. Demystifying Sha Shou Jian: Chinafs gAssassinfs Maceh Concept
Jason Bruzdzinski ........................................................................................ 309
11. The Future of PLA Modernization: Bumps and Boosters
Ellis Joffe ...................................................................................................... 365
12. About the Contributors............................................................................ 373

309

CHAPTER 10

DEMYSTIFYING SHASHOUJIAN:
CHINA''S ASSASSIN MACE CONCEPT

Jason E. Bruzdzinski

KEY QUESTIONS

In the absence of a comprehensive base of knowledge or
intellectual debate on shashoujian, this chapter seeks to develop a
baseline for understanding shashoujian in the context of current
Peoplefs Republic of China (PRC) military affairs and aspirations for
transformation of the Peoplefs Liberation Army (PLA) in the early
21st century. To this end, this chapter will seek initial responses to
three fundamental questions:
1. What are the historical origins of shashoujian and what does the
term mean in a military context?
2. How has shashoujian emerged as a topic of significance within the
Chinese national defense establishment?
3. How might shashoujian satisfy Chinese national defense
requirements?

BACKGROUND

For those interested in the potential of the Chinese military to
challenge or threaten U.S. interests, shashoujian is an important
concept that must be properly understood and appreciated.
While omitted from many discussions about Chinese military
modernization in recent Western books and essays on the PLA, the
shashoujian concept is a component of Chinafs strategic culture that
infl uences grand strategy, in addition to Chinese national security
policy and PRC military affairs. As will be discussed in this chapter,
shashoujian is an important part of Chinafs effort to transform the
PLA into a modern, effective, and professional force and should
be important consideration for those studying PLA trends and
developments.
310

CHALLENGES

Chinese Secrecy.

Military affairs are a very sensitive topic for discussions and
publications in the PRC. The PRC regime considers nearly all of
Chinafs information on military subjects to be restricted (neibu) or
internally published (junnei faxing). In fact, very little useful offi cial
information is publicly available or accessible to foreigners. Moreover,
the national defense information that is made available by the PRC
must be scrutinized carefully by researchers as it is commonly
propagandist in nature and may be deliberately inaccurate for the
purposes of perception management. Secrecy and a general lack of
transparency on the part of the PRC often prove to be the greatest
challenges to American understanding of the PRC government and
the PLA. Much of the primary source material cited in this chapter
was obtained from the Chinese (.cn) and Taiwan (.tw) domains of
the Internet and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS);
some was drawn from earlier research by experts in government and
academia. Internet searching in the Chinese and Taiwan domains
was enabled by the search engines provided by Googlec and Yahooc,
but there can be little doubt that the PRC authorities have sanitized
data of any sensitive or classifi ed information in sources that are
searchable by using these tools.
Open Source Publications Acquisition/Translation Issues.
The U.S. National Defense University (NDU) in Washington,
DC, has a formalized publications-sharing program with the PLA
National Defense University. This program was established in 1985
by a U.S.-PRC memorandum of understanding that was re-affi rmed
in 1995. The documents exchange program is a component of the
U.S.-PRC military-to-military relationship, but from an American
perspective the program has not been very successful. PLA NDU
representatives have not demonstrated reciprocity by sharing
unclassifi ed PLA NDU military journals and other publications.
Conversely, the U.S. NDU has given its PLA interlocutor virtually
every document published by the U.S. NDU Press. Regrettably,
311
the military-to-military program has reportedly failed to produce a
comprehensive collection of documents from the PLA NDU and at
present none of the limited Chinese documents shared by the Chinese
are catalogued, translated, or otherwise available to researchers
using the U.S. NDU Library.1
FBIS carries out relatively limited collection and translation of
PRC publications that focus on military and military-related topics.
In light of this fact, many researchers within the PLA-watching
academic community make regular visits to China to conduct
interviews and visit bookstores and newsstands to obtain the latest
information available on developments within the PRC defense
establishment. Regrettably, this chapter did not directly benefi t from
project-specifi c travel to the PRC or from interactions with PRC
government or Chinese military offi cials.
At FBIS, the translation and dissemination of Chinese publications
transitioned from hardcopy/in-print to online/softcopy availability
in 1996. Documents dating from 1993 to present are available from
FBIS on CD-ROM. For U.S. Government personnel and contractors
with access to classifi ed government networks, FBIS provides
additional archived publications (all unclassifi ed) from 1988 to 1993;
materials that predate 1988 are only available gin transferh from the
original hardcopy to microform.2 Unfortunately, FBIS materials that
exist on microform, while available with full tables of contents, are
not searchable using automated research tools.
Varying precision of FBIS translations poses another challenge
for researchers. FBIS translations of Chinese documents into English,
in some instances, have been found to be inconsistent. For example,
since 1996, FBIS appears to have translated the three-character term
shashoujian using at least 15 different interpretations.3 Multiple
interpretations of a term can severely complicate a researcherfs ability
to identify a topic of signifi cance and perform trend analysis against
terms and topics or to identify frequency spikes or changes in usage
in primary sources. For the U.S. Government, such shortcomings
hold the potential to undermine the monitoring of key indicators for
warning against strategic surprises.
Problems in identifi cation, translation, and media/trend
analysis may be one of several reasons for the relatively long time
that elapsed between the emergence of shashoujian in the PLA and
312
evidence of American interest in the term. They may also be why so
little is known in the United States about shashoujian as it pertains to
the current and future interests of the Chinese military.
When a single translation/interpretation for shashoujian is
applied to all documents containing the term, it appears that
shashoujian is more than a mere idiom or metaphor in the vernacular
of the PLA cadre and individuals within the PRC defense
establishment. This fi rst becomes noticeable in materials published
in 1995 and becomes increasingly obvious by 1999. In 2000, there are
indications that shashoujian could be part of a formalized, clandestine
weapons research, development and acquisition (RD&A) effort.
To demonstrate this point, the term shashoujian is not translated,
but presented in Chinese pinyin transliteration throughout this
document.

EXISTING RESEARCH

Only limited research examines the topic of shashoujian. In
the United States, a small number of researchers have attempted
to defi ne and contextualize the term, but none of the research
discovered in the course of this project examined the subject of
shashoujian comprehensively. The work of Dr. Michael Pillsbury
comes closest. While American and Taiwan academics share some
common views, there are also clear differences in their respective
interpretations and assumptions about the context of shashoujian.

WHAT ARE THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF SHASHOUJIAN
AND WHAT DOES THE TERM MEAN?

To correctly examine the concept of shashoujian, it is important
to understand its historical origins and the context of the term.
The three Chinese characters that make up the term shashoujian
are literally translated as kill (sha), hand (shou), sword, club, or
mace (jian). The most common English language interpretation of
shashoujian is gassassinfs mace.h
Dissection of the term shashoujian by non-Chinese (who lack
deep cultural and linguistic skill) can be misleading, and the true
meaning and context of shashoujian can be easily lost. For example,
313
the meaning of the Chinese compound gshashouh is interpreted as
ghitmanh or gassassin,h and jian as gsword,h gclub,h or gmace.h
This approach most often results in the translation/interpretation:
gassassinfs mace.h Alternatively, shashoujian might be dissected as
sha (meaning kill or killing) followed by the compound gshoujianh
(ghand sword,h ghand club,h or ghand maceh). The result in this
case is most often the interpretation of shashoujian as gkiller maceh or
gkilling mace.h
Interestingly, the Chinese characters jiaan and jian are different,
but have very similar meanings and are used by most Chinese
interchangeably. The jiaan is a short wood, iron, or steel rod with
three or four angled edges. Some jiaan are tipped with a mace-type
head. The jiaan does not have a sharp blade as a sword (jian) does.
According to the Chinese Global Language and Cultural Center
in Taiwan, the Chinese characters for these weapons are probably
derived from zhujiaan: a bamboo strip that was used as a medium by
the Chinese for writing before the invention of paper.4
As American scholars have argued, shashoujian has its origins
in Chinese antiquity. Shashoujian has been frequently referenced in
Chinese legends, folklore, and history, and the term is particularly
common in Chinese contemporary martial arts novels.5 However,
determining its origin, defi ning the term, and understanding its
important context can be somewhat challenging.
In ancient China, when wars were common and often long, the
martial arts emerged to serve the needs of individuals and armies. As
a result, the gway of the fi sth (quanfa), the sword art (jianshu), and the
war art (wushu) became a way of life for many Chinese people and
set the martial arts as a cornerstone in Chinese culture. The practice
of jianshu, which remains very popular in China today, emphasizes
not only the disposition of an adversary and the desired effect of
onefs strikes, but also onefs own attacking position and the forms
(techniques) of strikes that one should use. Great attention is paid
to the precision of onefs position and use of forms in the practice of
jianshu, as is the case in the practice of taichi quan (shadow boxing).
Historical references to martial arts weapons in Chinese legend
and folklore pre-date the Southern and Northern dynasties period
that began in 386 A.D. and can be traced to the Warring States
(475-221 B.C.) and the Spring and Autumn (770-476 B.C.) periods.6
314
However, early records of Chinese fi ghting movements known
as ghit and thrusth exercises were practiced as early as the Shang
dynasty (1700-1027 B.C.).7 The establishment of the Shaolin Temple
by Emperor Xiao Wen during the Northern Wei dynasty (356-534
A.D.) was a key catalyst for the development of the martial arts
in China. During this period, the original Shaolin style of gong fu
(martial arts) was practiced with only 18 basic weapons\among
them, the hand mace (shoujian).
The shoujian was a surprisingly small and light weapon,
measuring only about 15-20 inches in length and weighing just a few
pounds. Modern day analogues might resemble a lead pipe, crowbar,
or hammer. Both the jian and jiaan were considered highly lethal
close combat weapons and could be concealed within a wide sleeve.
However, effective use of these weapons required considerable skill
based on deception, good training, and long practice. Using the
proper forms (techniques), the shoujian was a weapon that could
be immediately employed with little or no warning against an
adversary. A forged shoujian was capable of breaking swords and
crushing a human skull or bones\even if an enemy was protected
by the type of helmets or armor available during early periods of
Chinese history.
The historical origin of the term shashoujian is elusive. According
to one Taiwan source, it is found in a legend about General Xin
Xiong of the Tang Empire (618-907 A.D.). General Xin is said to have
had a great reputation for very rare skill with a (nonbladed) jiaan
that was passed down to him by several generations of ancestors.8
He used the weapon in fast striking forms, including the gmoving
serpenth and gdropping snowfl akeh movements. General Xinfs
most powerful form, however, was called gshashoujiaan.h The
legend relates that when General Xin taught his cousin, Lou Cheng,
the most effective forms to employ with the jiaan, he kept secret the
gshashoujiaanh form because he realized that he might no longer be
the best user of the jiaan if he taught the form to his cousin. Hence,
the form gshashoujiaan,h with the implication of gthe most powerful
and secret skill,h is allegedly derived from this historic Chinese
tale. From this story it seems clear that while the jian and jiaan are
weapons, shashoujian is also a form\a well-practiced technique or
movement.
315

HOW HAS SHASHOUJIAN EMERGED AS A TOPIC
OF SIGNIFICANCE WITHIN THE CHINESE NATIONAL
DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT?

