THE SECRETS OF HEZBOLLAH'S SUCCESS

"We are in a world today where we have a non-state actor
using all the tools of weaponry...
Thats what this new 21st-century warfare is going to look
like.
We have now entered an era where non-states or quasi-states
do a lot better militarily than states do."
Peter Singer (Brookings, author of "Corporate Warriors")
in reference to Hezbollah's performance against the Israeli military.
From a NYTimes article by Thom Shanker.
Global
Guerilla
Infosearch:
José Cadenas
Bureau Chief
Research Dept.
La Nueva Cuba
July 30, 2006
Although Peter Singer's statement is likely unsupported, he does
stumble onto a conclusion that captures the essence of the moment.
Hezbollah's performance in a set-piece battle with the Israeli military
(arguably, pound for pound, the best conventional military in the
world) is an excellent example of how non-state groups have radically
improved their ability to conduct tactical and strategic operations.
To wit, the continued success of its efforts has put the Israelis
on the horns of a dilemma: either request a ceasefire or push for
a full invasion of southern Lebanon (each fraught with disastrous
consequences).
Organizational
Improvements
The central
secret to Hezbollah's success is that it trained its (global) guerrillas
to make decisions autonomously (classic 4GW), at the small group
level. In every area -- from firing rockets to defending prepared
positions to media routing around jamming/disruption -- we have
examples of Hezbollah teams deciding, adapting, innovating, and
collaborating without reference to any central authority. The result
of this decentralization is that Hezbollah's aggregate decision
cycles are faster and qualitatively better than those of their Israeli
counterparts.
Hybrid Methods/Systems
Ancillary to
the improvements in organizational design (unlikely to be replicated
at the state level), Hezbollah also demonstrated its ability to
supercharge antiquated conventional weaponry/tactics with off-the-shelf
technology to create weapons systems and hybrid tactics attuned
to defeating Israeli military systems. We can expect to see this
behavior accelerate among non-state groups as readily available
commercial technology continues its pace of radical improvement.
Extracting
an Economic Toll
Hezbollah's
success against Israel codifies two strategic methods that we will
see global guerrillas emulate. The first is the value of strategic
coercion through economic attrition. Ongoing disruption of the Israeli
economy through rocket attacks attaches a quantifiable strategic
cost to the conflict. This offensive decision decisively broke the
barrier between ancillary actions by professional militaries against
non-state groups and domestic economic activity (business as usual).
With the economic clock ticking (to the tune of hundreds of millions
of dollars a day), Israel has been forced into an aggressive air
campaign to accelerate progress on the ground against missile launch
sites and interdict resupply of new missiles from Syria. This air
campaign has backfired due to the asymmetry of targets, in that
Israeli air strikes have alienated the Lebanese government and increased
the moral cohesion of its foes.
Leveraging
force protection and an aversion to casualties
A second strategic
method is to trade territory (something a non-state organization
is easily able to ante up) for the blood of professional soldiers
and delay. The intent is demonstrated by Hezbollah's dispersal of
units across a wide geographic area in small autonomous units (defense
in depth, rather than concentrating its defenses along the border).
This deployment clearly shows Hezbollah's willingness to trade ground
for the lives of Israeli soldiers and time. It succeeds by leveraging
the aversion to casualties and dedication to force protection found
in modern Western militaries (these men are professionally educated
and therefore considered too valuable for use as cannon fodder).
An aversion to casualties ensures that assaults conventional militaries
will bog down if faced with stiff opposition, until intense applications
of firepower to clear the path (which is made much less effective
due to Hezbollah's high level of dispersion and fortifications).
Time is a factor that clearly works particularly in the favor of
Hezbollah (due to the potential of a widening conflict) and more
generally in favor of any non-state group fighting a state.
|