Interestingly, very few modern defi nitions of shashoujian can be
documented. The most comprehensive Chinese military statement
about shashoujian\that resembles a formal defi nition\comes from a
PLA Air Force (PLAAF) offi cer, Senior Colonel Yang Zhibo, who, in
2002, served as a deputy researcher at the PLAAF Command College
in the Offi ce for Planning and Management Research. According to
Yang, shashoujian can be gweapon systems and equipmenth and/or a
certain type of gcombat method.h In a Kongjun Bao article, he wrote:
Basically, it is whatever the PLA needs to win future local wars under
modern high-tech conditions. It includes two aspects: (1) weapon
systems and equipment (e.g., hardware); and (2) every type of combat
method (e.g., software). Weapons and equipment are the systems needed
to deal with the enemyfs electronic warfare and information warfare,
and to counter every type of weapon and equipment the enemy can use
for fi repower attack. [Shashoujian] [c]ombat methods include attacking
different types of weapons, such as early warning aircraft, stealth
aircraft, and cruise missiles, as well as the combat principles to deal with
different situations.
To build a shashoujian, China must fi rst complete a development
program. It is a diffi cult, systematic process and not just one or two
advanced weapons. It is something that all the services will use. It is
an all-army, all-location, composite land, sea, and air system. It must
also be a Chinese program that can use advanced foreign technology,
but should not be purchased as a full system from abroad. One reason
for not purchasing it from abroad is that these types of technology and
tactics are common knowledge to everyone else, including the enemy.
Second, other countries may not want to give China those types of
technology and tactics, which are secret. Third, during wartime, political
and foreign affairs (diplomacy) could possibly cut the fl ow of technology
off from China In developing new combat methods research, combat
methods constitute the full development of weapons and equipment
technical and tactical capabilities, and the effective methods of raising
combat effectiveness. The development of weapons, equipment, combat
methods, and training must go hand-in-hand for them to be effective.9
Postings on two popular Chinese military enthusiast
websites offered additional defi nitions of shashoujian. One writer
316
described shashoujian in the context of gweaponsh and gsystem
countermeasuresh and also hinted that plans to develop a shashoujian
program originated in the early 1990s.
A shashoujian is a weapon that has an enormous terrifying effect on the
enemy and that can produce an enormous destructive assault. System
countermeasures involve comprehensive development of land, sea,
air, and strategic weapons that increase the overall countermeasures
capability of equipment systems. It should be said that these are two
different trains of thought in the development of weaponry, but the two
are not opposites. Shashoujian are not isolated weapons, but rather should
become important constituent parts of equipment systems. Development
of shashoujian is aimed at further perfection of equipment systems, and
can promote faster development of equipment systems; it is a step in the
improvement of systems countermeasures capabilities. . . . The concept
of system countermeasures is a new train of thought proposed in the
early 1990s for the development of weaponry. . . . Under conditions
where military funding was constrained and scientifi c/technical forces
were limited, China could focus on the development of a few shashoujian
weapons . . .10
Another writer cited the popular emergence of the term
shashoujian in China in the 1990s, offered a historical defi nition of the
term, and spoke of a shashoujian gdesignationh for specifi c weapons
systems. This enthusiast wrote:
Shashoujian is a term often heard in China beginning in the mid-to-late
1990s. It is a synonym for a secret weapon as originally used in traditional
Chinese storytelling to describe an ancient weapon of surprising
power. . . . several domestically made weapons have their names on the
list of successful candidates for the designation shashoujian.11
As Dr. Michael Pillsbury and Dr. Alistair I. Johnston have noted,
the Chinese also use the terms wangpai (trump card) and shashoujian
to characterize certain U.S. and Russian weapons.12 Johnston
observed that gthis implies that PLA writers believe Americans and
Russians can conceptualize [and develop] shashoujian just as Chinese
can.h13 One PLA writer validated Pillsburyfs and Johnstonfs ideas
when he commented that,
U.S. troops had at least fi ve shashoujian on the battlefi eld [during
Operation DESERT STORM], i.e., the F-117A stealth fi ghter bombers,
317
the B-1B stealth bombers, the B-52H bombers (specialized in launching
cruise missiles outside the air defense zone), the ship-based Tomahawk
cruise missiles, and the B-2A stealth bombers which can take off or touch
down from domestic airbases to carry out shock tasks. Moreover, the
U.S. troops would also use various kinds of ammunition which are more
powerful and more accurately guided.14
Understanding the origins and context of shashoujian is very
important for discovering the meaning of the term, realizing its
true signifi cance, and assessing the implications of shashoujian for
the PLA. For example, learning the historical origins and context
of shashoujian allows researchers to appreciate the termfs resilience
despite the signifi cant changes that have occurred in China over the
last 2,000 years. Such strong endurance of the concept of shashoujian
through transgenerational storytelling or gvignettismh15 highlights
the signifi cance of the term in Chinese society, strategic culture, and
as a possible driver for the development of Chinese military strategy,
tactics, and weapons in the 21st century. Correctly translating and
interpreting shashoujian are also important to facilitate meaningful
research, to establish a baseline of knowledge, and to make
new discoveries. Indeed, while there are Western analogues to
and applications of shashoujian, gmirror-imagingh for analysis
to understand the term is a pitfall to be avoided. The Chinese
defi nitions and context must be the genesis of scholarly work on this
unique subject.
The PLA Debates Alternative Paths for Military Strategy and Force
Modernization.
Since the mid-1980s, Chinese military scholars have been
studying trends in the development of U.S. defense policy and
strategy, operational doctrine, and the enhancement of overall
combat capability of the U.S. armed forces. During this period,
many of these scholars also have been engaged in debate about the
requirements for future warfare and the most appropriate direction
for the modernization of the PLA. These military studies and debates
have served as signifi cant agents for change within Chinafs national
defense establishment.
318
In 1986, at a military campaign theory seminar where 60 new
warplans were submitted and discussed by leading Chinese military
strategists, a majority of those strategists espoused a move from
Chinafs traditional gwar of annihilationh goal to a focus on gfi ghting
a full-fl edged war and attacking key-points.h16 In June 1991, at the
direction of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the Chinese
Academy of Military Science (AMS) held a forum on Operation
DESERT STORM to explore new approaches to gdevelopment of
defense-related scientifi c research and army building,h among
other major topics.17 Infl uenced by the Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA) trend and the overwhelming combat effectiveness
of U.S. military operations from 1991 to present,18 Chinafs military
scientists broke into three distinct schools of thought on military
modernization; gthe Peoplefs War school,h gthe Limited, High-
Technology War school,h and gthe RMA school.h19
According to Michael Pillsbury, from the early to mid-1990s,
individuals and groups within the three schools of thought publicly
debated alternative paths for PLA modernization in an apparent
campaign for recognition by the PRC leadership.20 Leaders of
the PLAfs RMA school of thought sought to persuade the PRC
leadership that China must quickly develop the capability to deter,
counter, or defeat U.S. military capabilities. The group held that
nonlinear modernization by leaps was the best path.21 Gradually,
PLA strategists shifted their thinking from a gPeoplefs War Under
Modern Conditionsh mindset toward gLocal, Limited War Under
High-Technology Conditions,h as articulated in 1993 by then PRC
President Jiang Zemin.
By 1996, public statements from PLA general offi cers and PRC
leaders indicated a strong move away from that school of thought and
toward the nonlinear RMA or counter-RMA22 approach to military
modernization.23 American PLA scholars observing Chinafs military
debates often opined that PLA writers were merely mimicking
or gmirror-imagingh the U.S. RMA for their own purposes, but a
closer examination reveals that the ideas espoused by many Chinese
military scholars were indeed different from those driving the
American military modernization. The following statement from
Major General Xu Yanbin is characteristic of professional discussions
about modernization of PLA in the 1990s.
319
We should not mechanically follow U.S. theory. As a military
revolution is an inevitable outcome of scientifi c and technological
progress and thus a general tendency, we should not try to meet a new
challenge by running after others . . . We should try to create our own
superiority. . . . We should combine Western technology with Eastern
wisdom. This is our trump card for winning a 21st century war.24
A gTransformationh for the PLA?
The American RMA and Chinafs study of trends in U.S. military
operations during the 1990s sparked a period of critical thinking
and intense publishing on alternative views in military affairs in the
PRC. These developments resulted in unprecedented discussions
and debate among the PLA cadre that prompted Chinafs senior
leaders to evaluate PRC national military strategy, as well as PLA
force structure and warfi ghting capabilities. By 1998, signifi cant
policy, strategy, organizational, training, and operational reforms
were underway within Chinafs defense establishment. However,
despite the American focus on gtransformation,h Chinafs senior
leadership remained committed to carry forward the military
doctrines of Mao and Deng. It would be another 5 years before the
phrase military gtransformationh would be publicly uttered by the
Chinese president and CMC chairman, Jiang Zemin. In 2002, at the
16th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) National Congress, Jiang
said, gOur national defense and army building should keep in line
with the worldfs military transformation.h According to the Nanfang
Zhoumo news magazine, this was the fi rst time the term gmilitary
transformationh was used publicly by a leading member of the
CCP.25
In the spring of 2003, Chinafs senior political leaders and
military offi cers participated in a series of signifi cant meetings to
encourage Chinafs own military transformation among the rank
and fi le of the PLA and institutions that support it. These events
served to promulgate a signifi cant evolution in strategic thinking by
Chinafs senior leadership and establish slogans to properly motivate
members of these communities.
At the National Peoplefs Congress (NPC) and National Committee
of the Chinese Peoplefs Political Consultative Conference in March,
CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin said it was gnecessary to push forward
military transformation within Chinese characteristics.h26
320
In May, PRC President Hu Jintao attended the fi fth meeting of
the CCP Political Bureau to study gtrends in the development of
the worldfs new military transformation.h Members of the CCP
Political Bureau heard lectures on military transformation from
several Academy of Science speakers. Discussions at this event
explored the history of the worldfs six military transformations and
the signifi cance of information technology for the sixth (current)
military transformation.27 AMS scholar Pi Mingyong identifi ed and
described the six major gmilitary revolutions,h noting that all have
been linked to gthe rise and decline, the glory and humiliation of the
Chinese nation.h28 Importantly, Pi argued that developing countries
in a relatively gbackward positionh can catch-up with military
revolutions. He cited the Japanese Meiji Reform, Turkeyfs military
revolution led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, and Chinafs gnuclear
revolutionh as examples. PLA General Liang Bi of the AMS also
highlighted the signifi cance of information as the catalyst of the sixth
transformation. He argued that:
The extensive use of information technology can multiply the peoplefs
capacity to fi nd out about the battlefi eld situation and enable the
commanders to deploy an appropriate type of combat force, on an
appropriate scale, at an appropriate time, in an appropriate location, and
to carry out highly integrated combined operations in an appropriate
manner.29
Several months before the CCP Political Bureau meeting at the
Human Studies Forum of Chinese Scientists, Deputy Chief of the
PLA General Staff Xiong Guangkai articulated details of the PLAfs
new modernization path in a speech titled, gOn the New Military
Transformation.h Xiong stated that gthe essence of the new military
transformation is a refl ection of the information revolution in the
military fi eld.h30
Jiang Zeminfs 2002 utterance of the phrase gmilitary
transformationh and the subsequent campaign of speeches on
this topic by other senior leaders\to educate and indoctrinate
PLA offi cers and enlisted personnel\were signifi cant events. The
consistent use of the phrase gmilitary transformationh served to
acknowledge the success of efforts by the PLAfs RMA scholars in
their campaign to break from Chinafs long adherence to gPeoplefs
321
Warh doctrines and the PLAfs practice of linear, reactive approaches
to force modernization.
Some American observers of the Chinese military have argued
that Chinafs ethnocentrism and bureaucracies are the principal
reasons for the PLAfs lagging combat capabilities and resistance to
adopting foreign ideas. Moreover, some contend that Chinese pride
or ineffi ciency may be the reasons for the 5-year delay in Jiangfs use
the term gtransformation.h However, a more rigorous examination
of these events, with an understanding of the cultural and political
dynamics in China, produces alternative conclusions.
Chinafs reluctance to abandon the gPeoplefs Warh doctrines of the
recent past probably has as much to do with the Marxist philosophy
of gdialectical materialismh and the application of the scientifi c
method to military affairs as it does with Chinese pride, gface,h or
inertia.31 Decades of training, indoctrination, and belief meant that
Chinafs military scholars and senior leaders probably could not
be convinced to move away from gPeoplefs Warh until the laws of
warfare that they had accepted as valid could be demonstrated to
be gincorrect.h The capabilities employed by the U.S. armed forces
in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and other U.S. military actions up to
2002 validated the hypotheses of many Chinese RMA scholars and
severely damaged the validity of gPeoplefs Warh for the 21st century.
As the practical application of gPeoplefs Warh doctrines for modern
warfare eroded in the mid-1990s, an opening was created for new
military thinking in China. The historical and cultural grounding
of shashoujian in Chinese society and strategic culture afforded the
PRC leadership an opportunity to blend Chinese tradition with the
requirements of the future, or, in the words of an ancient Chinese
stratagem, to gborrow a corpse to raise the spirit.h32 With his term
as president nearing an end, Jiang Zemin did not fail to seize this
uncommon opportunity to secure his legacy as a visionary leader for
the PLA.

Emergence of Shashoujian Within the PLA.

As noted by Johnston, the term shashoujian does not appear in
the major published military writings of Mao Zedong.33 However,
usage of the term within the PLA probably began in about 1955
under Maofs regime, when China embarked on its gtwo bombs and
322
one satelliteh program.34 Some Chinese articles published since 1997
include historical references and comparisons of shashoujian with that
program. Perhaps surprisingly, research for this chapter uncovered
no comparisons of shashoujian with Chinafs g863 Program.h35
By the mid-1990s, Chinese military scholars and other senior
offi cers were advocating the development of shashoujian for
deterrence, and as a means to defeat a superior adversary in
modern, high-tech warfare.36 In his research, Pillsbury identifi ed
and translated more than 20 articles mentioning shashoujian and
has commented on the rise of positions and ranks of the PLA cadre
discussing shashoujian from the mid-1990s to 2000. According to
Pillsbury, the earliest, recent references to shashoujian weapons by
Chinese military writers appear in scholarly books37 as well as the
AMS journal, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, in 1995.38 The Guang Jiao Jingkan
journal also reported on a military program to develop shashoujian
weapons in 1995.39 The emergence of the term shashoujian at that time
suggests a link to Chinafs internal debates about military strategy
and modernization.
From 1995 to 1997, leading PLA scholars from the RMA school
of thought appeared to be campaigning to convince senior PLA
leaders and the core leaders of the CCP to initiate programs to cope
with the impact of the American RMA. According to Pillsbury, this
campaign was probably led by General Wang Pufeng, the fi rst senior
PLA offi cer known to advocate the PLAfs use of shashoujian weapons
to defeat of the U.S. military.40 Pillsbury also commented that he
came to realize that the term was sensitive when he asked a senior
PLA strategist about shashoujian and was told that the term could
not be discussed.41 By early 1997, senior PLA offi cers (warfi ghters)
were advocating the positions espoused by General Wang 2 years
earlier.42
While some advocates for shashoujian may have come from the
RMA school of thought, the historical and cultural signifi cance of
the term to the Chinese means that in a modern context shashoujian
blends tradition (the old) with modernity (the new). Given its
lineage, shashoujian is a term that probably holds appeal for PLA
scholars within the Peoplefs War and Local, Limited War schools of
thought as well. For example, a statement by General Huang Bin of
323
the PLA NDU demonstrated continuing emphasis on the Peoplefs
War maxim of protracted warfare in combination with shashoujian:
We can fi ght a war with them [the United States], they will not be able to
continue the war after a while. Moreover, we also have our shashoujian.43
Additional research will be necessary to demonstrate conclusively
the relationships among the three schools of thought and the term
shashoujian.

A Traceable Chronology of Documents.

Statements made by the Chinese militaryfs most senior offi cers
after 1996 clearly encouraged the development of shashoujian as a new
direction for the PLA. Pillsbury cited a March 1997 issue of Zhongguo
Junshi Kexue which featured an article by General Liu Jingsong, then
president of the AMS. In the article, General Liu associated the classic
Chinese stratagem of the ginferior defeating the superiorh with the
use of shashoujian weapons.44 Pillsburyfs examination of the journal
also revealed that several articles containing discussions about
shashoujian were presented by the commander of the Guangzhou
Military Region, commander of the Chengdu Military Region, and
commander of the PLA Navy. Pillsbury also obtained a copy of the
Journal of the PLA National Defense University (junnei faxing) where
General Liu discussed methods to successfully attack a U.S. aircraft
carrier using shashoujian weapons.45
In April 1997, PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Commander Liu Shunyao
hinted at a change in PLA direction when he discussed the PLAfs
need to gform, as soon as possible, a certain scale of shashoujianh
and also said, gThe prospect has emerged for the study of a
tactical methodology aimed at defeating enemies possessing hightechnology
armament.h46 In the same month, the restricted AMS
journal Junshi Xueshi contained an article by Admiral Yang Yushu
of the PLA Navyfs (PLAN) East Sea Fleet in which the author
advocated the development of an information warfare system as a
shashoujian weapon to defeat an enemy.47 A September 1997 article in
a Hong Kong newspaper further indicated that changes were taking
place within the PLA when it reported, gthe Statefs third generation
324
leading collective calls on the armed forces to adapt themselves to
the requirements of modern local warfare and to have their own
shashoujian.h48
By 1998, advocacy of shashoujian programs for the PLA
had reached the highest levels of the PLA and Chinafs civilian
leadership. PRC National Defense Minister Chi Haotian disclosed
in August that President Jiang Zemin had advanced ga general train
of thought on Chinafs national defense and army modernization
drive and outlined tasks for specifi c stages in the run up to the mid-
21st century . . .h Among those tasks disclosed by General Chi, the
development of shashoujian is specifi cally called out. In discussing
Chinafs military modernization plans, he said:
We should learn and master advanced science and technology; keep
abreast with the latest high-technology developments in the world;
develop key technologies in the main; develop weaponry and equipment
with a substantially higher scientifi c and technological standard; create
some shashoujian; and explore a weaponry and equipment development
path with Chinese characteristics.49
In February 1999, Vice Chairman of the CMC General Fu Quanyou
also spoke of the need for shashoujian:
To defeat a better equipped enemy with inferior equipment in the
context of high-technology, we should rely upon high-quality personnel,
superior operational methods; and high-quality shashoujian weapons.50
In May 1999, in the wake of the accidental NATO bombing of the
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Jiang Zemin stressed to the PLA
leadership that gIt is necessary to master, as quickly as possible,
a new shashoujian needed to safeguard state sovereignty and
security.h51
At roughly the same time, following the publication of a long
article on the history of Chinafs gtwo bombs and one satelliteh
program written by Zhang Jingfu,52 Chinese Academy of Science
(CAS) offi cials discussed the article and noted gthat so long as it
is needed for state security, they will work like those who did in
earlier periods to develop the necessary items for the state as quickly
as possible.h CAS scholar Yang Dongsheng, who took part in the
historical research, stated that:
325
China cannot be bullied by others at will. China must become strong
through our own effort. Therefore, we must develop our own hightechnologies
and produce some impressive and important things.53
In August 1999, Jiang Zemin repeated his call to the Chinese military
for shashoujian weapons. This time he said:
We should set great store by stepping-up high-technology innovation
for national defense purposes and by developing technology useable
for both military and civil purposes as well, and we should also master
several new shashoujian for safeguarding our national sovereignty and
security as quickly as possible.54
In early March 2000, General Fu Quanyou echoed his own earlier
statements on shashoujian, and also reinforced Jiang Zeminfs calls for
shashoujian development at the National Peoplefs Congress before a
panel of PLA deputies. He said:
We must lose no time developing and building shashoujian, strengthening
military theoretical research and overall planning for preparations
for military struggles, making increased efforts to acquire scientifi c
and technical knowledge, increasing the scientifi c and technological
drilling of troops, and improving construction for war preparedness
and the study and practice of task-specifi c methods of operation in
order to comprehensively improve our armyfs ability to fi ght combined
operations under high-technology conditions.55
In August 2000, following a statement by the U.S. Government
that the United States regards China as a gstrategic competitor,h
Jiang issued a memo to the senior PLA cadre. In the secret memo,
Jiang Zemin rejected PLA requests for large budgetary increases.
Instead, he specially ordered the development of shashoujian.56 He is
reported to have said:
. . . As a big nation, China should have procured some shashoujian
weapons in the struggle against global hegemony . . . As our internal
resources are limited, we should concentrate them fi rst and foremost in
areas of strategically vital importance to safeguard our national security,
territorial integrity and to oppose hegemony in today and tomorrowfs
world.57
326
A November 2000 leak to a Hong Kong newspaper validated this
report, which claimed that Jiang gave direction on PRC preparations
to deal with the Taiwan situation. In the context of the possibility of
a U.S. intervention, he discussed the importance of shashoujian for
Chinafs ability to maintain options for its strategy against Taiwan,
stating:
The long delay of [resolution of] the Taiwan issue is detrimental to its
peaceful solution. It is imperative to step-up preparations for a military
struggle so as to promote the early solution of the Taiwan issue. To this
end, it is necessary to vigorously develop some shashoujian weapons and
equipment. In this way, we will always have the initiative in solving the
issue in either a peaceful or nonpeaceful way.58
Shashoujian: A Secret Program?
In 2000, reports surfaced that Chinafs senior military offi cers
and national leaders had indeed outlined a secret project to develop
shashoujian (warfi ghting concepts and weapons).59 Details of the
project (assigned the code number 998) were leaked in June 2000. Dr.
Pillsbury discovered a February 2001 Jiefangjun Bao article (written
by a bona fi de CCP Central Committee offi cial) that verifi ed the plan
to develop shashoujian weapons.60 In February 2001, Wang Congbiao
of the Policy Research Unit of the CCP Central Committee quoted
Jiang Zemin as having said:
We should have a high regard for enhancing the innovation in advanced
national defense technology, stressing the development of military/
civilian dual-use technology and mastering as quickly as possible the
new shashoujian needed to safeguard our national sovereignty and
security.61
The Chinese leadership probably established the 998 Project
in response to their growing concerns about the implications of
an interventionist U.S. military strategy, missile defense program
decisions, and the on-going American RMA. It was formalized
by a strategic resolution adopted at Beidaihe in early August 1999
during an enlarged session of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central
Committee.62 However, references to shashoujian in Chinese military
327
writings and statements appear to indicate that preliminary work on
this program could have begun as early as 1995. If so, China could be
as many as 7 years into a shashoujian weapons acquisition program.
Chinafs 998 State Security Project has several components that
respond to U.S. foreign policy decisions (including decisions to use
force) and the development of new military capabilities.63 The 998
Project calls for the PLA to g. . . accelerate the research, development
and installation of new weapons . . . to resist U.S. hegemonism.h64 It
is managed under the direction of the Political Bureau of the CCP
Central Committee and the Central Military Commission. The 998
Project Leading Group is reported to include the members shown
in Figure 1. The work conferences supporting the 998 Project are
directed by the four PLA General Staff Departments.65
(From left to right)
Jiang Zemin - Former PRC President, CMC Chairman
Hu Jintao - PRC President, CCP General Secretary, CMC Vice
Chairman
WU Bangguo - Chairman, Standing Committee of the National
Peoplefs Congress
Cao Gangchuan - CMC Vice Chairman, Minister of National
Defense
Guo Boxiong - Member, Political Bureau - CCP Central Committee.
CMC Vice Chairman
Liu Jibin - Director, Commission on Science, Technology and
Industry for National Defense (COSTIND).
Figure 1. The 998 State Security Project Leading Group.
328
The 122 (December 2) Project and 126 (January 26) Program:
Components of a Shashoujian Research and Development Effort?
In December 2000, Jiang Zemin announced that the CMC, the
Political Bureau of the Central Committee, and the State Council had
adopted a new gdecision on the development of strategic weapons
to meet the needs of the situation in the new period.h66 The decision
is referred to as the gResolution on the December 2 Project.h The
objectives of the December 2 (122) Project are said to be to improve
the combat effectiveness, counterattack capability, and gwinning
edgeh of the PLA. These goals are to be achieved by developing
a new generation of gstrategic high-tech weaponsh and gstrategic
nuclear weaponsh and by gimproving the readiness of PLA strategic
weaponry.h At the meeting, Jiang Zemin is said to have announced
the members of the 122 Project Leading Group, which reportedly
includes Hu Jintao (as leader); Wen Jiabao and Chi Haotian (as
deputy leaders); and members Guo Boxiong, Cao Gangchuan, Wang
Zuxun (Commandant of the AMS), Yang Guoliang, Huang Cisheng
(Deputy Commander of the Second Artillery and Chief of Staff for
Nuclear Weapons), Shen Binyi (Deputy Commander of the PLAN),
Li Yongde (Deputy Commander of the PLAAF), and others.
Chinafs 126 Program was approved by CMC Chairman Jiang
Zemin following a national conference on science, technology, and
industry for national defense held in January 2000. The program
focuses on the acceleration of Chinafs development and production
of high-technology weaponry. According to a Chinese news source,
the 126 Program is the second national-level program established
for Chinafs development of military equipment. (Chinafs fi rst such
program was the 863 Program established by Deng Xiaoping in
March 1986). Under the 126 Program, China will develop six major
projects within a period of 12-15 years. These projects are reported
to include the development of an aerospace technological system,
an electronic information technological system, a strategic defense
technological system, a deep-level counterattack technological
system, an optical laser technological system, and a nonconventional
and conventional materials technological system.67 Under these six
projects, 36 gtheme projectsh have been developed by expert groups,
329
technology groups, and logistics groups established to support the
126 Program.68
The 126 Program is said by a Chinese source to be regarded by
the PLA as ga development program for the new century.h The
program is overseen by PRC President Hu Jintao, with Vice Premier
Wu Bangguo serving as the program leader. Wang Zhongyu, Cao
Gangchuan, and Liu Jibin serve as deputy leaders of the programfs
leading group.69 Interestingly, the members of this leading group are
very similar to those in charge of Chinafs 998 Project.
Although the term shashoujian is not used in reference to the
122 Project or the 126 Program, additional research is necessary to
determine whether these initiatives are associated with or related to
the 998 Project or shashoujian in any way.
Shashoujian and PLA Research, Development and Acquisition
(RD&A).
Chinafs military-industrial sector is a large and complex
network of PRC academic, civil, and military organizations. Some
of these organizations are independent; others remain state-owned
enterprises. Within this large network there are three principal
organizations where Chinese military RD&A decisions are made.
This smaller set of critical organizations includes the PRC State
Council, the CMC, the PLA General Staff Department, and the
Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National
Defense (COSTIND).
At the direction of Jiang Zemin, a sweeping series of military
reforms was initiated across Chinafs national defense establishment
in 1998. In that year, the PLAfs General Armament Department
(GAD) was established as a PLA General Staff department to manage
and fund military RD&A plans. At the same time, the function and
authority of COSTIND were examined, and the commission was
reorganized and streamlined. If shashoujian weapons and tactics
development are indeed components of a larger PRC state security
project, as evidence suggests, it is highly likely that leaders and
senior offi cials within the PRC State Council, CMC, PLA General
Staff Department, and at COSTIND have addressed considerations
and decisionmaking for these issues. All of these organizations are
330
represented in the 998 State Security Project Leading Group.
In addition to the numerous calls for shashoujian made by Chinafs
senior leaders, a number of various publications include statements
about shashoujian in the context of PLA modernization efforts. These
references occur mostly (beginning in 1998) in articles in Chinese
military newspapers, such as Jiefangjun Bao, which are intended
for a PLA audience. In many instances, these articles refer to the
development of shashoujian weapons in an aspirational context.
June 1998: gThe PLA should stress both real war preparations and
deterrence preparations by fi rst developing a number of deterrent
shashoujian of a standard identical to that of an enemyfs as it did
in the past when developing gtwo bombs and one satelliteh and a
nuclear submarine.h70
August 1998: gWe must give priority to the development of
defense-related research and high-tech weapons and equipment,
concentrate resources on the tackling of key technologies, exert
ourselves to tackle gbottlenecksh which prevent the improvement of
our combat effectiveness, and strive to achieve major progress in key
projects which will play an important part in the winning of future
wars, so that our army will have a number of powerful shashoujian as
quickly as possible.h71
April 1999: PLA scholar An Weiping observed that Chinafs
shashoujian program should be responsive to Chinafs gone low and
fi ve insuffi ciencies.h The gone lowh refers to Chinafs low integration
of information technology with armaments and equipment,
while the gfi ve insuffi cienciesh are identifi ed as (1) high-power
armaments, (2) weapons for launching attacks, (3) precision guided
munitions, (4) reconnaissance, early warning, command and control,
and (5) electronic armaments. The scholar recommended a focus on
gkey projects and development of our own shashoujian weapons . . .
We should concentrate our resources on developing a number of
shashoujian weapons with great deterrent power, thus making up for
the insuffi ciencies of our armaments.h72
February 2000: Michael Pillsbury translated a Zhongguo Junshi
Kexue article in which General Wang Ke, a member of the CMC and
director of the PLAfs General Logistics Department, discussed three
priority areas for military investment. The three areas General Wang
331
identifi ed were defense infrastructure, education and training, and
shashoujian weapons.73
June 2000: Party committees of various services and arms made
meticulous efforts to organize the research and development and
further improve measures related to weaponry development,
particularly the development of shashoujian.74
June 2002: An article from Huajianbing Bao indicated that the
CMC and the PLAfs four General Departments had approved the
establishment of gseveral projects for shashoujian weapons.h75 The
article also reported that gsome shashoujian weapons have already
been fi elded in units and have formed up combat capability . . .
[while] others already have fi nal designs and are about to be issued
to [Second Artillery Corps] units.h76 Further reporting in the article,
if correct, seems to indicate a program featuring a signifi cant level of
investment, effort, and dedication.
So as to put shashoujian weapons in the hands of units as soon as possible,
numerous scientifi c and technological cadre of the Fourth Institute . . .
spend nearly 200 days each year [performing operational research] . . .
producing more than 10,000 technical reports and documents of various
kinds to submit to leaders at all levels to use in their decisionmaking.
Nearly 4,000 of their recommendations have been adopted by staff and
research and development organizations, and as many as 10,000 diffi cult
problems have been discovered and resolved. Science and Technology
personnel have also completed more than 600 scientifi c research projects,
of which eight received fi rst, second, and third class commendations
as National Science and Technology Advancements, and 187 received
awards as Military Science and Technology Advancements. Some of the
research fi lled either military or national gaps.77
June 2003: In the course of innovation in military technology,
vigorously developing critical technological equipment with
independent intellectual property rights and strategic impact is
an endeavor to forge shashoujian of our army for informationized
warfare and to build our armyfs modern operational system
centering on informationization.78
These discussions about shashoujian weapons by no means
indicate or prove that China has a secret shashoujian weapons RD&A
program. However, it also cannot be proven that such a program does
not exist. The examples of PLA references to shashoujian weapons in
332
the context of military RD&A are provided to offer food for thought
and perhaps a starting point for further research to examine these
possibilities.

HOW MIGHT SHASHOUJIAN SATISFY CHINESE NATIONAL
DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS?

As the previous discussion has shown, shashoujian is an element
of Chinese strategic culture that infl uences military thinking and
preparations within the PLA. If it has been formalized as a PRC
state security program, shashoujian has signifi cant implications for
the Chinese national defense establishment and also U.S. national
security interests. The fi nal section of this chapter examines the
implications of the PRCfs shashoujian concept as it relates to 1)
Chinese views about modern warfare, 2) the PLAfs calculus for
military assessments, and 3) the PLAfs developmental efforts to cope
with inferiority.

A View of Warfare in the Early 21st Century\
Characteristics of Information Age Wars.

Chinese military scholars have dedicated great effort to study
the change in the requirements of warfare from the mechanizationfi
repower age to the information-fi repower era.79 As an example,
Major General Wang Baocun, a leading PLA scholar on military
strategy and an expert on information warfare, concluded in 1997 that
ten defi ning features will characterize warfare in the informationfi
repower era of the 21st century: 1) limited goals in confl icts;
2) wars of short duration; 3) less damage; 4) larger battlefi elds
and less density of troops; 5) transparency on the battlefi eld; 6)
intense struggle for information superiority; 7) unprecedented
force integration; 8) increased demands for command and control;
9) strategic objectives achieved through precision, not mass; and,
10) attacks on weaknesses, not strengths, of the enemyfs gcombat
system.h80
Interestingly, these characteristics represent strategic and
operational objectives, centers of gravity (key points of strength or
weakness), and opportunities for the PLA to seize the initiative in
333
confl ict. Wang advocated the consideration of these features for the
development of Chinese military strategy, warfi ghting methods,
and the PLAfs transformation process.
To be sure, it is diffi cult to know for certain whether General
Wangfs ideas have been accepted by Chinafs senior leaders.
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that such expert judgments
about future warfare can infl uence PRC military strategy, warfi ghting
methods, and the PLA modernization. General Wangfs judgments
may also help Chinafs national defense community establish
requirements that support strategy, policy, and the development of
shashoujian (weapons and tactics). In this sense, the characteristics of
future wars described by Wang (as well as those identifi ed by other
PLA scholars) can reveal hints or cues about the focus and direction
of Chinafs shashoujian programs for PLA watchers.
Shashoujian and Military Strategy\Using the Inferior to Defeat
the Superior.
Mao Zedong: Historically, . . . absolute superiority is present at the end,
but is rare at the beginning of a war or campaign.81
Deng Xiaoping: Even if we could modernize our military equipment in
the next 10 or 20 years, compared to our enemies, our weapons would
still be inferior. We are moving forward, but our enemies are not asleep
either. Therefore, by that time, if we have to fi ght, we will still be the
weak trying to defeat the strong.82
Jiang Zemin: At present, our armyfs modernization standard is still
incompatible with the need of fi ghting a modern war, this being a major
contradiction faced by our army building. . . . our army still lags behind
armed forces in developed countries in the West in terms of weapons and
equipment, intelligence and reconnaissance, telecommunications and
liaison, command and control, joint operations, logistics support and in
other basic fi elds as well.83
Hu Jintao: High-tech developments have greatly facilitated new
military changes in the world. . . . China must improve its research into
the change so as to constantly improve national defense and military
modernization.84
Hu Jintao: [China must]cachieve a leap-forward style of development
in defense and army modernization.85
334
PRC leaders have recognized that the PLA has trailed behind
foreign militaries in its ability to integrate science and technology
with weapons and equipment\and, in this context, that the PLA
is relatively inferior to advanced foreign militaries. For much of
Chinafs pre-revolutionary history, the same can be said to have been
true of Chinafs armies. Historically, Chinese forces emphasized and
depended upon superior (and asymmetric) strategies and tactics to
cope with the inferiority of weapons and equipment.86 This trend
continues today inside the PRC.87 The emphasis on superior strategy
and tactics is an important characteristic of Chinese strategic culture
and has a signifi cant impact upon Chinese military thinking, despite
the relatively recent (and certainly more visible) priority placed on
introducing advanced military hardware into the PLA.
Although Chinafs leading military strategists and scholars
recognize the relative inferiority of PLA weapons and hardware,
it is important to note that this acknowledgment is not consistent
with their judgments about Chinafs ability to prevail against a
superior military adversary in an information age war. In fact,
American academic reviews of Chinese military literature reveal
that Chinafs best-known military scholars calculate that the PLA
can prevail in an asymmetric confl ict against a superior military
under the right conditions, despite the shortcomings of Chinese
military hardware.88 For many American military strategists, this
inconsistency is illogical and confusing, but the assertion is, in fact,
quite logical and reconcilable from the Chinese perspective. Chinese
strategic culture, modes of thinking, and the concept of shashoujian
consistently support the Chinese belief that the inferior can defeat
the superior. The research of both Dr. Pillsbury and Lieutenant
Colonel Mark Stokes fi rst identifi ed the linkage between shashoujian
and the Chinese inferior-superior stratagem.89
Chinafs robust community of military scholars has been working
hard for more than a decade to study the new characteristics
of modern warfare amidst the period of the so-called gsixth
transformationh in military affairs. PLA scholars apply a holistic
approach to the assessment of military capabilities, potential, and
opportunities to seize initiative on the battlefi eld. This holistic view
often is complemented by disciplined application of dialectical and
relativistic reasoning. Using dialectical and relativistic approaches,
335
they judge the military strength, weakness, and capability of the
U.S. armed forces in comparison to those of the PLA. While rare
among U.S. military analysts, dialectical and relativistic thinking
is a defi ning characteristic of Chinese military science and strategic
thinking. This important intellectual difference is precisely what
enables PRC military scholars to rationalize (and believe in) the
ability of the inferior to defeat the superior. Ancient and modern
Chinese military literature is replete with examples of dialectical
and relativistic reasoning that seeks to demonstrate this ability.
This approach to military assessment is taught to offi cers at the
PLAfs NDU and refl ected in the scholarship of AMS researchers.
It is probably practiced by PLA forces in the fi eld during training
exercises.
In 1995, Major Yu Guangning, an assistant researcher at the AMS,
published an essay in a military journal that highlighted the historical
signifi cance of dialectical thinking through his examination of
differences between Chinese and Western approaches to geostrategic
thinking. He also identifi ed four major differences between Chinese
and Western geostrategic thinking:
Chinafs best known classical statesmen, strategists, diplomats, and
even philosophers all favored treating war-making might dialectically.
They had a whole set of dialectical war-making logic such as the weak
defeating the strong, the inferior winning out over the superior, a
standoff between weak and strong, and the conversion of weakness into
strength. . . . We always seek to keep our opponents from bringing their
might into full play, while strengthening ourselves through weakening
our opponents. . . . In Western military history, the strongest military
forces often do not win the fi nal victory. That is the case in the oft stated
gwinning the battle, but losing the war,h which is related to the Westfs
military thinking of controlling means and emphasizing might to the
neglect of winning the war.90
Yu concluded that Western geostrategic thinking is an expansive
grivalry for superiorityh with an emphasis on gtechnological might,h
while Chinafs thinking values gbalanceh and stresses the importance
of gstrategy.h The impact of Chinafs traditional use of dialectical and
relativistic thinking on matters of state is unmistakable in the writing
of this PLA scholar.
336
The impact of Chinafs historical traditions and practices are
also visible in PLA scholarly writings. Two PLA senior colonels
highlighted these characteristics in their discussion about seizing
combat initiative and using relative strengths against a superior
enemyfs points of weakness.
It is natural that the core idea of our armyfs operational doctrine for hightech
conditions is deeply rooted in our armyfs rich operational traditions.
An overview of our armyfs war history shows that, in most cases, our
army was inferior to its enemies in terms of the overall strength and
the quality of weapons and equipment. Apart from political factors, the
main reason our army managed to defeat time and time again its strong
enemies, Chinese or foreign, was because our army had reached higher
standards in the art of war and operational guidance.91
Using a holistic approach and dialectical thinking, many PLA
scholars assess military strengths and weaknesses with a focus
on the grelative.h In an example that is characteristic in Chinese
military literature, Colonel Yu Guohua, a lecturer at the PLA NDU,
demonstrated the PLAfs consideration of the grelativeh in its military
assessment methodology, arguing that:
. . . the relative nature of our enemyfs strength and our own weakness is
manifest in the fact that although the other side may be strong, they are
not strong in all things; they have some weaknesses, and our side may be
weak, but we are not weak in all things; we have some strength.92
Yufs essay also showed the signifi cant infl uence of Chinese history
and tradition on assessments of strength and weakness. In his
paper, he recommended that the PLA turn weakness into strength
through the use of classic stratagems: undermine the righteousness
of the enemyfs cause, sow discord, create confusion in the enemyfs
communications, cause the enemy to deplete war materials without
achieving objectives, and target weaknesses (not the strengths) of the
enemyfs war apparatus (systems, equipment, and weapons). In his
essay, Yu anticipated what might be a common foreign criticism of
his arguments and approach to reasoning\such as gCan examples
of the inferior defeating the superior be identifi ed in the case of a
modern, local high-tech war?h Yufs answer seems astonishingly
simplistic:
337
. . . so far, among the local high-tech wars that have occurred, there has
never been an actual case of the weak defeating the strong or the inferior
defeating the superior. There are two main reasons: One, the history
of high-tech local war is relatively short; we have not seen all of its
forms and shapes yet. Second, the high-tech local wars so far have been
unique.93
Another example of the PLAfs use of a holistic approach to
military assessments, which included a reference to shashoujian,
appeared in a May 2000 newspaper article. According to the article,
in 1999 the PLA NDU established a Center for the Study of Military
Operations against Taiwan.94 Since then, this Center has conducted
in-depth studies of tactics, campaigns, and other subjects and drawn
lessons from the limited wars of the late 1990s, including the confl icts
in Kosovo and Chechnya. The fi ndings from the Centerfs work were
forwarded to the CMC and PLA General Staff Department for
consideration. Later, in April 2002, the PLA General Staff sponsored
an all-army conference to hear an exchange of views among PLA
scholars on campaigns and tactics for operations against Taiwan.95
An authoritative source from the PLA conference argued that some
foreign methodologies for military assessments are incorrect because
they are not holistic and fail to appreciate the virtue of dialectical
and relativistic reasoning:
The foreign assessment that currently China does not have the ability
to invade Taiwan is not correct . . . In comparing military strengths, not
only the extent of modernization of onefs weaponry, but also the use of
tactics, onefs mastery of weaponry, and the morale of the troops must
be included. When all the factors, including a certain degree of U.S.
involvement, are considered, the PLA can win the war without any
doubt. Besides, the PLA has a shashoujian unknown to outsiders.96
While Chinafs military scholars approach military assessments
holistically, employ dialectical and relativistic thinking, and often
arrive at judgments favorable to the PLA, most Chinese military
scholars also emphasize the PLAfs need to make up for having less
(in terms of technology, weapons, and equipment, etc.). It is here
that the Maoist philosophy (the value of man over material) comes
into play. Increasingly, PLA scholars seem to straddle the issue and
highlight the virtues of both sides. Their judgments often lead to
338
three common recommendations. First, the PLA must continue to
study and apply Chinafs rich tradition of superior strategy and art
of warfare. Second, the PLA must progress rapidly in developing
science and technology and in integrating advanced technology with
the PLAfs weapons and equipment. Third is a defense or validation
of the ginferior can defeat the superiorh stratagem. Quotations from
the writings of three Chinese military scholars demonstrate a range
of views within the PLA.
Reverse the Balance of Combat Strength with Superior Strategy.
Western countries have made rapid progress in science and technology
in modern and contemporary times. They enjoy an obvious scientifi c
and technological superiority in wars. In order to win a victory in their
wars for national liberation or war against aggression, some developing
countries naturally have to count on their traditional superiority in the
use of strategy for making-up for their technological weakness. This
indicates that the use of strategy can reverse the balance of combat
strength despite the varying technological standards of weapons and
equipment.97

Employ Deadly Weapons.

We need to change our traditional way of thinking that we can win
against superior forces by stressing tactics, but even more so by having
shashoujian weapons.98
Develop New Equipment While Carrying Forward Tradition.
. . . we should speed-up the development of equipment for reconnaissance
and early warning, the automation of air defense command and
electronic warfare, and of shashoujian weapons for hard destruction
of the enemy, to narrow the technology gap between ourselves and
powerful enemies. While developing new technology, we should also
pay close attention to drawing sustenance from our national culture, and
inheriting and carrying forward our armyfs tradition in being skilled at
applying strategy, that is, as experts say: gLet thought and technology
soar together.h99
The concept of shashoujian is attractive to the PLAfs warfi ghters
and intellectuals regardless of whether they represent the PLAfs gold
339
guardh or its gyoung turks.h Shashoujian is also appealing to Chinafs
senior leaders who seek to motivate, professionalize, and modernize
the PLA. Because it blends the traditional with the modern, the
shashoujian concept does not threaten Chinafs legacy philosophy and
doctrine, but it does allow an exciting way forward for the Chinese
military in an uncertain period of transformation. For the PLA, in
terms of military strategy, the shashoujian concept effectively bridges
the divide between the past and the future.
Shashoujian and PLA Operational Art.
There has been a great deal of discussion in PLA literature about
how and when weapons and tactics (including shashoujian) should be
optimally employed against superior adversaries to achieve military
objectives. Pillsbury discussed several of these gemployment
conceptsh in his November 2001 report for the U.S. China Economic
and Security Commission.100 Five specifi c methods are common in
Chinese military writings: 1) identify and exploit weaknesses, 2)
seize initiative through surprise, 3) employ extraordinary means, 4)
attack vulnerabilities (key points/at certain moments), and 5) ensure
survivability and counter-strike capability.
Identify and Exploit Weakness. According to Pillsbury, the Chinese
believe that the successful employment of shashoujian against a
superior adversary requires good intelligence and assessments
of the adversaryfs strategy, tactics, weapons, platforms, and
systems.101 This is necessary to identify the centers of gravity
(weaknesses) within the enemyfs military structure. Once strengths
and weaknesses have been identifi ed and assessed, the strengths
can be avoided, and the weaknesses (particularly key nodes) can
be targeted for attack using shashoujian (weapons and methods). In
1996, a passage from a Zhongguo Junshi Kexue essay highlighted the
need to correctly identify and fatally attack structural weaknesses
(key nodes supporting military operations) while avoiding enemy
strengths. Notably, the recommendation to focus on striking
weaknesses is complemented by recommendations to employ other
shashoujian methods, including surprise and precision targeting.
. . . in operations under high-tech conditions, we must not only focus
on annihilating the enemyfs combat effectiveness, but we must, fi rst of
340
all, pay attention to and place stress on striking nodes of the enemyfs
operational structure. With regard to operational guidance, we must try
our best to fi nd out in good time the structural weaknesses of the enemyfs
operational system, including the essential weak links of the enemyfs
whole national infrastructure which supports the enemyfs operations;
then we can use precision guided weapons, deep striking forces, and
special operational forces to swiftly bypass the enemyfs strong nodes,
skillfully direct our fi repower to enemyfs weak links, and give it a fatal
strike. . . . It is necessary to realize the combination of mobility with
fi repower and shock attack at a higher level, and concentrate operational
effectiveness in a decisive time and at a decisive place to attack decisive
spots and to strike at the enemyfs critical part.102
In 1999, the Lanzhou Military Region Headquarters conducted
studies of glocal wars of the 1990s.h A Jiefangjun Bao editorial about
the study effort made some revealing comments concerning the
PLAfs needs and requirements for shashoujian, calling for
. . . prioritizing and slanting our manpower and fi nancial resources
in an effort to develop a few world-class and directed shashoujian for
an extreme deterrent against a strong enemy. . . . We need to intensify
our asymmetrical combat preparations aimed at enemy weak points.
We need to counter enemy asymmetrical weapons with our own
asymmetrical countermeasures. A strong enemy with absolute
superiority is certainly not without weakness that can be exploited
by a weaker side that fi nds the weakness of the stronger one and [at
the same time] striking larger weaknesses with smaller strengths . .
. [we need to be] able to take a certain initiative by making a small
move that would affect the overall situation. So our military combat
preparations need to be more directly aimed at fi nding tactics to
exploit the weaknesses of a strong enemy.103
Seize Initiative Through Surprise. For the Chinese, operational
surprise is an essential condition for an inferior force to seize initiative
and achieve victory in combat against a superior adversary. It is fi rst
necessary to keep secret some shashoujian weapons and tactics (others
are made known for the purpose of deterrence) and to prevent an
adversary from knowing the ways and means of shashoujian strikes.
To maximize the effect of such strikes the PLA will also engage an
adversary in conditions when attacks are not expected. In these
circumstances, the PLAfs combat effectiveness can also benefi t from
the shock effect of shashoujian strikes. Inversely, infl icted damage
341
and the shock effect of shashoujian strikes severely impact the ability
of the adversary to observe, orient, decide, and act. In this sense,
surprise also delays and degrades the combat effectiveness of the
superior adversary.
. . . we should not fi ght with the enemy in a way anticipated by the
enemy, in a time and in a place that the enemy are expecting. Only in this
way will we be able to change inferiority into superiority, and passivity
to activity, and thus win the initiative in conducting operations.104
Employ Extraordinary Means. Chinese military operations
researchers believe that the use of secret, deceptive, or otherwise
unorthodox methods (stratagems, doctrines, tactics, techniques, and
procedures) that are unknown to an adversary can signifi cantly aid the
employment of shashoujian weapons. The use of such extraordinary
means for attacks with conventional, nuclear, and shashoujian
weapons can transform weakness into strength by generating
shock and inducing chaos and paralysis in the forces of a superior
adversary. In this context, tactical surprise (the use of unorthodox
and/or unanticipated methods) is distinctly different from strategic
surprise (in the context of time, location and conditions). Both forms
of surprise are typically viewed by PLA operations researchers as
force multipliers.
The key principle of the stratagem of prevailing over the enemy with
extraordinary means is that it is necessary, on the basis of having technical
shashoujian [methods] to make surprising uses of such weapons when the
opponent is not psychologically or materially prepared at all.105
Everyone knows that shashoujian weapons can be used surprisingly
effectively at a certain time, place and under certain conditions, but these
shashoujian weapons in turn require rational combinations with other
weapons.106
Attack Vulnerabilities. In 2001, a PLA researcher examined two
U.S. military operational incidents in an effort to identify lessons of
value for military tactics development. The researcher highlighted
the ggray critical statesh (what other Chinese military scholars have
called gdefi nite blind spotsh or gdead zonesh107) of two U.S. military
platforms: the U.S. Marine Corpsf MV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft and
342
the USS Kittyhawk aircraft carrier.108 In December 2000, an MV-22
crashed during a night training mission. The cause of the crash was
investigated and found to be the result of a rapid vertical descent that
created unstable airfl ow. This occurred in the aircraftfs transition
from horizontal to vertical fl ight. In another instance, in October
2000, USS Kittyhawk was participating in a joint military exercise
with elements of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces and
conducting underway replenishment operations when two Russian
Sukhoi-27 fi ghter aircraft overfl ew the deck of the carrier at very low
altitude. The PLA operations researcher concluded that:
The crash of the tilt-rotor craft MV-22 Osprey and the penetration into the
USS Kittyhawk aircraft carrierfs defense zone have shown that dangerous
critical gray states exist in both high-tech weaponry systems and modern
joint combat operation processes. We ought to earnestly study it [critical
gray states] to get to the heart of the problem and discover measures
to deal with this problem. Only by doing so can we transform this
contradiction into something benefi cial to us and enable us to defeat the
enemy.109
Coping with U.S. aircraft carriers is a common topic of
examination by Chinese military analysts. Dr. Pillsbury was among
the fi rst to identify the specifi c interest of PLA operations researchers
in determining the vulnerability of U.S. aircraft carriers.110 A number
of articles explore strategies and tactics that Chinese military
researchers believe might permit the PLA to effectively deter,
deny, or destroy an aircraft carrier.111 A 2001 Junshi Wenzhai article
highlighted the use of combined attacks that employ asymmetric
measures such as: gsea mine emplacement, timely jamming, and
electronic confusion, submarine ambush, focused surprise attack
with guided missiles, and [other] raids which take the enemy by
surprise.h112 In 2002, another article highlighted fi ve shashoujian
weapons that could be successfully employed in operations against
U.S. aircraft carriers:
. . . the aircraft carrier has an immense body like an island, leaving it
basically no hiding ground on the vast seas, and no way to evade enemy
reconnaissance and tracking. Aircraft, submarines, anti-ship missiles,
torpedoes, and mines are the fi ve major killers the aircraft carrier must
face.113
343
The article highlighted the utility of advanced mines, citing their
unanticipated effectiveness against the U.S. Navy during Operation
DESERT STORM when USS Tripoli and USS Princeton suffered
signifi cant damage from mine explosions.
These examples are characteristic of many contained in Chinese
military writings. They serve as clear indicators that PLA analysts are
carefully studying the operational vulnerabilities of U.S. weapons,
platforms, and military systems. The identifi cation and discussions
about the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the U.S. armed forces
reveal a key part of PLAfs systematic effort to develop operational
methods to counter technologically superior adversaries in a future
war.114
Ensure Survivability and Counter-Strike Capability. The Chinese
believe that shashoujian (in the context of weapons, platforms,
systems, and methods) must remain denied to intelligence
collection, both before and after use in combat, to ensure the
effectiveness of strikes as well as the survivability of shashoujian
units and equipment. Deception, concealment, and mobility all
help to avert the opportunity to mitigate against shashoujian strikes.
These practices also minimize the likelihood of surprise (effective
preemptive attacks) against shashoujian units and equipment. For the
Chinese, shashoujian forces must serve as a credible deterrent and an
effective tool in preemption, but must also be able to survive initial
attacks by a superior adversary to ensure the PLAfs ability to achieve
victory through devastating counterstrikes.
. . . we must guarantee that our strategic units still have nuclear
counterattack and retaliation strengths even after receiving several
attacks. China has already formed a network of strategic nuclear
weapons using land-based fi ring (from deep wells and underground
tunnels), mobile fi ring (from strategic highways and exclusive railway
lines), and sea fi ring (from nuclear submarines).115
The strategic missile nuclear submarine is the shashoujian of the
Chinese navy. It is characterized by a large cruising radius, broad
operations area, good stealthiness, strong mobility, and high speed.
In coming wars against aggression, a nuclear submarine will be a
mobile and stealthy missile base, striking after the enemy has struck,
to make a surgical fatal blow against an enemy.116
344

Effects of Shashoujian Strikes.

In addition to PLA discussions about methods, Chinese military
scholars also frequently discuss the effects of shashoujian strikes.
These effects include: deterrence, decapitation, blinding, paralysis,
and disintegration.
Deterrence. According to Chinafs ancient strategists, the best
military leader wins his objectives without resorting to warfare.
This virtue is still respected and practiced in the PRC today and
directs emphasis on psychology (through strategy, deterrence, and
negotiation) over armed confl ict.117 Most Chinese military writing
on shashoujian weapons includes discussion of psychological
warfare and the requirement for credible deterrence. Frequently,
PLA scholars characterize Chinafs strategic missile forces -including
the PLAfs Second Artillery Corps and, increasingly, the PLA Navyfs
strategic submarine fl eet\as shashoujian forces.118 It is, therefore,
apparent that China regards its nuclear forces as shashoujian because
of their psychological deterring effect and overwhelming destructive
power. The missions and methods of both the Second Artillery Corps
and the PLAN strategic submarine fl eet include requirements for
survivability and counter-strike capability.119 Moreover, PRC leaders
judge these elements of the PLA to possess the ability to decapitate,
paralyze, disintegrate, and blind (e.g., through electromagnetic
pulse) the most powerful adversary that China might face in confl ict.
This belief is the basis for Chinafs declared deterrence strategy and
nuclear weapons program.
Appropriately developing the military deterrent threat force required by
an active defense policy, such as a limited and effective nuclear force, and
constantly developing air force, space forces, elite armed forces, and the
overall peoplefs war waging capability, we will possess a shashoujian that
will leave the enemy trembling; this is the basis of Chinafs intimidation
psychological war.120
Despite the focus of this quotation on nuclear weapons, it is
important to reiterate the earlier point that PLA scholars value the
signifi cant deterring power of conventional shashoujian weaponry.121
As previously discussed, Chinese military researchers conclude that
mobile ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, sea mines, and torpedoes all
345
serve as means to deter U.S. air and naval forces from entering into
a military engagement with the PLA.
Decapitation. In the traditional sense, the defeat of an adversary
by a single fatal strike or gdeath blowh is the intended outcome
of a shashoujian strike. Ideally, such a strike is executed with
foreknowledge. It comes deceptively and swiftly, and without any
perceptible indication or warning to alert the enemy. If employed
perfectly, a shashoujian strike kills the adversary instantly, without
the victim ever seeing it coming. The grim result is fi nal and
irreversible. In a discussion about the PRC nuclear weapons policy
one PRC analyst said,
Enlightened by the Iraq war, in waging war against Taiwan in the future,
the PLA is considering applying gdecapitation actionh against the leading
elements of Taiwan independence, together with precision lightning
strikes on Taiwanfs major military, economic, and political targets.122
Blinding, Paralysis, and Disintegration. As in martial arts (specifi cally
quanfa) and the medicinal practice of acupuncture, pressure point
warfare against key nodes is intended to have debilitating systemic
effects within a military structure or organization. PLA strategists
often discuss the importance of conducting shashoujian strikes on
critical infrastructure that supports military operations. Some targets
frequently identifi ed by Chinese military scholars include command
and control centers and networks, early warning and intelligence
systems, remote sensing platforms (specifi cally unmanned aerial
vehicles and reconnaissance satellites), and military logistics systems.
PLA scholars view these systems as operational dependencies\the
relative weaknesses of a superior enemy\and as more vulnerable
to attack than the relative strengths (weapons and platforms)
of a superior adversary. Effective shashoujian strikes on the key
nodes of a superior adversary can cause paralysis and initiate the
disintegration of a superior force. In the minds of Chinese operational
research experts, these effects can enable the inferior to overcome the
superior by transforming the PLAfs weakness into strength and the
adversaryfs strength into weakness. In an authoritative PLA NDU
document, two editors highlighted the importance of gvital pointsh
attacks on military systems to achieve gblinding, paralyzing, and
lethalh effects.
346
Attacks on vital points in the enemyfs systems should take as their main
targets three basic links in the enemyfs information systems; namely,
sources from which the enemy probes for information, information
channels, and information processing centers. The sources from which
the enemy probes for information are the geyes and earsh of the enemyfs
combat operations system. The information channels are the systemfs
gnerve centers,h and the information processing centers are its gbrains
and heart.h It is not diffi cult to see that these three basic links are key
links, which assure that an information system, and even an entire
system of combat operations, can operate normally. Attacks on these
three basic links in an enemyfs information systems should be part of a
single, coordinated whole. Through gblinding, paralyzing, and lethalh
actions against the enemyfs combat operations system, these attacks
create conditions favorable for decisive combat. . . . By striking directly
at the gbrains, heart, and nerve centersh of the enemyfs systems, this
method paralyzes powerful troop formations and makes them collapse
without being attacked.123
In another essay, two PLA senior colonels explained the
importance of dominance across the electromagnetic spectrum to
create chaos for an adversary in modern warfare. They characterized
electronic warfare as an gintangible power on the modern
battlefi eld.h
Electronic warfare has obscured the demarcation line that marks the
beginning of an engagement and [EW] has become an intangible power
on the modern battlefi eld. Whichever side loses in an electronic war will
be reduced to blind and deaf, so its weapons will be disabled, and it
will lose its initiative in battle or a campaign or even a whole strategic
situation.124
PLA Major General Dai Qingmin has discussed the critical role
of information warfare as an element of electronic warfare to deny
critical information to an adversary.
Integrated network-electronic warfare uses electronic warfare to disrupt
the opponentfs acquisition and forwarding of information. It uses
computer network warfare to disrupt the opponentfs processing and
use of information. And it makes integrated use of electronic warfare
and computer network warfare to form up overall, combined power to
paralyze an opponentfs information systems.125
347
In an interview about U.S. dominance of the electromagnetic
spectrum in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Dai observed:
. . . the United States used the space-based strategic-class reconnaissance
advanced warning and positioning system with very high resolution,
Airborne Warning and Control System planes, unmanned aircraft, other
campaign-class information systems, all types of sensors and other
tactical-class information systems to conduct round-the-clock continuous
reconnaissance on Iraq, and provide real-time information about the
targets to U.S. and British special forces and ground forces, thereby
considerably raising the hit rate. To the U.S. troops, the battleground was
gcrystal clear,h and the battle situation was gin full view.h But because
the other side did not have complete reconnaissance positioning system
of all classes, it could not see clearly and even was completely blind
about what the other side was doing; to them, the battleground was
gshroudedh with heavy gbattle fog.h126
From a defensive perspective, several strategies to minimize
the impact of an adversaryfs high-technology advantage in warfare
were proposed by Sun Zian in 1995. This scholar identifi ed the
following as key areas for PLA strategy development: employing
long-range interception weapons, maintaining communications
during warfare, maintaining secrecy, exploiting intelligence derived
from commercial channels, conducting saturation ballistic missile
strikes against key nodes, ensuring camoufl age and dispersal of
equipment, deceiving the enemy with false targets, jamming enemy
targeting systems, and enhancing the mobility of existing weapons.
He also noted that other factors can minimize an enemyfs high-tech
advantage, including seasonal and weather factors and terrain.127
In summary, shashoujian is an important concept for the Chinese
military because it impacts thinking on military strategy, weapons
acquisition programs, and also the PLAfs warfi ghting methods. The
stratagem that the ginferiorh can overcome or defeat gthe superiorh
is a separate concept that is also an important element of Chinese
strategic culture. However, the two concepts are linked because
shashoujian (weapons and tactics) make valuable contributions to
support the stratagem (as shashoujian can serve as both the ways and
the means by which an inferior military can defeat a more powerful
military). However, it is important to emphasize that, for China, the
question is not whether the weak can overcome the strong, but how.
348
This seems the critical question being considered by contemporary
Chinese military strategists and PLA analysts of foreign military
capabilities. For the Chinese, shashoujian is not necessarily a gsilver
bulleth that automatically brings victory in warfare. The Chinese
seem to believe that shashoujian will assure victory against a superior
adversary only if used appropriately, in the context of the correct
strategy, under the proper conditions, and at optimal moments. The
Chinese also recognize that superior adversaries can also possess
and employ shashoujian weapons and tactics that can force a weaker
enemy to capitulate, as the U.S. armed forces have done on two
separate occasions in wars against Iraq.

CONCLUSIONS

Chinafs history and traditions profoundly infl uence the thinking
of Chinafs leaders and senior military offi cers. Ancient Chinese
history, as well as more recent experiences and observations, are
guiding internal PLA debates about strategy, methods, and the
development of new weapons and military equipment. In these
debates, Chinafs military scholars are also reexamining philosophical
issues, such as Mao Zedongfs emphasis upon the relative value of
strategy and methods (man) versus new weapons, platforms, and
systems (material). Practical matters, such as the applicability of
traditional approaches versus the modern methods and others, are
also being considered by scholars, particularly at the AMS and the
PLA NDU.
For China, the initial years of the 21st century will serve as
an interesting and appropriate period of refl ection, examination,
reexamination, and experimentation where old and new ideas
compete\and sometimes mix\to drive the development of the PLA.
Such is the case for shashoujian as it relates to PRC military strategy,
methods (doctrine), and the PLAfs transformation campaign. While
Chinafs leaders seek to rapidly improve both the PLAfs warfi ghting
methods and the quality of weapons and equipment through
resource reallocations and the acquisition of shashoujian (weapons),
PRC military strategy will likely remain asymmetric vis-a-vis the
United States. Chinafs long tradition of minimizing the relative
superiority of adversaries while employing effective stratagems and
349
tactics will also endure. The PLAfs transformation is underway, but
it will take time. The infl uence of ancient Chinese military concepts
and stratagems will likely remain strong within the PLA throughout
this transformation. In the minds of Chinafs military strategists
and, increasingly, of the PRC leadership, the shashoujian concept is
not only compatible, but also potentially catalytic for current and
emerging military strategy and for the PRCfs ambition to develop
new capabilities to credibly deter, and if necessary defeat, military
superpowers. At a minimum, shashoujian serves as a function to help
Chinese military offi cials prioritize a select set of military programs
for special funding and rapid development to guide Chinafs military
modernization program.
Shashoujian holds signifi cance for Chinese military affairs,
strategic culture, and military preparations. A spike in the usage of
the term by PLA scholars in the mid-1990s indicates that shashoujian
was an element or outgrowth of the PLAfs post-DESERT STORM
debates over military strategy. In 1995, references to shashoujian
began appearing in Chinafs most authoritative military journal,
Zhongguo Junshi Kexue. By 1997, numerous references to and
indications of PLA discussions about shashoujian appeared in
other signifi cant PRC military journals and in PLA newspapers,
particularly in Jiefangjun Bao. From 1996 to 1998, Chinafs senior
military offi cers, including PRC military region commanders and
PLA service chiefs, wrote a series of PLA articles about shashoujian. In
1998, PRC Defense Minister Major General Chi Haotian said publicly
that President Jiang Zemin had advanced a new line of thinking on
military modernization and had specifi cally called out the need for
shashoujian. During the same year, Chinafs military RD&A system
began to implement an unprecedented reform that included the
restructuring of COSTIND and the establishment of the PLAfs GAD.
From 1999 to 2000, several of Chinafs most prominent senior leaders
and military offi cers undertook a campaign of speeches about
military preparations that included slogans calling upon the PLA to
develop shashoujian (weapons and tactics). By the summer and fall
of 2000, several Chinese newspapers reported that Jiang Zemin had
ordered the creation of the 998 State Security Project, a secret project
to develop shashoujian. And, fi nally, in 2002 Jiang Zemin advocated
a gtransformationh with shashoujian weapons for the PLA.
350
During this remarkable period, the shashoujian concept appeared
to be a response to changes in military strategy. It also infl uenced
PRC leadership decisions about reform within the PLA, military
transformation, plans for the development of new weapons, and
tactics tailored for asymmetric warfare.
Despite the traceable chronology of events over a period of 5
years and the relevance of the shashoujian concept to the classic
stratagem of govercoming the superior with the inferior,h there has
been surprisingly limited study of shashoujian in the United States.
With the exception of Pillsburyfs groundbreaking discoveries, the
PLAfs unusual focus on shashoujian has gone largely unnoticed and
uninvestigated by the American PLA-watching community. Perhaps
a more comprehensive examination of open source materials from
and on the Chinese military is necessary.
At present, due to resource limitations and prioritization, the
U.S. Government directs FBIS translation of only selected articles
from Jiefangjun Bao, with virtually no full-text translations of other
PLA (military region or PLA service) newspapers, military journals,
or books specifi c to Chinese military affairs.128 Absent the specifi c
direction and resources from various U.S. Government communities
of interest\to shift the emphasis of FBIS translation work to perform
these tasks\FBIS was quite understandably unable to recognize
the signifi cance of shashoujian\that shashoujian is more than a mere
idiom or metaphor for those discussing it within Chinafs national
defense establishment.
For U.S. policymakers, analysts, and academics, routine and
comprehensive coverage and translation of publicly available
Chinese military literature is important for several reasons. First,
an increasing amount of published information is becoming
available from authoritative Chinese military sources, including
the AMS, the PLA NDU, and other military research institutions.
Importantly, these documents appear to be precisely where new
ideas, theories, and concepts are initially raised within the PLA.
Moreover, the reporting in Chinese military newspapers, such as
the popular Jiefangjun Bao, tends to lag from 6 to 12 months behind
the appearance of key issues in the PLAfs more prominent military
journals and full-length books.
351
Second, surprising as it may seem, few American PLA watchers
can read Chinese well enough to perform primary source research
or are trained with machine language translation and other tools.
They remain largely dependent upon Chinese military literature
in translation. Third, failure to keep up with developments
in the Chinese national defense establishment by exploiting
primary sources (especially PRC military journals and books) can
prevent identifi cation of key indicators of change\or warning of
developments that are of interest to U.S. policymakers. In a worst
case scenario, the failure to monitor Chinese military literature could
be a contributing factor in a future miscalculation or intelligence
failure.
While the United States and China both conduct military
assessments of their own and each otherfs armed forces and
military operations, they reach starkly contrasting conclusions.129
In a cautionary 1996 report for the Department of Defense Offi ce
of Net Assessments, Pillsbury wrote of PRC judgments about U.S.
military strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities, concluding that
these judgments could lead to gdangerous misperceptionsh with
potentially catastrophic consequences.130 An example of such a
gdangerous misperceptionh is found in a PLA judgment made about
the performance of the Yugoslav army during NATOfs ALLIED
FORCE operation in Bosnia, which stated that
From the outstanding performance of the Yugoslav army in resisting
NATO airstrikes, we can see that there are great prospects for overcoming
a superior enemy with an inferior force in a high-tech war.131
While the deception and denial campaign of the Yugoslav army
may have been effective against NATO air forces, it seems a leap for
the PLA military scholar to conclude that the Yugoslav army was
successful in overcoming NATOfs superior forces.
The contrast between U.S. and PRC assessments and judgments
is troubling because these views can lead either nation toward
miscalculation and possibly military disaster. It is dangerous for
Chinafs leaders to believe that the PLA can prevent a confl ict or
prevail in a military campaign against a superpower such as the
United States with gsuperior strategy,h despite the generational
352
gaps between the United States and China in hardware and in the
integration of science and technology with military equipment. The
notion that Chinafs leadership could decide to order a shashoujianequipped
PLA into what would almost certainly be a disastrous
confl ict with the United States is, indeed, very troubling.
These grim possibilities are the fundamental reasons why PLA
watchers must consider dozens of new research questions concerning
the implications of shashoujian for PLA organizational reform,
warfi ghting capability and readiness, and PLA professionalization.
In addition, researchers should carefully study the impact of the
shashoujian concept on strategic issues, including Chinese negotiation
strategy, PRC deterrence and military coercion theory, Chinafs
propensity to use force for confl ict resolution, and escalation issues.
When considered in the context of current Chinese threat
perceptions concerning the United States, PRC assessments of
PRC and U.S. military capabilities and vulnerabilities, and the
potential for miscalculation, the shashoujian concept and weapons
development programs hold disturbing implications for American
defense strategy and military operations in the Asia-Pacifi c region.
Shashoujian is a concept that merits watching as it continues to
be incorporated into the lexicon, weapons acquisition plans, and
practices of the PLA.
Can China successfully develop and use shashoujian to enhance
its position as an inferior military force? On the one hand, it can
be argued that leaders within the PLA think so and will persevere
to achieve these objectives. It is also evident that increasingly
sophisticated research is being performed and published at the
AMS. Similarly, the PLA offi cer corps is becoming more professional
as a result of improvements in PRC and PLA education programs.
Operational training of PLA offi cers and enlisted personnel is also
more realistic and challenging than in the past. On the other hand,
Chinafs military is rising from a low base of professionalism and
capability, and has few discernible areas of world-class excellence.
China has also had a long history of military inferiority and has
traditionally trailed the worldfs leading militaries in the development
and integration of cutting-edge military hardware. The PRC defense
industrial base, although reforming, remains a complex, corrupt, and
ineffi cient network of organizations where personal relationships
353
continue to heavily infl uence important investment decisions and
outcomes. Thus, the outlook for the PLAfs successful development
and employment of shashoujian is uncertain.
Dr. Larry Wortzel, a former U.S. Army attache to China and
long-time scholar of the Chinese military, examined a similar set of
questions in a 1998 essay titled gChinese Military Potential.h132 In
his essay, he asked and answered the question, gCan the Chinese
[PLA] get it all together? . . . The short answer is probably not.h
But Wortzel added an important caveat in the form of a case study:
another possible scenario. He noted that in 1984 Zhang Ruimin took
over Chinafs leading producer of home appliances, the collectively
owned and failing Haier Group, and by 1989 had turned the failing
collective into one of Chinafs most successful companies. Zhang
incorporated world-class gbest practicesh in leadership, management,
and production; established an effective quality control system;
dealt out incentives and penalties to govern employee performance;
and enhanced the companyfs systems engineering and integration
capabilities. Wortzel concluded that if the PLA could similarly
attract and properly assign individuals with these talents, then the
PLA could achieve its military potential\as Wortzel claims the PLA
has already done for its M-class missile programs, as well as its sea
and air launched cruise missile programs.
Whether the PLA can develop and effectively use shashoujian is
perhaps less important than whether Chinafs senior leaders believe
in the possibility, and whether the PLA would attempt to defeat the
superior with the inferior, plus a few gassassinfs maces.h
Senior American policymakers should concern themselves with
and watch out for the following elements or combinations of elements
to counter shashoujian and the stratagem of the ability of an ginferior
defeating the superiorh: 1) the possibility of China presenting a
military operational concept that takes the United States by surprise,
2) weapons systems and infrastructure that can enable the PLA to
implement the operational concept, and/or 3) a strategic or tactical
context in which the successful use of this operational concept is
decisive.
This chapter is an effort to address these important issues.
However, these and many other questions about shashoujian and
its impact on the PLA merit serious attention and dedicated study
354
by PLA watchers in academia and government. It is hoped that this
research will complement a larger foundation of existing work\
upon which to build a stronger, more robust base of knowledge.

CHAPTER 10 - ENDNOTES

1. Dr. David Shambaugh has led other efforts to encourage greater collection
and sharing of Chinese military literature by the academic community and the
U.S. Government, in part by establishing the Chinese Documents Center, a library
of Chinese military publications at The George Washington Universityfs Gelman
Library.
2. Conversation with Mr. Jeffrey Dyrek, FBIS Customer Service Offi ce, August
21, 2003.
3. Some FBIS interpretations include: assassinfs mace, decisive weapons,
killer mace, killing mace, killing sword, killer weapons, leap ahead weapon, leap
forward weapon, magic weapon, new type weapons, powerful weapons, silver
bullets, sure-to-win striking power, trump card weapons, and vital acupuncture
point weapons.
4. Chinese Global Language and Cultural Center Online: http://edu.ocac.gov.tw/
taiwan/kungfu/e/5123-3.htm.
5. See Michael Pillsbury, Dangerous Chinese Misperceptions: The Implications for
DoD, prepared for the Offi ce of Net Assessment, Washington, DC, 1996; Michael
Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future Warfare, Washington, DC: National Defense
University Press, 1997; Mark Stokes, Chinafs Strategic Modernization: Implications for
the United States, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies
Institute, 1999; Alistair Iain Johnston, gToward Contextualizing the Concept of
a Shashoujian (Assassinfs Mace),h unpublished manuscript, August 2002; Dennis
Blasko, gPLA Ground Forces Lessons Learned: Experience and Theory,h Laurie
Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, and Larry M. Wortzel, eds., The Lessons of History: The
Chinese Peoplefs Liberation Army at 75, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War
College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003, pp. 61-89.
6. Discussion with Michael Pillsbury in August 2003. Also see gSecurity
Issues: Strategic Perceptions.h
7. See gThe History of Kung Fuh at http://www.prodigymartialarts.com/wing_
chun.htm.
8. This paragraph draws from Chinese Global Language and Cultural Center
Online.
355
9. Yang Zhibo, gAn Attempt at Analysis of Sashoujian,h Kongjun Bao, May
16, 2002 [sashoujian has a slightly different meaning than shashoujian: sa implies a
gsudden thrusth of a hand mace].
10. Anonymous explanation posted at http://army.tom.com, September 29,
2000.
11. Posting by Kadey, www.redfox88.com/w090htm (originally carried on
Zhonghua Wang Luntan [China Network Forum]), August 2, 2002.
12. Michael Pillsbury, Chinafs Military Strategy Toward the U.S.: A View from
Open Sources, November 2, 2001, http://www.uscc.gov/beseanchieports/200_2003/
pdfs/strat.pdf, p. 16. Also see Johnston, gToward Contextualizing the Concept of a
Shashoujian.
13. Johnston, gToward Contextualizing the Concept of a Shashoujian, p. 1.
14. Dong Wenxian, gDiplomatic Success Comes From the Sky\Analyzing U.S.
Troopsf Military Deterrent During the Iraqi Arms Inspection Crisis,h Jiefangjun
Bao, April 14, 1998, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter
FBIS).
15. A term coined by Dr. Dore Levy of Brown University, author of gVignettism
in Chinese Poetics,h in a paper presented at the Association of Asian Studies,
Washington, DC, April 4-7, 2002. Abstract available at http://www.aasianst.org/
absts/2002abst/China/sessions.htm#138. I am grateful to Dr. Michael Pillsbury for
highlighting the importance of gvignettismh as it pertains to Chinese military
history and strategy.
16. Gao Guozhen and Ye Zheng, gOperational Doctrine Must Change Over
Time,h Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, November 20, 1996 in FBIS.
17. Li Xuanqing, Fan Juwei, and Su Kuoshan, gDefense Science and Technology
Forges Sharp Sword for National Defense\Second Roundup on Achievements
of Army Building Over the Past 50 Years,h Jiefangjun Bao, September 7, 1999, in
FBIS.
18. An incomplete list of events examined by the PLA cadre at the PLA
National Defense University and AMS includes, but is not limited to, the sale of
U.S. defense articles to Taiwan (1991-present), Operation DESERT STORM (1991),
Desert Hammer Exercise (1994), the Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995-96), and Operation
ALLIED FORCE (1999).
19. Michael Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Future Warfare.
356
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid. Also see discussions with Dr. Michael Pillsbury in summer 2003.
22. Thomas Christensen, gPosing Problems Without Catching Up,h
International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 10. For additional comments on the
gcounter-RMAh approach, also see Zhang Dejiufs excerpt of Major General Xu
Yanbinfs gAcademic Report at the National Defense University,h published under
the title gIn Depth Information Warfare Is Psychological Warfare,h Jiefangjun Bao,
August 13, 1996, in FBIS.
23. This movement was likely vindicated (from a Chinese perspective) as a
result of the strong U.S. military response to PLA operational exercises during the
1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis.
24. Zhang Dejiu.
25. Wu Chenguang, gPush Forward Military Transformation,h Nanfang
Zhoumo, June 12, 2003, in FBIS.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid. Also see Wang Baocun, gSubduing Enemy Force Without Battle and
Informationized War,h Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, May 4, 1999, pp. 60-63, in FBIS;
Peng Guangqian, gMeeting the Challenge of the New Military Transformation,h
Liaowang, No. 23, June 9, 2003, pp. 52-54, in FBIS.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. I am grateful to Dr. John Battilega for sharing his expertise on the impact
of Marxist dialectical materialism and use of the scientifi c method on military
affairs.
32. gBorrow a Corpse to Raise the Spirith: to gtake an institution, a technology,
or a method that has been forgotten or discarded and appropriate it for your own
purpose. To revive something from the past by giving it a new purpose, or to
reinterpret and bring to life old ideas, customs, and traditionsh (from http://www.c
hinastratagies.com).
33. Johnston, gToward Contextualizing the Concept of a Shashoujian,h p. 1.
357
34. Unattributed article, gTake the Road of Building Crack Troops with
Chinese Characteristics,h Ta Kung Pao, September 3, 1997, in FBIS; Yi Jan, gThe
Peoplefs Liberation Army Will Conduct Massive Anti-Hegemony Military Drill;
Breakthroughs Will Be Achieved in Deadly Equipment,h Ching Pao, No. 263,
June 1, 1999, in FBIS; Li Xuanqing, Fan Juwei, and Su Kuoshan, gDefense Science
and Technology Forges Sharp Sword for National Defense\Second Roundup on
Achievements of Army Building Over the Past 50 Years,h Jiefangjun Bao, September
7, 1999, in FBIS; Xu Hezhen, gFocus on Psychological War Under the Background
of Larger Military Strategy,h Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, October 20, 2000, p. 67-76, in
FBIS; Zhang Yining and Sun Kejia, gUnderstanding Development by Leaps in the
Build-Up of the Armed Forces,h Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, June 1, 2001, pp. 123-131,
in FBIS; Wang Congbiao, gStudying Jiang Zeminfs eOn Science and Technologyf,h
Jiefangjun Bao, February 13, 2001, in FBIS.
35. Chinafs 863 Program was a national-level program initiated in March
1986 to advance Chinese science and technology through indigenous research and
development, foreign acquisition, and other hybrid approaches as a component
of, and to achieve the objectives of, Deng Xiaopingfs gFour Modernizations.h
Some U.S. scholars believe it to have been responsive to President Ronald
Reaganfs Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program that was presented on March
23, 1983. See Su Enze, gObserver: e863f and Military Modernization,h Jiefangjun Bao
(Internet Version), February 28 2001, p. 9.
36. You Ji, gThe Evolution of Chinafs Maritime Combat Doctrines and Models:
1949-2001,h Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2002, p. 25. Also
see Dr. Youfs references to Zhang Youcai, gSeveral Issues Regarding Electronic
Warfare in a Landing Operationh and gResearch on Operational Command Under
High-Technology Conditions,h Beijing: PLA National Defense University, 1997,
pp. 327-333.
37. As identifi ed by Michael Pillsbury: Wang Pufeng, Information Warfare and
the Revolution in Military Affairs, Beijing: Military Sciences Press, 1995.
38. Wu Jianguo, gThe Nuclear Shadow in High-Technology Warfare Cannot
Be Ignored,h Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, November 20, 1995, in FBIS. Also, as identifi ed
by Michael Pillsbury: Shen Zhongchang, Zhou Xinsheng and Zhang Haiying, gA
Rudimentary Exploration of 21st Century Naval Warfare,h Zhongguo Junshi Kexue,
No. 1, February 20, 1995, pp. 28-32, in FBIS.
39. Xu Zhzhi, gJiang Zemin Deploys Highly Intelligent Defense System,h
Guang Jing Yuekan, March 1995.
40. Michael Pillsbury, Chinafs Military Strategy Toward the U.S., p. 12. Also see
General Pan Junfengfs essay, gSeveral Views on New Military Affairs,h Zhongguo
Junshi Kexue, Summer 1996, p. 111, translated in part by Dr. Michael Pillsbury in
358
China Debates the Future Security Environment, Washington, DC: National Defense
University Press, 2000, p. 70.
41. Interview with Dr. Michael Pillsbury, September 3, 2003.
42. Interview by Xu Bodong, Director of the Institute of Taiwan Studies, with
Major General Huang Bin, Professor of the PRC National Defense University,
published in Ta Kung Pao, May 13, 2002, in FBIS.
43. Ibid.
44. Michael Pillsbury, Chinafs Military Strategy Toward the U.S., p. 13.
45. Ibid., p. 12.
46. Sun Maoquing, gMake Efforts to Build Modernized Peoplefs Air Force\
Interview with Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Liu Shunyao,h Liaowang,
April 14, 1997 in FBIS.
47. Pillsbury, Chinafs Military Strategy Toward the U.S., p. 14.
48. gTake the Road of Building Crack Troops with Chinese Characteristics,h
Ta Kung Pao, September 3, 1997, in FBIS.
49. Tseng Hai-tao, gJiang Zemin Defi nes Cross-Century Military Strategy,h
Chiao Ching, August 16, 1998, in FBIS.
50. Fu Quanyou, gDeepen the Study of Characteristics and Laws of High-
Technology Local War and Raise the Standard of Guidance for Winning High-
Technology Local Wars of the Future,h Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, February 20, 1999,
pp. 6-14, in FBIS.
51. Yi Jan, gZhongnanhai Plans New Military Strategy,h Ching Pao, No. 284,
March 1, 2001, pp. 38-39. Also see Pei Fang, gMajor Operation to be Performed on
Military Logistical System,h Chiao Ching, March 16, 1999, pp. 50-52.
52. Zhang Jingfu is a former Secretary of the Party Committee of the Chinese
Academy of Sciences.
53. Yi Jan, gThe Peoplefs Liberation Army Will Conduct Massive Anti-
Hegemony Military Drill; Breakthroughs Will Be Achieved in Deadly Equipment,h
Ching Pao, No. 263, June 1, 1999, in FBIS.
54. As identifi ed by Dr. Michael Pillsbury: Wang Congbiao, gStudying Jiang
Zeminfs eOn Science and Technologyf,h Jiefangjun Bao, February 13, 2001, in FBIS.
359
55. Zheng Shuyan, gFu Quanyou Emphasizes at NPC Panel That It Is
Necessary to Make Solid Preparations for Military Struggles With Great Sense of
Political Responsibility and Urgency,h Jiefangjun Bao, March 8, 2000, in FBIS.
56. Cary Huang, gJiang Zemin Reportedly Urges the Development of Strategic
Weapons,h Hong Kong iMail (internet version) August 5, 2000.
57. Ibid.
58. gJiang Zemin Orders Effectual Preparations for Use of Force,h Ching Chi
Jih Pao, November 29, 2000.
59. Pillsbury, Chinafs Military Strategy Toward the U.S., p. 5.
60. Wen Jen, gRevealing Secrets of Beijingfs 998 State Security Project,h Tai
Yang Pao, June 13, 2000; and Cary Huang, Hong Kong iMail (Internet Version),
August 5, 2000, p. A3. Also from Pillsbury, see Wang Congbiao, gStudying Jiang
Zeminfs eOn Science and Technologyf,h Jiefangjun Bao, February 13, 2001 in FBIS.
61. Wang Congbiao.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid. According to the source, the components are as follows: gSet-up the
research and manufacture of new weapons to deal with new strategic tactics,
develop naval ship-launched missiles and cruise missiles, equip the troops ahead
of schedule with electron laser and light beam weapons, stop discussing the
issue of proliferation with the United States, revise some original policies on not
being the fi rst to use nuclear weapons, revise the improper policy on not forming
alliances or blocs.h
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Wen Jen, gBeijing Starts December 2 Strategic Weaponry Project,h Tai Yang
Pao, December 11, 2000, in FBIS. The information in the paragraph is all taken from
this source.
67. Wen Jen, gJiang Orders Hi-Tech Aerospace Weapons Development,h Tai
Yang Pao, March 21, 2000, in FBIS.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
360
70. Cheng Jian, gTake Information Warfare as a Starting Point of Military
Preparations,h Jiefangjun Bao, June 2, 1998.
71. Qiu Jichen, Cai Jicheng, and Gao Huai, gVigorously Strengthen the Armyfs
Quality Building in the New Period,h Jiefangjun Bao, August 27, 1998, p. 6.
72. An Weiping, gThoughts on Developing Armaments by Leaps and Bounds,
Jiefangjun Bao, April 6, 1999, in FBIS.
73. Pillsbury, Chinafs Military Strategy Toward the U.S., p. 14.
74. Tang Wu and Zhu Ruiqing, gLeading Cadre Should Set an Example in
Practicing the Three Represents\Roundup of the Study and Implementation
of Chairman Jiangfs Important Thinking on the Three Represents by Party
Committees at and Above the Army Level of the Armed Forces and the Armed
Police,h Jiefangjun Bao, June 3, 2000, in FBIS.
75. Fang Bin and Chen Zhenzhong, gFourth Research Institute Provides
Powerful Support for Fighting and Winning,h Huojianbao, July 2, 2002, in FBIS.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. Peng Guangqian, gMeeting the Challenge of the New Military
Transformation,h Liaowang, No. 23, June 9, 2003, in FBIS.
79. Yao Youzhi and Zhao Dexi, gThe Generalization, Conservation, and
Development of eStrategyf,h Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, September 30, 2001, pp. 120-
127, in FBIS.
80. Wang Baocun, gA Preliminary Analysis of Information Warfare,h
Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, November 20, 1997, pp. 102-111. Also see Peng Guangqian,
gMeeting the Challenge of the New Military Transformation,h and Li Zhangrui
and Liu Chunjun, gFirepower Cannot be Excluded from Information Warfare,h
Jiefangjun Bao, September 19, 2000, in FBIS.
81. Collected Works of Mao Zedong, Beijing, Renmin Chubanbshe, 1964, p. 456.
82. Collected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Beijing, Jiefang Chubanshe, 2nd edition,
Vol. 2, October 1994, p. 78.
83. Wang Congbiao, gStudying Jiang Zeminfs eOn Science and Technologyf,h
Guangzhou Yangcheng Wanbao, February 13, 2001, in FBIS.
361
84. Untitled article, Renmin Ribao, May 25, 2003. Also see Agence France Presse,
Beijing, May 25, 2003.
85. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, gPLA Seeks a New Leap Forward,h China Brief,
Jamestown Foundation, June 2, 2003, p. 1.
86. Zian Ruyi, Command Decision-making and Strategems, Beijing: Kunlun
Publishing House, 1999, in FBIS. Of course this focus on asymmetric efforts by a
weaker, poorly armed military to wage war against a larger and better armed foe
is not unique to China.
87. PLA scholarly literature since 1993 is replete with discussions and
examples.
88. The following PLA experts have made extensive efforts to study Chinese
military literature: Michael Pillsbury, Thomas Christensen, Mark Stokes, and
Timothy Thomas (Foreign Military Studies Offi ce, Ft. Leavenworth, KS).
89. See Mark A. Stokes, Chinafs Strategic Modernization: Implications for the
United States, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, p. 27. Also see Pillsbury,
Chinafs Military Strategy Toward the U.S., p. 8.
90. Yu Guangning, gA Comparison of Chinese and Western Geostrategic
Thinking,h Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, November 20, 1995, in FBIS.
91. Senior Colonel Huang Xing and Senior Colonel Zuo Quandian, gHolding
the Initiative in Our Hands in Conducting Operations, Giving Full Play to
Our Own Advantages to Defeat Our Enemy\A Study in the Core Idea of the
Operational Doctrine of the Peoplefs Liberation Army,h Zhongguo Junshi Kexue,
No. 4., November 20, 1996, pp. 49.56, in FBIS.
92. Yu Guohua, gOn Turning a Strong Force Into Weak and Vice Versa in a
Local High-Tech War,h Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, May 20, 1996, in FBIS.
93. Ibid.
94. Huang Lien-cheng, gThe PLA Makes All-Out Preparations for War with
Taiwan,h Ching Pao, No. 274, May 1, 2000, in FBIS.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. Huang and Zuo, gHolding the Initiative in Our Hands,h pp. 49-56.
362
98. Jia Weidong, gAsymmetrical War and Smart War,h Jiefangjun Bao, April
17, 1999, in FBIS.
99. Fan Chunglong, gStand in the Forefront of the New Military Revolution
in Deepening Troop Training Through Science and Technology,h Jiefangjun Bao,
April 4, 2000, in FBIS.
100. Pillsbury, Chinafs Military Strategy Toward the U.S., pp. 9-14.
101. Ibid., p. 9.
102. Huang and Zuo, gHolding the Initiative in Our Hands.h
103. Unsigned editorial, Jiefangjun Bao, June 22, 1999, p. 6.
104. Huang and Zuo, gHolding the Initiative in Our Hands.h
105. Niu Li, Li Jiangzhou, and Xu Duhui, gOn Information Warfare
Strategems,h Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, August 20, 2000, pp. 115-122, in FBIS.
106. Dong Guishan, gPursuing Development in Strides in Military Equipment
Construction Calls for New Trains of Thought\Several Points of Consideration
Regarding Our Armyfs Equipment Development and Support Guarantees,h
Jiefangjun Bao, May 30, 2000, in FBIS.
107. See Zhou Yi, gAircraft Carriers Face Five Major Assassins,h Junshi
Wenzhai, March 1, 2002, pp. 4-6, in FBIS.
108. Liu Jiangping, gLetfs Begin with the Crash of the MV-22 Osprey and
the Penetration in the USS Kittyhawk Defense Zone,h Jiefangjun Bao, February 14,
2001, in FBIS. Also see Zhou Jianguo and Xiao Wen, gA Breath-taking Scene from
the Sea of Japan: Russian Fighter Jets Conduct eSneak Attackf on U.S. Aircraft
Carrier,h Jiefangjun Bao (Internet Version), November 20, 2000, in FBIS.
109. Ibid.
110. Pillsbury, ed., China Debates the Future Security Environment, Washington,
DC: National Defense University Press, 2000, pp. 83-85.
111. Among numerous other articles, see Major General Guo Xilin, gThe
Aircraft Carrier Formation Is Not an Unbreakable Barrier,h Guangming Ribao
(Internet Version), December 26, 2000; Zhou Yi, gAircraft Carriers Face Five Major
Assassins,h Junshi Wenzhai, March 1, 2002, pp. 4-6; Feng Changsong, Xu Jiafeng,
and Wang Guosheng, gSix Aircraft Carrier Busters,h Zhongguo Guofang Bao, March
5, 2002, p. 4; Dong Hua, gAircraft Carrierfs Natural Enemy Anti-ship Missiles,h
363
Junshi Wenzhai, July 1, 2002, pp. 50-52; Xiao Yaojin and Chang Jiang, gChinafs
Existing Tactical Missiles Can Fully Meet the Need of a Local War Under High-
Tech Conditions,h Guangzhou Guangzhou Ribao (Internet Version), October 21,
2002.
112. Wang Jiasuo, gAircraft Carriers: Suggest You Keep Out of the Taiwan
Strait!,h Junshi Wenzhai, April 1, 2001, pp. 58-59, in FBIS.
113. Zhou Yi, gAircraft Carriers Face Five Major Assassins,h pp. 4-6.
114. Also see ibid., and Huang and Zuo, gHolding the Initiative in Our
Hands,h pp. 49-56.
115. Wen Jen, gSimultaneously Hitting Five Targets Five Thousand Kilometers
Away in Mid-December Test Firing,h Tai Yang Pao (Internet Version), December
25, 2000, in FBIS.
116. Chiang Shang-chou, gChinafs Naval Development Strategy\Building an
Offshore Defensive Naval Armed Force,h Kuang Chiao Ching, December 16, 1998,
in FBIS.
117. Lieutenant General Zhao Xijun, gVictory Without War and Modern
Deterrence Strategy,h Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, October 31, 2001, pp. 55-60, in FBIS.
118. Liu Xiaodu and Kang Fashun, gA Certain Brigade Builds Itself into an
All-round, Perfectly Masterful eAssassinfs Macef Unit,h Huojianbing Bao, May 25,
2002, in FBIS. Also see Liu Xiaodu and Wang Xuezhong, gCharging to Control the
High Ground of Training,h Huojianbing Bao, October 6, 2001, in FBIS.
119. Tseng Shu-wan, gChina Test-Fires A New Missile Which Cannot Be
Intercepted So Far,h Wen Wei Po, August 3, 1999, in FBIS.
120. Xu Hezhen, gFocus on Psychological War Under the Background of
Larger Military Strategy,h Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, October 20, 2000, p. 67-76.
Also see Wu Juncang and Zhang Qiangcheng, gThe Doctrine of Psychological
Operations in Ancient China,h Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, 2002, No. 5, pp. 88-94, in
FBIS.
121. Yuan Zhengling, gOn Conventional Deterrence,h Zhongguo Junshi Kexue,
September 30, 2001, in FBIS.
122. Tien Ping, gSpace for Readjustment in Nuclear Policy,h Hsiang Kang
Shang Pao, June 23, 2003, p. A2.
123. Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, eds., Zhanyi Xue (The Science of
Campaigns), Beijing: National Defense University Publishing House, May 2000,
364
pp. 168-182. Also see Liu Jun and Zhou Ruhong, gHow to Concentrate Capability
in Joint Operations,h Jiefangjun Bao, June 12, 2001, in FBIS.
124. Huang Xing and Zuo, gHolding the Initiative in Our Hands,h pp.
49-56. Also see Shen Zhongchang, Zhou Xinsheng and Zhang Haiying, gA
Rudimentary Exploration of 21st Century Naval Warfare,h Zhongguo Junshi Kexue,
No. 1, February 20, 1995, pp. 28-32; Major General Dai Qingmin, gInnovating and
Developing Views on Information Operations,h Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, August 20,
2000, pp. 72-77; and an untitled article by Lin Zheng published in Huoli Yu Zhihui
Kongzhi, Beijing: Ministry of Electronic Industries, October 1996, pp. 16-21.
125. Dai Qingmin, gOn Integrating Network Warfare and Electronic Warfare,h
Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, February 1, 2002, pp. 112-117, in FBIS. Also see Niu, Li, and
Xu, pp. 115-122.
126. Bao Guojun, gMilitary Expert Urges China to Promptly Eliminate eEra
Gapf in Military Technology\An Interview with Major General Wang Baocun,
Renowned Military Expert of the Academy of Military Science,h Tzu Ching, No.
153, June 1, 2003, pp. 57-60, in FBIS.
127. Sun Zian, gStrategies to Minimize the High-Technology Edge of the
Enemy,h Xiandai Bingqi, No. 8, August 8, 1995, in FBIS.
128. As an example, FBIS is not directed to routinely perform full-text
translations of the periodical Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, published by the AMS.
129. Chinese judgments concerning the performance of the U.S. military in
the 1950-1953 Korean War, the Vietnam confl ict, and the operations of the U.S.
military in the 1990s starkly contrast with U.S. assessments. These examples and
judgments are common in publicly available Chinese military literature.
130. Pillsbury, Dangerous Chinese Misperceptions.
131. Guo Anhua, gEvaluation and Thoughts on the Kosovo War Situation,h
Jiefangjun Bao, May 4, 1999, in FBIS.
132. Larry Wortzel, Chinafs Military Potential, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army
War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1998, pp. 20-22.
365

CHAPTER 11

THE FUTURE OF PLA MODERNIZATION:
BUMPS AND BOOSTERS

Ellis Joffe

After more than 2 decades of continuous but uneven efforts, the
Chinese leaders have transformed their armed forces from the huge
backward contingents of Maoist days into a modernizing army.
They have reformed all major areas of Chinafs conventional military
establishment and upgraded their nuclear capability.
Their achievements have been impressive. Most outstanding
has been the achievement of a capacity to deter or defeat a largescale
conventional or nuclear attack on China. However, this
objective was achieved more than a decade ago, after the Chinese
had substantially improved their existing weapons and acquired a
second-strike nuclear capability. And its achievement was due as
much to Chinafs natural assets as to its military development.
Since then, the Chinese have doubtless greatly strengthened this
capacity. However, they are still a long way from achieving their
most fundamental objectives outside China: to confi dently deter, or
defeat, American intervention in a war with Taiwan; to effectively
challenge U.S. military presence in the Pacifi c; and, over the long
haul, to acquire a military posture that will underpin recognition of
China as a great power.
The desire to attain these objectives--strengthened by the political
clout of the military and by Chinafs projected economic progress-
-ensures that Peoplefs Liberation Army (PLA) modernization will
continue in the coming decades. However, while this combination
sets the direction for the Chinese armed forces, it alone does not
determine the pace, scope, and content of military modernization.
These will be shaped by concrete circumstances that will infl uence
the modernization process as bumps or boosters.
External Realities.
While long-term aspirations may drive Chinafs military
modernization, its mode in a particular period has been determined
366
by a realistic assessment of Chinafs external situation. During the
Maoist period such an assessment was infused with a heavy dose of
ideology, which for 2 decades had blocked the advance of Chinafs
conventional forces due to Maoist reliance on a gpeoplefs warh and a
gpeoplefs armyh for defending China, and on foreign revolutionaries
to promote Chinafs external objectives. Shortly after the end of the
Maoist period, this approach was abandoned in favor of a focus on
military modernization.
However, despite the appalling backwardness of Chinese
conventional forces, their modernization in subsequent years has
been uneven in intensity and scope. While leadership statements
uniformly stressed the need for modernizing, on the ground there
were more compelling considerations.
The fi rst was the leadershipfs perception of external threats,
which determined the degree of urgency with which it viewed the
need to acquire military wherewithal. And throughout the period of
post-Mao modernization, only in a few instances did a heightened
sense of urgency accelerate the PLAfs military modernization: the
1995-96 crisis with Taiwan; the 1999 NATO bombing campaign
against Yugoslavia; and Taiwan President Lee Tenghuifs 1999
provocative declaration that Taiwan should be treated as a separate
state.
Even in these instances, the Chinese leadership did not perceive
a direct military threat to China from the United States, as it had,
for example, for a few years after the border clashes with the Soviet
Union in 1969. The improvement of relations with the United States
after 9/11/2001 has apparently reduced Chinese concerns that the
Bush Administration would lend support to provocative acts on the
part of the Taiwan government. Together with a growing feeling
among Chinese leaders (despite deep suspicion of Chen Shuibian)
that time is on their side on the Taiwan issue, the Chinese seem to
be much more relaxed regarding the danger of a war in the Strait.
How long this situation will last, and how it will affect military
modernization, remains to be seen, but for the time being it appears
to have removed a sense of military urgency from the Taiwan
situation.
However, such urgency could return quickly and drastically. This
could happen if, in the campaign leading up to the elections of 2004,
Taiwan President Chen Shuibian continues to provoke the Chinese
367
with statements that Taiwan is moving toward independence. If he
goes too far from Chinafs standpoint, major military action by the
Chinese to interdict this unacceptable trend should not be ruled
out.

Economic Uncertainties.

In the absence of a direct military threat to China, the
modernization of the PLA, for more than 10 years after Mao,
proceeded slowly and selectively. Despite the sorry state of its
weapons and equipment after 2 decades of neglect, and despite
proclamations about the need to change this situation, the leadership
focused primarily on improving the nontechnological areas of the
military establishment. The bulk of the PLAfs arsenal.especially
tanks and planes--were upgraded, not replaced, while new weapons
were purchased from abroad sparsely and in very small quantities.
There were several reasons for this policy, but the main one
was economic. The Deng leadership decided that economic and
technological progress would precede major military advances that
required fi nancial outlays. The result for the PLA was low military
budgets that not only severely hampered the conversion of its
armaments, but also created hardships in the daily life of its troops.
The military leadership complained about the shortage of funds but
accepted this policy--because it did not dispute Dengfs decisions,
because it was committed to Party control, but also because the
generals accepted the rationale behind the policy. The expectation,
however, was that once the economy advanced, the military would
receive more money.
The change came in 1989, after which the military budget grew
steadily. The catalyst was the Tiananmen crackdown and the desire
of Dengfs successor, Jiang Zemin, to curry favor with the generals.
But the underlying factor that facilitated these increases throughout
the 1990s and beyond has been Chinafs rapid economic growth. And
the anticipation of continued military modernization is based on the
assumption that the Chinese economy will continue to grow.
If it does, economic growth will be a strong booster to military
modernization. But what if it does not? After all Chinafs economic
progress, especially at the rapid pace needed to cope with social
368
problems, is not guaranteed, and economists do not rule out a
slowdown in varying degrees of severity. In assessing the future
course of PLA modernization, this possibility should also be taken
into account.
For the military, an even more important factor than the state
of the economy is their share of the national budget. From the
start of post-Mao modernization, the mantra repeated by political
and military leaders alike has been that economic development
must come before military advances because the economy is the
foundation on which national defense is built. However, this vague
formulation still leaves open the question of how much the generals
will get in a given year.
This will be determined by the condition of the economy and the
external situation. But no less important are the state of civil-military
relations and the position of the paramount leader.

Civil-Military Friction.

Until after the 16th Party Congress of 2002, it generally had been
expected by analysts that Party-Army relations would be based
on several premises. First, that the paramount Party leader would
continue to be head of the military hierarchy, as had been the case
since the founding of the Peoplefs Republic. Second, that Jiangfs
successor, Hu Jintao, would also continue to be an exceptionally
PLA-friendly paramount leader, because, like Jiang, he completely
lacked the personal authority that had enabled Mao and Deng to
dominate the military. And, third, that, like Jiang, Hu would work out
an arrangement with the military that would give them substantial
allocations and broad autonomy in return for their support.
This expectation was undermined by Jiang. By clinging to the
chairmanship of the Central Military Commission (CMC) even
when he had to give up his post as supreme Party leader, Jiang
caused the separation of political and military leaderships at the
very top. The result has been an untenable situation. It deprived
Hu, as paramount leader, of supreme formal command of the armed
forces and subordinated him to Jiang in the CMC. It deprived the
generals of unique access to the Standing Committee of the Politburo
that they had when the chairman of the CMC was also chairman
369
of the Standing Committee. And it abolished the unifi ed control
of the Party and the military by the paramount leader that had
been essential to the smooth cooperation between the political and
military leaderships.
The implications for the PLA of this unprecedented setup have
been signifi cant. It has generated or exacerbated tensions between
Hu and Jiang, and between the Party and the Army. It has made it
harder for the generals to present their case to the Partyfs highest
decisionmaking body. It has probably generated bad blood between
Hu and the generals who supported Jiang enthusiastically, which
will presumably leave a legacy even after Jiang retires and Hu
becomes chairman of the CMC. It has most likely caused splits in
the military between military leaders who have reservations about
Jiangfs chairmanship and those who have supported him fervently,
each group for its own reasons. And it may have even weakened
Jiangfs position, as refl ected in the fawning campaign to study
and implement the gthree representsh in the PLA, despite their
irrelevance to military affairs.
It is not clear how these frictions might infl uence the future
development of the PLA, but it is clear that they are harmful to
a harmonious relationship between the political and military
leaderships that is essential for a smooth and sustained modernization
drive. Such frictions will become particularly harmful if personal
rivalries become entangled with policy issues.

Policy Issues.

Policy differences over two issues surfaced again in 2003. The fi rst,
pertaining to economic versus military development, is not new, but
it undoubtedly drew fresh force from the tensions between Hu and
Jiang and between the Party and the Army. The second, pertaining
to the relation between conventional and information-based warfare
in PLA modernization, has presumably been reinvigorated by the
Iraq War and is limited to the military establishment, but might also
have ominous political overtones.
From its fi rst days, the Hu administration has played up its
sensitivity to social issues and to the need for more efforts to
alleviate social grievances. The decision to reduce the increase
370
in military spending, taken by the new Party leadership despite
the presumed dissatisfaction of Jiang and the military chiefs, was
probably designed to demonstrate this sensitivity.
Furthermore, in his only publicly-reported statement on military
policy, Hu placed military modernization in a subordinate position to
the nationfs central task of economic development and the building
of a prosperous society. On the other hand, statements attributed to
Jiang have placed military modernization on a par with social and
economic tasks.
Regarding PLA modernization, since the Iraq War, Jiang and
the military press have kept up a steady drumbeat of exhortations
on the need of the PLA to make a transition to information-based
warfare. Invoking the example of the stunning American victory
in Iraq, articles have emphasized that this transition cannot wait
for the completion of mechanization, but must be carried out
simultaneously. Other articles, moreover, have given precedence
to information-based warfare over mechanization, and have also
condemned offi cers who refuse to change their mindsets in line
with changing times. These are clearly the surface ripples of a major
debate on the future of the PLA.
The awareness that information technology is crucial in modern
warfare in not new in the PLA. In the late 1990s it had already
been discussed by Chinese military commentators, and in 2000
Jiang himself supposedly emphasized its importance as a force
multiplier. Following the Iraq war, information technology has shot
to new prominence in PLA commentaries, which portray Jiang as its
originator and staunchest advocate.
However, since Jiang is not a military thinker or innovator, it
is obvious that he has formed an alliance with generals who favor
a rapid transition to an information-driven PLA. The Iraq War has
clearly given them fresh ammunition to demand new technologies.
For Jiang, this alliance has probably provided an opportunity to
shore up his personal position and to leave a much-coveted mark on
the military.
This does not portend a new PLA surge to information-based
warfare. Most of the articles that call for a transition explain in detail
why information technology is decisive in war and how the United
States exploited it in Iraq, but, beyond general pep talks on the need
371
to adopt it, they are vague on what the PLA should do. The few
commentaries that are more concrete emphasize that the PLA must
continue mechanizing, while the transition to information-driven
warfare, given Chinafs resources, has to be gradual and limited.
Furthermore, the new stress on information-based warfare has
generated resistance that is apparently coming from the ground
forces. This possibly derives from a combination of reasons.
One, ground force generals may believe in continued reliance on
fi repower over information power. Second, they probably have a
vested interest in opposing the transition, which involves troop
cutbacks, control centralization, and abolition of command levels.
Finally, it is exceptionally diffi cult to change any army, and the
Chinese army is particularly resistant to change due to entrenched
traditions, cultural patterns, and personal ties.
In sum, the Chinese army is changing, but, it is not moving into
the information age by gleaps and bounds.h Differences among its
leaders as to how it should change are not going to speed up the
process.

373

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

KENNETH W. ALLEN is a Senior Analyst at the Center for Naval
Analyses Corporation, a nonprofi t research and analysis organization. He
was previously a Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center and the
Executive Vice-President of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council. During
his 21-year career in the U.S. Air Force, he was an Assistant Air Force
Attache in China and also worked for the Defense Intelligence Agency. He
has written extensively on Chinafs air force and Chinafs foreign military
relations.
JASON E. BRUZDZINSKI is a specialist on defense policy, military
strategy and intelligence matters with more than a decade of Washington
experience. Currently a Senior Professional Staff Member at the MITRE
Corporation, Bruzdzinski provides consultative and technical support
for the U.S. Government on a variety of national security-related issues.
Bruzdzinski was previously a Senior Consultant in the Government
Services practice of Arthur Andersen, LLP. where he led teams supporting
the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Agencies and the U.S. Intelligence
Community. Bruzdzinski also served the U.S. Congress for nearly four
years on the Professional Staff of the U.S. House of Representatives.
Committee on Armed Services, and as a Research Analyst in the offi ce of
former Senator and Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen. Bruzdzinski
has conducted research on U.S. national security affairs at some of
Washingtonfs most prominent public policy research organizations,
including: The American Enterprise Institute, The Johns Hopkins Foreign
Policy Institute, The Heritage Foundation, and The Asia Pacifi c Policy
Center. Concurrent with his civilian career, Bruzdzinski serves at the
rank of Lieutenant, as a Special Duty Offi cer, in the U.S. Navy (Reserve).
Assignments have included tours at the Offi ce of Naval Intelligence,
Naval Air Facility-Pensacola, Navy-Marine Corps Intelligence Training
Center, Fleet Intelligence Training Center Pacifi c, Offi ce of the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Naval War College, and three tours
at the Defense Attache Offi ce of the U.S. Embassy (Beijing). Bruzdzinski
conducted U.S.-PRC military-to-military relations research as a Visiting
Fellow at the U.S. National Defense University from 1998.2001. He holds
an M.A in National Security Studies from Georgetown Universityfs
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and an A.B. in Government
from St. Lawrence University in upstate New York.
374
EVAN S. MEDEIROS is currently a Political Scientist at the RAND
Corporation in the Washington, DC offi ce. He specializes in research on
Chinafs foreign and national security policies. Prior to joining RAND, Dr.
Medeiros was a Senior Research Associate for East Asia at the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
During 2000, he was a visiting fellow at the Institute of American Studies
at the China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in Beijing and an adjunct
lecturer at Chinafs Foreign Affairs College.
DEAN CHENG has spent over a decade studying Chinese and Asian
security and economic issues. He is currently a Research Analyst with
Project Asia at the CNA Corporation, where he specializes in Chinese
security issues. Prior to joining CNA, he was a senior Asia analyst with
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). Mr. Cheng has also
worked with the U.S. Congress Offi ce of Technology Assessment, and the
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. Mr. Cheng has written extensively
on Chinese security issues, including commentaries in China OnLine, and
chapters in several books examining aspects of Chinafs economy and
defense policy.
JOHN F. CORBETT, JR., is a Senior Analyst with CENTRA Technology,
Inc., specializing in China, Taiwan, and Asian security issues. He retired
as a colonel after serving 29 years as a U.S. Army Military Intelligence/
China Foreign Area Offi cer. Colonel Corbettfs last Army position was as
Senior Country Director for China and Taiwan in the Offi ce of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. During his military
career, he served in a variety of operational, intelligence, and policy
positions in the 82d Airborne Division, U.S. Army Pacifi c, and Defense
Intelligence Agency. Colonel Corbett also served as an Army Attache in
Beijing from 1986-88 and in Hong Kong from 1992-98. He has published
articles in The China Quarterly and The China Strategic Review. Colonel
Corbett is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, the Armed Forces
Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College, and holds M.A. degrees in
Political Science and Asian Studies from the University of Hawaii.
JOSEPH FEWSMITH is Professor of International Relations at Boston
University and Director of the East Asian Interdisciplinary Studies
Program. He is the author of Party, State and Local Elite in Republican China:
Merchant Organizations and Politics in Shanghai, 1890-1930 (1985), The
Dilemmas of Reform in China: Political Confl ict and Economic Debate (1994),
Elite Politics in Contemporary China (2000), and China Since Tiananmen: The
375
Politics of Transition (2001). He has written extensively on contemporary
politics in China, with articles appearing in such journals as Asian Survey,
Current History, Journal of Contemporary China, Problems of Communism,
Modern China, China Journal, China Quarterly, and Comparative Studies in
Society and History.
KEN GAUSE is a Senior Research Analyst at the Center for Strategic Studies
of the CNA Corporation in Alexandria, VA. He has spent the last 20 years
focusing on issues related to leadership structures around the world. He
has done extensive research on authoritarian regimes, such as North Korea
and China. Mr. Gause has written over 200 articles, which have appeared
in such publications as Janefs Intelligence Review, RUSIfs China Military
Update, SP Military Yearbook (Indiafs premier defense journal), and The
Worldwide Government Report.
ELIZABETH HAGUE analyses Chinese leadership and political-military
affairs at the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Before joining DoD
in 2000, she worked in the Voice of Americafs East Asia Division and
Mandarin Service. She received her MA in East Asian Studies (China) from
Stanford University in 1998 and her Bachelorfs in East Asian Languages
and Literatures from Bates College in 1992. She lived in Taiwan and China
for four years and speaks fl uent Mandarin.
ELLIS JOFFE is Professor of Chinese Studies at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem and a Senior Fellow at the Truman Research Institute at that
university. He was educated in Jerusalem, Hong Kong, and at Harvard
University. Among Dr. Joffefs works are Party and Army: Professionalism
and Political Control in the Chinese Offi cer Corps, 1949-1964 (1965), The Chinese
Army After Mao (1987), and many articles in journals and books.
MARYANNE KIVLEHAN-WISE is an Asia Security Analyst at the CNA
Corporationfs gProject Asia.h A specialist in Chinese politics, foreign
policy, and Chinafs new generation of leaders, she also recently published
an in-depth study of the political, legal, economic, environmental, and
security dimensions of the South China Sea entitled The South China Sea,
a Regional Survey, and co-authored a study entitled Institutional Reforms of
the Chinese Peoplefs Liberation Army: Overview and Challenges. She holds
an MA in Security Policy Studies from the Elliott School of Foreign Affairs
at the George Washington University, and is a graduate of the Hopkins-
Nanjing Center for Chinese and American Studies, as well Capital Normal
University in Beijing, where she studied Mandarin. Before joining the
CNA Corporation, she worked for an international nonprofi t organization
376
directing projects on Chinese, Mongolian, and Russian affairs. She also
spent time in Bosnia working with the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in support of the 1997 municipal elections.
JAMES R. LILLEY is Senior Fellow in Asian studies at the American
Enterprise Institute. Mr. Lilley was the U.S. Ambassador to the Peoplefs
Republic of China from 1989 to 1991 and to the Republic of Korea from
1986 to 1989. He served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs from 1991 to 1993. Mr. Lilley wrote the forewords for the
AEI publications Chinese Military Modernization, Over the Line, and Chinafs
Military Faces the Future. He is also the coeditor of Beyond MFN: Trade
with China and American Interests and Crisis in the Taiwan Strait. He has just
published his memoirs: China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage,
and Diplomacy in Asia, available in English and Chinese.
JAMES C. MULVENON, a Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation
in Washington, DC, is a specialist on the Chinese military. His current
research focuses on Chinese strategic weapons doctrines (information
warfare and nuclear warfare), theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD) in
Asia, Chinese military commercial divestiture, and the military and civilian
implications of the information revolution in China. He is the author of
Soldiers of Fortune: The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Military-Business Complex,
1978-1998 (2001); and other publications. Dr. Mulvenon received his Ph.D.
in political science from the University of California, Los Angeles.
ANDREW SCOBELL was born and raised in Hong Kong. He joined the
Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) in August 1999 and is SSIfs specialist on
Asia. He taught at the University of Louisville, Kentucky, and Rutgers
University, New Jersey. He is the author of Chinafs Use of Military Force:
Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (2003). Dr. Scobell holds a Ph.D.
in Political Science from Columbia University.
MURRAY SCOT TANNER is Professor of Political Science at Western
Michigan University. Currently on a leave of absence, he is a senior
political scientist at the RAND Corporation in Washington, DC. He has
published widely on Chinese politics, in particular leadership politics and
succession, the dilemmas of legal reform, policing, internal security and
political stability. His articles have appeared in such journals as Comparative
Politics, China Quarterly, China Journal, Problems of Post Communism, Current
History, and others. He is also the author of The Politics of Lawmaking in
Post-Mao China: Institutions, Processes, and Democratic Prospects (1998).
377
JOHN J.TKACIK, JR., has been Research Fellow in Asian Studies at The
Heritage Foundation specializing in China since 2001. Of his 24-year
career in the U.S. State Department, 15 were spent in China- and Taiwanrelated
assignments, including tours in Taipei, Peking (now Beijing), Hong
Kong and Guangzhou, and in the Department as Chief of China Analysis
in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He left the State Department in
1994 and was Vice-President of RJR-Nabisco China based in Hong Kong.
In 1998, he returned to Washington where he formed a small consulting
operation called gChina Business Intelligenceh which published the
gTaiwan Weekly Business Bulletinh for China Online. He has BSFS in
International Relations from Georgetown University and a Masterfs in
Public Administration from Harvard University.
LARRY M. WORTZEL is Vice-President for Foreign Policy and Defense
Studies for the Heritage Foundation and a member of the U.S.-China
Security Review Commission. He retired in November 1999 as a colonel
in the U.S. Army after 32 years of military service. During his military
career, he served in infantry and intelligence positions in Morocco, Korea,
Thailand, Singapore, and China. Dr. Wortzel also served in the Offi ce of
the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Pacifi c Command, and on the Department
of the Army Staff. His last position before retiring was as Director of the
Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. Dr. Wortzel is
the author of two books on China and has edited and contributed to two
other books, as well as many journal articles and monographs. Dr. Wortzel
earned a B.A. from Columbus College, Georgia, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in
Political Science at the University of Hawaii.